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ABSTRACT

WHERE IS OUR REVOLUTION?: WORKERS IN CIUDAD JUAREZ AND PARRAL-SANTA
BARBARA DURING THE 1930s

Andres Hijar, PhD
Department of History
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Rosemary Feurer, Director

This dissertation explores the way workers on the border in Ciudad Juárez and in the mining
district of Parral-Santa Barbara increased their power during the 1930s. Unionization, collective
bargaining, labor tribunals, political alliances, and direct action gave workers control of crucial aspects of
the production process for the first time in the nation’s history. Furthermore, workers’ efforts allowed
them to extend their power beyond the workplace and into the community. In some instances, workers
were radicalized, especially in the border city. To attenuate workers’ rising power, political and economic
elites intervened in labor conflicts in different ways depending on the interests of the elites in the location
under study.
Political elites’ intervention in some cases deradicalized miners, but it also allowed them to
increase their power against The American Smelting and Refinement Company (ASARCO). In Ciudad
Juárez, workers’ rising power and radicalization resulted in a violent response from political and
economic elites, which eventually reversed workers’ victories during the 1920s and 1930s. The Lázaro
Cárdenas presidency supported workers in both the border and the mining district, but failed to rein in
political and economic elites’ actions against workers in Juárez, who guarded their interests above those
of workers through violence and illegal means.
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INTRODUCTION
How and to what extent did workers increase their power after the Mexican Revolution?
That is the central inquiry of this dissertation, which asks how workers struggled to make the
Revolution their own. This dissertation explores two different areas of Chihuahua, Mexico, the
cradle of the Revolution, to address this question. It focuses on workers in the border city of
Ciudad Juárez and in the mining region of Parral-Santa Barbara, also known as the Hidalgo
Mining District. It also addresses the following questions: What were the tangible gains for
workers after the Revolution? What was the role of local, state, and federal officials? To what
extent did federations of organized labor and its leadership shape or limit workers’ identities
along class lines after the Revolution? What kind of tactics and strategies did workers use to
increase their power, and did these differ depending on the location? What role did radicalism
play (or not) in either of these areas? What was the extent of intra-class divisions among
workers?
This exploration of these two areas of Chihuahua adds to our existing knowledge
regarding the different ways in which the Revolution increased workers’ power, and the role that
place, as well as regional and global power played. The resulting analysis will help us understand
why some regions developed a more enduring labor movement than others. Moreover,
examining different regions within Chihuahua, where the Revolution took center stage, will help
us determine whether Chihuahua’s workers benefited in any way from the Revolution.
Furthermore, examining two areas in Chihuahua allows for thinking about the contours of these
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developments within diverging bases of workers and industries. The production of a
major global extractive commodity, in this case silver, defined the Hidalgo Mining District,
while Ciudad Juárez was one of the most important border cities in Mexico, one whose main
economic activity depended on U.S. political and economic interests. Examining these two areas
will allow us to see the effect and limits of the Revolution on workers. The Revolution did not
take place in a vacuum: the interests of foreign capital, mainly U.S., also contributed to these
post-revolutionary changes. Moreover, the Revolution was also contextualized by the
experiences of workers who crossed the border to the United States and experienced life as
laborers in that country before the 1930s. Finally, the comparison will help us understand local
political and economic elites’ contrasting behavior towards workers in both areas, and how their
power could dictate workers’ eventual success, or lack thereof.
The focus on the role of place stems from the argument that Mexico’s history is the sum
of its parts. As a result, the most effective examinations would have to take into account a deep
understanding of each region. Historian Mark Wasserman, in his landmark study of Chihuahua
before the Revolution, highlighted the importance of examining specific locales in Mexico to
understand the changes that certain watershed events, in this case the Revolution, brought to
specific communities: “Mexican history, from Independence to Revolution, is a narrative of
regions and locales.”1 This study follows Wasserman’s methodology by examining workers’
roles at the local level after the Revolution. 	
  

1

	
  Mark Wasserman, Capitalists, Caciques and Revolution: The Native Elite and Foreign Enterprises in Chihuahua,
Mexico, 1854-1911 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1984), 19.
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Historiography
This is the first study examining workers in the mining region of Parral-Santa Barbara, or
in Ciudad Juárez after the Revolution. This study thus adds to a significant number of regional
studies examining workers in pre- and post-revolutionary Mexico. These studies show
radicalism’s influence on workers’ identities and behaviors, and workers’ struggles to wrest
control of the workplace away from owners and business operators during the 1930s.
Labor historians have studied specific regions and industries to address questions similar
to mine. Jeffrey Bortz’s, Revolution within the Revolution: Cotton Textile Workers and the
Mexican Labor Regime (2008), utilizes a comparative regional approach to analyze workers in
his study of the Puebla and Veracruz textile workers. Bortz examines workers’ efforts to
effectively control the workplace through the use of direct action and unionization. He concludes
that textile workers controlled the workplace vis-à-vis business operators once they organized
into unions and showed a willingness to rely on direct action. The comparison allowed Bortz to
establish revolutionary principles among workers in the textile regions of Puebla and Veracruz.
While Bortz examined only textile workers, his methodology comparing workers in two different
regions allowed him to see the changes beyond specific locales.	
  Juan Luis Sariego’s comparative
study of the coal region in La Laguna and the copper district of Cananea, Enclaves y Minerals en
el Norte de México, historia social de los mineros de Cananea y Nueva Rosita 1900-1970
(1984), demonstrates labor’s ability to transform longstanding power structures under similar
conditions to those present in Parral-Santa Barbara during the 1930s, and it remains one of the
few studies that examines extractive industry workers after the Revolution in northern Mexico.
Similar to the mining region in Parral-Santa Barbara in terms of its status as an extractive
community connected to the global economy, especially in the case of Cananea, Sariego
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demonstrates concrete improvements among the labor force and their communities in these two
regions once they organized into unions. Sariego shows tangible gains in workers’ power once
they began bargaining collectively for better wages, adequate housing, schools, hospitals, and
other essentials that they lacked before the Revolution.2
Other regional studies have shown the significant presence of radicalism among workers.
Historian Michael Snodgrass’ study of urban workers in highly industrialized Monterrey, Nuevo
Leon, Deference and Defiance in Monterrey: Workers, Paternalism, and the Revolution in
Mexico (2003), demonstrates significant communist influence among workers in the highly
developed steel industry during the 1930s. Snodgrass also looks at steel workers’ identities and
concludes that despite competing messages, steel workers in Monterrey adopted radical labor
tenets in an effort to further the changes brought about by the Revolution. For Mexico City,
Bakers and Basques: A Social History of Bread in Mexico (2012), shows the bakers’ proclivity to
join anarchist and Communist federations after the Revolution. Organized bakers eventually
became one of the largest and most radical organized groups in the nation. John Lear’s
investigation of workers in Mexico City during and after the Revolution, Workers, Neighbors,
and Citizens: The Revolution in Mexico City (2001), also demonstrates workers’ inclination to
adopt anarchist principles once they organized into unions. Myrna I Santiago’s investigation of
the rich oil area of Tamaulipas, The Ecology of Oil (2006), demonstrates the presence of
Industrial Workers of the World, hereafter referred to as IWW, organizers among the unionized
workforce in the area going back to the early 1920s, showing significant influence of radical
labor principles among workers in northern Mexico. For the state of Jalisco, Joseph Green’s
2

Jeffrey Bortz, Revolution within the Revolution: Cotton Textile Workers and the Mexican Labor Regime (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2008), Juan Luis Sariego, Enclaves y Minerals en el Norte de Mexico, historia social de
los mineros de Cananea y Nueva Rosita 1900-1970 (Ediciones de la Casa Chata, 1984).

5	
  

2006 dissertation reveals Jalisco miners’ significant ties with Communists in the 1920s. Andrew
Grant Wood’s, Revolution in the Street: Women, Workers, and Urban Protests in Veracruz
(2001), demonstrates that workers in the state of Veracruz used anarchist principles and tactics,
as well as the influence of Communist leaders in the 1921-1922 tenant strike movement in the
state of Veracruz.3
These examinations at the local level have resulted in an important cluster of studies,
which have concluded that the Revolution increased workers’ power. These studies account for
the importance of local, state, and federal authorities in workers’ ability to articulate their
demands; nevertheless, these studies have also critiqued previous histories that relate workers’
movements to state formation, and contest the majority of investigations that purport to
demonstrate epic failures on the part of organized labor to remain autonomous and combative
prior to and after the pro-labor presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas in 1940.
Two of these works that downplay labor’s impact are Adrian Bantjes’, As if Jesus Walked
on Earth (1998), and Ben Fallaw’s, Cárdenas Compromised (1991). Bantjes argues that
organized labor, despite its best efforts, failed to change or even modify power structures in
Sonora (the state neighboring Chihuahua). Bantjes also stresses the limits of President Lázaro
Cárdenas’ power by showing the way that local elites, in compliance with local and state
authorities, effectively stopped Cárdenas’ education and labor reforms in Sonora. Similarly,
Fallaw examines the failure of land reform in the Henequen-rich (twine) region of the Yucatán in
3

Michael Snodgrass, Deference and Defiance in Monterrey: Workers, Paternalism, and the Revolution in Mexico
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), Robert Weis, Bakers and Basques: A Social History of Bread in Mexico
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2012), John Lear, Workers, Neighbors, and Citizens: The
Revolution in Mexico City (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), Myrna I. Santiago, The Ecology of Oil:
Environment, Labor and the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
Joseph Howard Green, “Workers, Peasants, and State-building During the Mexican Revolution: The case of Jalisco,
1910-1940,” (PhD dissertation, University of California Riverside, 2006), and Andrew Grant Wood, Revolution in
the Street: Women, Workers, and Urban Protest in Veracruz, 1870-1927 (Wilmington Delaware: Scholarly
Resources, 2001).
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the Mexican southeast. He shows the way local elites wielded their power and prevented
Cárdenas’ operators (themselves elites who, according to Fallaw, excluded certain members of
the community from participating in the process) from transforming the way labor relations took
place in the state. These studies critique workers’ reliance on the state to arbitrate labor conflict
and uphold the law, which eventually resulted in a loss of their newly found, yet short-lived
power once government officials at all levels opposed or neglected workers’ interests. Other
scholars, like Nora Hamilton, have argued that Mexico’s dependence on foreign capital curtailed
Cárdenas from successfully implementing his pro-labor and agrarian initiatives.4
The aforementioned regional studies downplaying organized labor’s autonomy
complement the historiography examining workers at the national level. These studies have
argued that the co-optation of the post-revolutionary labor movement by the state took time, but
eventually resulted in labor’s loss of independence, and undermined workers’ ability to use direct
action to influence authorities and business operators throughout Mexico.5 They discuss the rise
of corrupt leadership among unions as one of the consequences of labor’s decision to rely on the
government as arbitrator and as a source of economic support. Scholars, including Fallaw and
Bantjes, also refer to powerful local political and economic elites whose interests directly clashed
with those of the workers as the main source inhibiting their success.
These scholars argue that Cárdenas failed to prevent these corrupting forces from
intervening in labor conflicts and hindering workers’ accrual of political power. Some date these
4

Adrian Bantjes, As If Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora and the Mexican Revolution (Wilmington Del.:
Scholarly Resources, 1998), and Ben Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised: The Failure of Reform in Postrevolutionary
Yucatán (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991) argues that Cárdenas’ efforts to establish certain revolutionary
principles among workers faced significant obstacles at the local level from local elites. For an international take of
Cárdenas, see Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-revolutionary Mexico (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982).
5
Norman Caulfield, Mexican Workers and the State: From the Porfiriato to NAFTA (Forth Worth: Texas University
Press, 1998), 76.
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corrupting forces to the Revolution itself, and workers’ relationships to power. Examinations of
workers during and after the Revolution have highlighted organized labor’s decision to ally with
the government, and its minimal role in radicalizing the Revolution as evidence of workers’ lack
of revolutionary commitment. Referring to workers’ role in the actual armed phase of the
conflict, which lasted from 1910 to 1920, historian Alan Knight argues that “it was not a
workers’ revolution,”6 despite the presence of armed workers, called red battalions, during the
height of the Revolution. Albeit that these battalions represented a minority among the reformist
wing of the Revolutionary war machine, but they do show that workers’ efforts to affect the
outcome of the Revolution included joining the war effort. Knight’s position also ignores the
significant political influence some unions and federations had at the local level during the
revolutionary years.7
But even historians like Alan Knight, despite claims that the Revolution was not a
workers’ one, admit that in certain locales, workers’ contributions to the revolutionary movement
were significant even in the 1920s. Most historians have accepted the 1930s as the decade in
which workers achieved tangible benefits. Evidence suggests that this was a result of the
struggles in the early 1920s in certain urban areas, mineral enclaves, including “the capital, the
major ports (Veracruz, Tampico, Acapulco), and communities in the border zone (Chihuahua,
6

Alan Knight, “The Working Class and the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1920,” Journal of Latin American Studies 16,
no. 1 (May 1984): 51. In this particular article, Knight argues that the Mexican Revolution was not a miners’
revolution, and that organized labor in their eagerness to access power and form alliances, traded independence and
principles. See also, “The Rise and Fall of Cardenismo,” in Mexico since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethall (N.Y.:
Cambridge University Press, 1991) argues that organized labor’s independence and short-lived power resulted from
the federal government’s efforts, headed by Cárdenas, to include them. See also,”Cardenismo: Juggernaut or
Jalopy,” Journal of Latin American Studies 26, no. 1 (Jan 1994): 73-107, in which the author argues that Cárdenas,
despite his good intentions, paved the road for the existing way of channeling discontent, which gave the state
effective mechanisms to direct it. For pre-Cárdenas, see Ramón Eduardo Ruiz, Labor and the Ambivalent
Revolutionaries, Mexico, 1911-1923 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
7

Ruth Marjorie Clark, La Organización Obrera en Mexico (Ediciones Era, 1979), 53-82, and Caulfield, Mexican
Workers and the State, 36-40.	
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Juárez, Cananea).” 8 These areas were most affected by labor’s influence before the 1930s, and
this thus constitutes a reason to study them carefully.
At the national level, two leading studies that examine Cárdenas’ rhetoric and policies
have also shown that during the 1930s, his government (1934-1940) successfully integrated
organized labor into the local, state, and national political landscape as an influential force.
Adolfo Gilly demonstrates that Cárdenas’ oil, agrarian, and labor reforms, as well as the unions’
contribution to them, had no parallel in Mexico’s history, making his a pro-worker presidency.
Arnaldo Córdova also shows the widespread level of unionization that workers experienced
during this decade. However, he points out that the workers’ eventual acceptance of the state as
arbitrator in labor conflicts began the corporatization of the labor movement, which undermined
their autonomy. Córdova also argues that the extraordinary mobilization of previously
disadvantaged sectors of the Mexican population in the 1930s had no precedent in Mexican
history. 9	
  
The historiography examining organized labor thus remains divided alongside
interpretive, geographical, and chronological lines. Whether workers benefited from the
Revolution depends on the locale, the period under examination, and the way scholars frame and
define the benefits workers’ achieved after the Revolution. 	
  

8

Alan Knight, “The Working Class and the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1920,” Journal of Latin American Studies
16, no. 1 (May 1984): 53.
9
Arnaldo Córdova, La politica de masas del Cardenismo (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1994) and Adolfo Gilly, El
Cardenismo: Una utopia Mexicana (Mexico D.F.: Cal y Arena, 1994).

Chihuahua
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The historiography on Chihuahua derives from its importance in Mexico’s history. That
importance in turn derives from its geographical location, size, natural resources, provincial
elites, and constant rebellions, including the Revolution of 1910, which officially began in
Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua.10 As a result of its sheer size, some regions in the state have received
more attention than others. Most of the pre-revolutionary historiography has examined the
Guerrero district, located in the Midwest of the state, largely because of its early importance as
the cradle of the first revolutionaries.11 Until recent events highlighting the murder of thousands
of women and the brutal drug war, scholars researching Ciudad Juárez have focused their
examinations on elites’ influences on the border and the economic development of the city.12
Recently, the transformations caused by the introduction of maquiladoras (transnational

10

For information on authors arguing for Chihuahua as the cradle of the Revolution, see Alan Knight, The Mexican
Revolution Vol. 1: Porfirians, Liberals, Peasants (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Mark
Wasserman, Persistent Oligarchs (Duke University Press, 1993), and Capitalists, Caciques and Revolution: The
Native Elite and Foreign Enterprise in Chihuahua, Mexico, 1854-1911 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1984). For more information on Chihuahuas’ pre-revolutionary revolts see, Paul Vanderwood, The Power of
God and the Guns of Government: Religious Upheaval in Mexico at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century, (Stanford
University Press, 1998), Jesus Vargas, Maximo Castillo y la Revolución Mexicana (Nueva Vizcaya Editores, 2003),
Francisco R. Almada, La Revolución en el Estado de Chihuahua, Tomo I, (Instituto Nacional de Estudios Historicos
de la Revolución Mexicana, 1964), Jane-Dale Lloyd, “Rancheros and Rebellion: The Case of Northwestern
Chihuahua, 1905-1909,” Maria Teresa Koreck, “Space and Revolution in Northeastern Chihuahua”, and, “US.
Military Interventions, Revolutionary Mobilization, and Popular Ideology in the Chihuahua Sierra, 1916-1971,”
found in Daniel Nugent’s, Rural Revolt in Mexico: US Interventions and the Domain of Subaltern Politics (Duke
University Press, 1998). The Jose Escobar rebellion in 1929 had an important popular and military base in the state.
In fact, the cities of Juárez and Jimenez were taken over by the rebels. For information on that see, El Continental,
April 2, and March 21-29. For a summary of Chihuahuas’ economic history, see, Moises de la Pena, Chihuahua
Economico, Tomos, I, II, III, (Mexico D.F.: talleres graficos de Adrian Morales, 1948),
11
Victor Orozco, Historia General de Chihuahua III: Los Pueblos del Distrito de Guerrero en el siglo XIX
(Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juarez, 1995), Francisco Almada, La Revolución en el estado de Chihuahua,
and, Resumen de la historia del estado de Chihuahua (Mexico: libros Mexicanos, 1955).
12
Oscar Martinez, Border Boom Town: Ciudad Juárez since 1848 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), Mark
Wasserman, Persistent Oligarchs, Nicole Mottier, “Drugs, Gangs, and Politics in Ciudad Juarez, 1928-1936,”
Estudios Mexicanos 25, no. 1 (2009): 25-46.
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corporations) in the city have captivated scholars’ attention.13 However, none of these works
examined workers in the 1930s as the central subject of their studies.
Conversely, the Hidalgo Mining District and its workers have received significant
attention from scholars. William French’s study of the working class in Santa Barbara and Parral
during the late nineteenth century demonstrates workers’ proclivity to remain peaceful and docile
in the mining region throughout much of the area’s history, and then the dramatic
transformations that workers experienced after the Revolution when they adopted a more
empowered sense of agency based on class interest. French’s work in the Hidalgo Mining
District at the turn of the twentieth century highlights workers’ behaviors and contributions in the
mining area, but whether workers increased their power after the armed phase of the conflict
ended remains unacknowledged.14 Thus, for the mining area of Parral-Santa Barbara, an area
with an otherwise well researched labor force, no one has examined workers’ participation in the
post-revolutionary era.15
On the popular side of the conflict, Francisco Villa, the embodiment of militarized
Revolution in the state, has garnered most of the attention by historians, leaving organized
workers little attention.16 Furthermore, scholars have studied Chihuahua and its elites in depth,
especially during and after the Revolution.	
  Historian William French’s study reminds us of the
13

Kathleen Staudt, Violence and Activism at the Border: Gender, Fear, and Everyday Life in Ciudad Juárez
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008).
14
William French, A Peaceful and Working People: Manners, Morals and Class Formation in Northern Mexico
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996).
15
For information on the Hidalgo Mining District going back to the colonial era see, Robert West, The Mining
Community in Northern New Spain: The Parral Mining District (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949),
Chantal Cramaussel, Poblar la frontera: La provincia de Santa Barbara en la Nueva Vizcaya en los siglos XVI y
XVII (Zamora: Colegio de Michoacán, 2007).
16
Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), Ruben Osorio,
“Villismo: Nationalism and Popular Mobilization in Northern Mexico,” found in Daniel Nugent’s, Rural Revolt in
Mexico: US. Intervention and the Domain of Subaltern Politics (Duke University Press, 1998), and Alejandro
Quintana, Pancho Villa: A Biography (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Press, 2012).
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state’s and elites’ centrality, and points out that the Canadian railroad tycoons were able to
continue operations successfully during the Revolution: “So began a decade of revolution that
would leave the Mexican economy in shambles and Chihuahua with the reputation as the cradle
of revolt.”17 Historian Mark Wasserman also acknowledges the state’s importance when he
argues that, “The Revolution began in Chihuahua, and its victories, which lead to the overthrow
of Díaz, were won here. Chihuahua can be a benchmark against which we measure the
Revolution.” 18 Wasserman showed the state elites’ ability to maintain economic and political
power during the tumultuous revolutionary years.19
Wasserman argues that Chihuahua’s political, social, geographical, and economic
dynamics effectively represent a microcosm of post-revolutionary Mexico, and that workers’
participation remains the only element missing from the existing research. Wasserman affirms
this and points to the absence of workers’ voices in his study of the elites’ roles in the reconstruction of Ciudad Juárez once the revolutionary conflict ended: “The outline nevertheless
leaves us with many questions, especially about the roles played by local agrarian and labor
organizations.”20 As Wasserman points out, despite extensive research on the Revolution and
post-revolutionary Chihuahua, most of the studies center on the elites’ contributions.
A small group of historians, including Jesús Vargas, have studied Chihuahuan workers’
behavior during the initial years of the Revolution (1900-1920). Vargas demonstrates the
influence of anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism, including the presence of operatives belonging
to the Partído Liberal Mexicano (PLM)—a radical organization headed by the Flores Magón

17

William French, “State Business as Usual: Mexico North West Railroad Managers Confront the Mexican
Revolution,” Estudios Mexicanos 5, no. 2 (1989): 221.
18
Mark Wasserman, Persistent Oligarchs, 12.
19
Mark Wasserman, Persistent Oligarchs.
20
Ibid, 119.
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brothers—among workers in the area during the initial stages of the Revolution. Historian
Friedric Katz notes the actual participation of Chihuahuan miners in the armed conflict.21
In relation to the border, recent historians have traced certain labor traditions that
provided workers with the foundation necessary to readily embrace the post-revolutionary
syndicalism calling for control of the workplace using direct action at the point of production.
These scholars point out that the transnational migration across the Mexican U.S. border, which
Mexican workers experienced in the early twentieth century, exposed workers to syndicalism,
and prepared them to eventually adopt the radical workers’ ideology that made its way into the
mining camps and the border area after the Revolution. Historian Joseph Barton illustrates these
dynamics by examining the different waves of circular migration between Mexico and the
United States in which workers engaged early in the twentieth century.22 Barton’s research
demonstrates the transnational status of Mexican workers extending back to the early 1900s, and
the significant wave of workers repatriated to Mexico during the 1930s, the time period this
study covers. Furthermore, he argues that workers were able to reproduce their communities
while in the U.S. in an effort to empower themselves, which shows the tendencies of Mexican
workers to organize communally in order to improve their standing. Moreover, workers’
migratory patterns placed them in direct contact with American workers who already had
experience in unionizing.23 In fact, Barton points out that Mexican workers themselves organized
and formed unions in America during this time.24
21
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This dissertation has also utilized the insights of comparative borderlands labor history
recognizing the benefits of community-level studies, which have revealed workers’ challenge to
power structures in the midst of an apparent lack of power. Scholars studying the mining centers
of Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado, as well as the actions of Mexican workers in California
and Texas, often utilize the struggle for space as a theoretical model to demonstrate radical
behavior by going beyond the workplace and into the community to demonstrate power among
workers, immigrants, and peasants. These spatial studies document underprivileged sectors with
a degree of power that would have proven difficult to show using other frameworks.25 In relation
to the mining district and the border, this framework helps illustrate the sphere of influence
unions had on both regions. Moreover, this study also uses existing frames that highlight the
status of the borderlands as a unique region with its own economic, labor, social, and cultural
traditions. The circumstances surrounding border areas have created a unique milieu in which
two opposing labor traditions, one forged through industrial conflict and the other by years of
agrarian struggle, meet where two nations come together.26
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Sources
The majority of the sources in this study originated from three municipal archives in the
state of Chihuahua: the Archivo Histórico Municipal de Parral, the Archivo Municipal de Santa
Barbara, and the Archivo Municipal de Ciudad Juárez. These three archives have not been
previously studied for the period and subjects that this investigation covers, which adds to the
value of this study. Scholars examining Ciudad Juárez in the modern era have not utilized
sources from the local municipal archive; instead, they have examined sources from the capital
city of Chihuahua, the United States National Archives, and documents located at the University
of Texas at El Paso. Furthermore, previous scholars have overlooked the Juárez’s municipal
archives in relation to workers. This study did not examine the municipal archives in the city of
Chihuahua. I am planning to expand this investigation of workers’ contributions after the
Revolution by visiting the municipal archives at the capital city in the immediate future.
This investigation brings extensive material from the Juárez municipal archive to light for
the first time. Perhaps more notably, previous studies have examined local elites’ role in postrevolutionary Juárez, but have neglected the contributions of workers. Concerning the need to
direct research towards labor organizations, historian Mark Wasserman writes, “We need to
know more about the formation of peasant leagues and labor unions, whether they were locally
based, state based, or encouraged by the national regime, or whether they were initially
independent and their leadership later co-opted by Cárdenas.”27	
  This investigation will
complement the work of other historians studying the 1930s in Ciudad Juárez, including Mark
Wasserman and Nicole Mottier, by examining workers’ contributions in the border city.
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In the case of the archives in Parral and Santa Barbara, no investigation prior to this one
examining workers after the Revolution exists. In fact, few scholars have examined the Hidalgo
Mining District’s municipal archives as they relate to workers in the modern era, except for
William French’s study of the working class in Parral and Santa Barbara at the turn of the
twentieth century.28
This dissertation examines the following local newspapers found at the El Paso Public
Library: The Spanish language daily, El Continental, the El Paso Times, and the El Paso-Herald
Post from 1927 to 1942, the last two in English. These three newspapers, especially El
Continental, concentrated most of their coverage on their sister city of Ciudad Juárez. For the
mining region, local newspapers, including the El Correo de Parral and El Crisol, were also
consulted, but not for the entire decade because of the difficulty in finding them. La Voz De
Chihuahua, a state-wide newspaper located in the University of Ciudad Juárez (UACJ), was also
examined from 1928 to 1940.
This investigation also includes materials from the United States National Archives and
Records Administration, located in Adelphi, Maryland. The sources analyzed in these archives,
including labor and political reports from the Chihuahua and Ciudad Juárez Consulates,
complement the local sources in various ways: the testimony of U.S. Consulate members affirms
how workers transformed certain power structures, including gaining more control of the
workplace through the use of direct action, the establishment of collective contracts, and the use
of tribunals. These American sources also confirm the extraordinary levels of unionization across
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trade and skill. Likewise, the reports shed light on the successes that unions achieved in the
courts against business owners and operators.
In the case of Ciudad Juárez, the U.S. reports also highlight local elites’ use of violence
and electoral fraud to perpetuate their power, which means the material at the U.S. archives
reaffirms the evidence found at the local archives. Thus, all four archives show a pattern
demonstrating organized labor’s rising influence, and perhaps more importantly, the way labor’s
ascendance took place.
This study also includes evidence found in the presidential correspondence of Presidents
Manuel Avila Camacho and Lázaro Cárdenas, located at Archivo General de la Nación in
Mexico City. A high volume of correspondence between Chihuahuan local unions, including
those in the mining area, and Juárez with the federal government shows support for strike
movements throughout Mexico and Chihuahua, demonstrating the extent of federal authorities’
interest in labor conflicts. This correspondence also reveals labor’s expectations that the central
government would come to its assistance.
It is also important to point out that the vast majority of the sources were originally
written in Spanish. I have translated all of the documents—trying to stay true to the original
form—by translating almost literally the words of workers and their leaders. Scores of
individuals with different levels of education and sophistication created these documents. As a
result, I have made concerted efforts to ensure that their messages stayed as true to the original as
possible. Thus, one can easily deduce by reading the translation whether labor’s leadership,
authorities, or the workers themselves wrote the documents by analyzing the language in which
they are written.
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This dissertation rests on the premise that archival research at the local level can alter
existing national narratives. Previous studies examining the Hidalgo Mining District have argued
that narrow class interest determined workers’ behavior.29 Even after the Revolution, a handful
of investigations examining workers in other locales have identified a wide array of forces
preventing workers from supporting class interests exalting syndicalism, including paternalism
and popular liberalism. 30 These works have demonstrated organized labor’s inability to resist
local elites and other competing forces, eventually halting labor’s efforts to increase workers’
power.
In contrast to the mining district, the evidence found in Ciudad Juárez coincides with
some of the arguments made by scholars looking elsewhere in Mexico, and concludes that
organized labor did not enjoy the support of local, state, and federal officials; its victories were
few and brief. Thus, they assign causality to the decision by organized labor’s leadership to ally
themselves with the state, and to eventually accept it as the ultimate arbitrator of labor relations.
Once less sympathetic authorities stepped into power at any level, but especially at the local
level, workers’ accrual of power proved elusive since the autonomy of local strongmen
prevented federal efforts to balance power structures in certain cases. Finally, most scholars
agree that once President Cárdenas stepped out of office in 1940, workers’ most powerful ally no
longer had the power to support them. The case of Ciudad Juárez will show that local and statewide officials’ economic and political interests trumped those of workers, despite the federal
government’s efforts to prevent this power imbalance from growing.
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In the case of The Hidalgo Mining District, the overall worker identity changed from
peaceful and collaborative, to organized and combative. However, the largest and most
significant unions in the mining district (National Miners Union, Section 9 and 11) never fully
embraced radicalism, except when it came to the use of direct action to control the workplace.
Miners’ Union victories in their strike movements against ASARCO throughout the 1930s were
in large part due to mediation, and to their close ties with government officials, who prevented
their full radicalization.
In Juárez, workers embraced anarcho-syndicalist tenets highlighting direct action and a
break with political officials, and a reliance on mass mobilizations, disruption of official events,
strikes, and walkouts to control the workplace. The success of radical labor principles and the
influence of Communist organizations at the border have almost no parallel in the history of
northern Mexico. Finally, this investigation will show that political and economic interests of
high-ranking local and state officials, as well as union leaders, affected workers in different
ways. For the mining area, local authorities’ ability to negotiate with labor and capital allowed
them to rein in radicalism among miners and other workers, including bakers and loaders. In
Juárez, once radicalism made its way to local unions, government officials reacted with violence.
Eventually, the military took over in Juárez, further deradicalizing the movement since the
army’s presence stifled mass mobilizations, strikes, and other radical forms of resistance.
This work will identify and reconstruct the tangible advancements achieved by workers
in both the border area and the mining region to demonstrate that workers readily accepted union
leadership’s efforts aimed at increasing their power in both regions of Chihuahua. This study will
show, through their actions and words, how workers’ consciousness and identity changed as
well. Moreover, this change took place during and after the Revolution. Workers achieved this
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transformation through massive unionization across trade and skill by using direct action (strikes,
manifestos, boycotts, and mass protest), relying on tribunals at both the local and federal levels,
and participating in electoral campaigns to choose sympathetic candidates. These elements
eventually transformed workers’ identities in both areas of the state.
Organization
Chapter one will provide the background necessary to understand the events that took
place in the 1930s, including a brief summary of both regions’ histories, the Revolution,
ASARCO, and the labor movement at the national level. This information will allow us to
understand the reasons why each region developed a different labor movement. In addition, this
chapter will trace the various forces shaping workers’ identities in both regions prior to the
Revolution. These contributing factors include ASARCO, the Revolution, transnational
migration, and the national labor movement.
Chapter two will show the different ways in which organized labor made concerted
efforts to organize workers and increase their power through widespread unionization across
trade and skill. Unions and federations sprang up during the 1930s in both regions. These labor
conglomerates undertook a massive process of unionization among the labor force, which
increased workers’ power in the workplace and in the community. The Cárdenas presidency
(1934-1940) and the Popular Front era, which called for a workers’ alliance with pro-labor
regimes, assisted in this process while at the same time attenuating workers’ radicalism,
especially in the mining district. This chapter will also show that despite the obvious competition
among labor federations, (both locally and nationally throughout the 1930s), the two main
national labor conglomerates, the initially radical, but increasingly co-opted Confederación de
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Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), and the always collaborative at the national realm, but
independent and combative in some locales, the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana
(CROM), effectively increased workers’ identities at the border and in the Hidalgo Mining
District.
In fact, the conduct of these two federations in both regions demonstrates concerted
efforts to transform workers’ behaviors and motivations along class lines, albeit with competing
definitions and approaches regarding what class struggle should entail. Despite the fact that these
class interests varied according to each federation, most organizations combined workplace
interests with community-wide concerns. These included the creation and enforcement of
collective contracts, demands for higher wages, hiring hall, and price and housing regulation, as
well as other interests exclusive to the working class, which comprised the majority of the
population, especially in the mining area.
Communist operatives radicalized the movement at the border once they formed alliances
with the most important labor union in Juárez, the Cámara Sindical Obrera, or CSO. In the
mining region, the National Miners’ Union alliance with political elites and enduring
paternalistic labor traditions, prevented radical labor tenets from influencing workers into
questioning their subordinate role vis-à-vis capital. This was true despite workers’ widespread
use of direct action and a handful of leaders’ rhetoric bordering radicalism. Despite, or as a result
of these radical elements, local and federal authorities in the mining region complemented
unions’ efforts to increase workers’ power towards acceptable class concerns, especially from
1932 to 1938. This decision to acquiesce to workers’ demands resulted in labor’s de facto
acceptance of their subordinate role in the economic structure.
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Chapter three will examine labor federations’ push to establish and enforce collective
contracts among the labor force in both areas as an effective tool to increase workers’ power.
The right to negotiate collectively, and the establishment of tribunals with worker-friendly laws
regulating labor relations (both products of the Revolution) changed labor relations. For the first
time in their history, workers had the mechanisms necessary to potentially control the workplace.
In addition, owners’ constant refusal to even negotiate these contracts provided labor federations
with opportunities to use these contracts as vehicles to shape workers’ identities. The use of both
local and federal tribunals allowed organized labor to negotiate with business owners and
operators as equals for the first time in the nation’s history, which provided federations and
unions with the moral capital to continue leading workers.
The unions’ ubiquitous utilization of the courts to ensure the enforcement of contracts on
the part of business operators balanced power structures in the workplace, both in Parral-Santa
Barbara, and for a brief period in Juárez. These newly acquired legal protections allowed
organized labor to increase its control of the workplace at unprecedented levels in the mining
area and in the border city (until officials in Juárez responded with violence). Local authorities
and business operators (these overlapped in many instances) also reacted to labor’s increasing
power in Ciudad Juárez through other means besides violence. These hindrances, which also
took place in the mining district at a much lower rate, consisted of utilizing legal loopholes to
delay the collective contracts’ validation by the federal government. In other instances, they
simply did not show up to sign the contracts in court. However, their main weapon to weaken
labor’s resolve remained violence and electoral fraud. Despite these tactics by elites, organized
labor used the local Conciliatory and Arbitration Courts to guarantee their provisions, and forced
businesses to respect these collectively bargained contracts.
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Chapter four examines the use of direct action in the form of labor stoppages, wildcat
strikes, public protests, sit-ins, manifestos, solidarity strikes, and other forms of direct action to
demonstrate that unions in both the mining area and Juárez did not rely solely on spatial
contestation, elections, and the tribunals to ensure the continuity of revolutionary policies.
Moreover, the use of direct action indicates radicalism. Loyal to their anarcho-syndicalist
origins, workers in the mining district relied on strikes, which jeopardized the elites’ efforts to
tame them.31 Furthermore, these strike movements required the approval and support of the rank
and file, which demonstrates that strikes responding to the needs of other workers show the
initiative and belief of workers in class struggle beyond the manipulation of their leaders.
Workers’ constant reliance on strikes demonstrates their active participation in the process of
class formation in post-revolutionary Chihuahua beyond the leadership’s rhetoric. For the mining
district, it was precisely during one of these strike movements that a small window for workers’
radicalization opened up.
Ciudad Juárez also experienced extraordinary levels of direct action and promotion of
radical labor principles, especially when one examines the continuous mass protests, radical
manifestos, and strikes the CSO engaged in. As mentioned previously, the CSO in Juárez made
alliances with the local representative of the Mexican Communist Party, the Cámara Unitaria
del Trabajo, in 1937. The CSO made concerted efforts to steer workers’ identities towards
radical definitions of class interests, using anarcho-syndicalist tactics calling for direct action and
a rejection of collaboration with authorities or capital.
Chapter five will show	
  the	
  federations’	
  participation in politics in both the mining area
and Ciudad Juárez. Unions in both regions significantly supported certain candidates with public
demonstrations, political rallies, and manifestos. Most of the candidates with union support
31
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eventually won most local elections in the mining region during the 1930s. In the case of Ciudad
Juárez, except for the anarchist/Communist CSO, unions also made concerted efforts to control
political power at the local level; however, local elites—through violence and electoral fraud—
ensured that organized labor never had the opportunity to assume local political power, despite
unions’ numerous efforts to establish coalitions with other political actors.	
  It will also show how
fraudulent elections allowed certain interests, including those favoring anti-worker initiatives, to
take control of political power in an illegal manner, which in turn corrupted the local tribunals
whose purpose was ensuring labor peace, and allowed the indiscriminate use of police force
against workers.
This chapter will also account for the different ways in which local authorities in Juárez
used violence to weaken organized labor by imprisoning, beating, and murdering its leaders and
members. Rodrigo Quevedo’s (1932-1938) tenure as governor of the state of Chihuahua
throughout the majority of the decade illustrates the power authorities could exert over organized
labor, especially at the local level. In addition to the Rodrigo’s governorship, Quevedo’s siblings,
Jesús and José, held the mayoral office of Ciudad Juárez on two occasions during the decade
(1931-1933 and 1936-1937). Moreover, their known associates occupied the office as well
throughout most of the 1930s, with the exception of 1936, when the federal government
appointed a general to replace one of Quevedo’s siblings.
Quevedo’s revolutionary credentials allowed him to capture the governorship with the
political backing of President Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928) after Quevedo supported the
Calles’ regime against General Escobar’s nationwide rebellion of 1929, which had an important
resonance in Chihuahua. His behavior in the mining region, where he supported workers in the
numerous labor conflicts throughout his tenure, was as a fierce anti-Catholic who promoted
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socialist education, and stands in stark contrast when compared to his actions in Juárez. The
reason for this paradox lies in the fact that his economic and political investments at the border
were much more significant than his interests in the mining district. In fact, his political
shrewdness reveals itself when one examines his staunch support of the federal policies at the
mining center supporting labor federations, anti-clerical policies, and socialist education, which
allowed him to operate relatively freely in Juárez.
The conclusion briefly suggests how these local dynamics contribute to the understanding
of the Revolution as it relates to workers, the Cárdenas regime, provincial elites, and the state of
Chihuahua.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE ORIGINS OF RADICAL UNIONISM IN THE HIDALGO
MINING DISTRICT AND CIUDAD JUÁREZ

The radicalism of workers throughout the 1930s in Ciudad Juárez and in the mining
district illuminates the radical legacy of the Revolution, but the foundation of this radicalism
goes back to the pre-revolutionary era (1900-1910). Radical activists seeking to transform the
existing Mexican economic and political system took refuge on the border. Juárez’s sister city in
the United States, El Paso, served as shelter for many political exiles of the Porfirio Díaz
dictatorship (1876-1911) , including Ricardo Flores Magón, founder of the Partido Liberal
Mexicano (PLM).
Exiles took advantage of the increasing discontent on the border to agitate against the
dictator. The PLM criticized Díaz’s economic policies favoring foreign interests to garner
support for Revolution. Juárez’s strategic location as a border port for immigrants headed to the
United States, alongside access to guns and ammunition, made Juárez the natural place to launch
armed rebellions to overthrow the Díaz regime.1 The mining district also suffered from the
dictator’s favoritism towards U.S. capital, which allowed the latter to abuse and exploit workers,
and monopolize resources. In the mining district, the spirit of Flores Magón in the form of his
newspaper, Regeneración, also goes back to the pre-revolutionary era.
1
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The long term resonance of the revolutionary era on workers movements in the 1930s is
indicated by Miguel Felix, an original founder of Local 11 of the Miners’ Union in Santa
Barbara in 1934. Felix reflected on the continuing PLM significance in radicalizing workers. The
PLM’s ideas in the form of reading material “were all over,” even into the 1930s, he recalled: “I
never met the Flores Magón brothers, they were around, I read their newspaper-- that is where
we got the idea of unions.” Felix explained that the impetus to organize into unions was the
result of conditions: “workers’ wishes to put a stop to the abuse (pisoteados) by the company.”1
But the role of ideas that came out of the Revolution is clear from Felix’s testimony because it
establishes a direct link between the PLM and the subsequent union movement, which
experienced its climax during the 1930s in the mining district. Felix considered himself and the
unions in the area to be the heirs to the rebellious spirit of the Magón brothers. Historians have
shown the PLM’s influence among workers in the northern mining districts before the start of the
Revolution of 1910. Javier Torres Pares demonstrates the presence of PLM cadres in Parral and
Santa Barbara and the minimization by local authorities of their importance, which would prove
a mistake four years later.2 According to historian John Mason Hart, “beginning in 1904, the
Magonistas, from their American sanctuary began to send emissaries - revolutionary culture
brokers - into the mining camps of the Mexican north.”3 On June 30, 1906, Elfego Lugo founded
the first PLM section in Parral, and Albino Pérez did the same in Santa Barbara that same year.4
The presence of PLM political clubs, organizers, and printed material in the mining camps of
1
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Parral and Santa Barbara provided workers with the necessary language and overall strategy to
increase their power.
Immigration from and to the United States also assisted in the spread of ideas derived
from pre-revolutionary sources through the 1930s. The railroad linked the two regions in the
study with transnational capital in this period, which made both regions susceptible to the
massive influx, or return, of immigrant labor. This transformed Ciudad Juárez and Parral-SantaBarbara into attractive destinations for thousands of pre-industrial landless immigrants seeking to
improve their rapidly declining ways of life. Legislative changes in 1867 modified land tenure
from communal to private, changes which speculators and large land owners utilized to take land
away from communities.5 These same transformations meant that workers were carrying
experiences from radical labor experiences in the United States. The border and the mining
district served as the endpoint of immigrant labor returning to Mexico after years working in the
United States, which introduced them to radical labor ideologies.
This chapter will show the processes that led radical views to be implanted in the labor
union structures of these areas, and also introduce the way that national labor unions were
affected by some of these radical goals before they began to compromise with the government in
the years before the 1930s. An examination of the forces shaping workers’ lives prior to the
Revolution, including foreign capital, transnational migration, radicalism, local elites,
government officials, national unions and their alliances (or not) with the state, and workers
themselves, will illustrate why workers on the border embraced radicalism to a greater extent
than their counterparts in the mining district. Some scholars have highlighted the role foreign
5
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capital played in generating worker divisions and conflict in mining and smeltering towns, while
others have given greater emphasis to local political conditions as detonators for the Revolution,
especially at the municipal level. The latter interpretation does not see workers as the main
engine fueling the pre-revolutionary process.6 This chapter combines these two interpretations by
demonstrating that the privileges foreign capital enjoyed in Ciudad Juárez and in the Hidalgo
district generated significant discontent, while at the same time, showing the influence radical
political leaders had in agitating the unprivileged masses of workers and peasants. Although the
PLM agreed that the dominating role foreign interests had in the Mexican economy needed to
change, their vision for Mexico consisted of a total transformation of the economic and political
system. Once the Revolution started in 1911 under the banner of Maderismo (those following
Francisco I. Madero, the apostle of the Revolution and a wealthy industrialist from Coahuila),
former PLM sympathizers and active members joined the Maderista movement, which initially
favored land and labor reform. These ideas remained hidden for twenty years while countless
reformist governments tried to eliminate them until the Lázaro Cárdenas presidency reopened a
smoldering radicalism
Political Economy Before The Revolution
In both regions, the dictator’s economic policies favored foreign interests which allowed
transnational capital to control the most profitable economic activities, including commerce and
mining respectively. These economic measures generated significant discontent among the
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middle class and workers across both regions. To add insult to injury, only a handful of local
notables (supported by Díaz) enjoyed extraordinary political and economic privileges. These
state elites, led by General Luis Terrazas and his son-in law Enrique Creel, used legislative
changes to eliminate local and state-wide elections, and imposed themselves and their cronies at
the municipal and state levels. Lack of democratic processes impeded border and Hidalgo
district residents from determining their political futures.7 These processes made these
communities ripe for the influence of the anarchist, Socialist, and agrarian pre-revolutionary
rebellions, and played a role in making labor activism a strong influence in the 1930s.
Foreign interests have dominated the Hidalgo district’s most profitable activities from its
inception. The Spanish crown founded Santa Barbara (1567) and Parral (1631) for the sole
purpose of exploiting the area’s productive silver deposits, and to a lesser degree, its gold
deposits. The crown turned Parral into the largest silver producer in the Americas throughout
most of the seventeenth century, and despite its decline in productivity over time, it remained an
important mining center up until the modern period.8 The cities of Parral, Santa Barbara, and San
Francisco del Oro are located within twenty miles of each other, and together they comprise the
Hidalgo Mining District.
The introduction of wage labor in an effort to attract workers began a narrative of
competing messages, one forged by centuries of independent mining, and the other aimed at
directing workers in the district to keep them locating, excavating, and smelting ore for the
crown.9 The coexistence of different ways of organizing the labor force in the mines continued
7
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until the start of the modern period, which meant three hundred years of contested labor
identities. The crown’s inability to influence workers’ behavior was compounded by workers’
ties to their own land, which compelled them to return to their communities in search of
independence.
Another element limiting employers’ control of the labor force and the mine’s resources
was the spatial layout of the district, which allowed individuals to reject wage labor and instead
work independently. Anyone in the community had access to the mines since many entrances to
the “mines” existed. In fact, the entire underground area was one big mine, which explains the
ubiquitous presence of independent miners in the area throughout the colonial era.10
Because of the relatively easy access to the mines, independent mining, or gambusinaje,
developed alongside wage and coercive non-wage labor in the region during the colonial era.
The widespread presence of independent mining emphasizing independence, control of work
rate, and a modest challenge to private property left a resonance for the language of industrial
unionism in the 1930s; it emphasized independence and workers’ control. However, workers’
ability to work independently and smelt ore through artisanal methods was curtailed, but not
eliminated altogether, once transnational capital entered the district. The foreign-owned
companies had the necessary capital to invest in the technologies needed to profitably smelt the
low grade ore left in the district’s mines as well as the managerial innovations - including
paternalistic methods to generate loyalty among workers - to prevent them from returning
home.11
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U.S. based capitalist influence in the area was conditioned on relationships with the Díaz
dictatorship and set labor terms learned in multiple sites of operation. The Guggenheim family
developed the largest smelting conglomerate on the continent, the American Smelting and
Refining Company (ASARCO), and entered the Hidalgo district in 1899 in large part because of
its close connections with high-ranking Mexican officials. These powerful individuals, including
Díaz, Terrazas, and Creel, gave ASARCO “special concessions, low taxes, and political
influence,” the kind of access unavailable to Mexicans.12 Founded in Pueblo, Colorado, in 1889,
ASARCO spread across the continent and the globe as one of the world’s largest trusts; it was
located in dozens of areas across the western hemisphere by the 1920s, including El Paso,
Texas.13 Immediately after its formation in 1899, ASARCO started operations in the Hidalgo
district with the acquisition of mines in Santa Barbara, including the largest and most productive
mine in Santa Barbara, Tecolotes, using its different subsidiaries, including American Smelters
Securities Company.14 By 1905, ASARCO already had a significant presence in northern
Chihuahua as well, including a smelting plant in Avalos, Chihuahua.15 On September 9, 1915,
Montezuma Lead Company transferred their holdings, which included the mines, La Veta Rica y
La Favorita in Santa Barbara, established in 1896, to ASARCO.
ASARCO also acquired smaller mines in an effort to control most of the registered
mines in the area. The company expanded its monopoly over smelting in Mexico when it started
processing other metals including copper, silver, zinc, and lead, which allowed the U.S. firm to
spread its dominion over the area. ASARCO took advantage of the new laws privatizing land
12
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previously held by communities, to expand into adjacent land to fuel their local smelters, which
displaced local communities and forced their members to work in the mines, or migrate. In an
effort to inconspicuously keep their intentions to monopolize mining activities in the district and
keep nationalistic fervors at a minimum, ASARCO entered into partnerships with Mexican
citizens who already had mine licenses. The advantages of partnerships and indirect ownership
had to do with legal concerns. For one, with various mines consolidated into one partnership, as
was often the case, owners only needed to provide overall production as evidence to confirm that
the mines were worked. The acquisition of mines allowed ASARCO to use the mines for
different purposes besides extracting ore, including storing machinery. But if they registered
each mine separately, the law required operators to provide production numbers for each venture
to avoid abandoned or unproductive mines. In addition, this massive acquisition of mines
reduced competition.16ASARCO’s main purpose was to close as many entrances to the mines as
possible to prevent gambusinaje, and that is why they made efforts to buy most of them, so they
could close the many entrances and prevent bootleg mining.
The company imposed onerous labor conditions in order to extract and process the
metals, thereby critically altering the social space of the mining areas. Managers notoriously set
up company towns and policing systems for their mines. Former miner and union leader, Miguel
Felix, confirms that “the Americans and other foreigners had their own private (colonia)
neighborhood, with a hospital, a school, and private guards.”17 Mining companies were also
infamous across their operations for exercising control through a systemized racial and ethnic
structure. Workers were pitted against each other for the best jobs, and dual-wage structures
based on these categories were operative. ASARCO was a huge wealth-extracting conglomerate,
16
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the largest mining interest in Mexico. This was a source of complaint about United States
imperialism, and had important implications. United States firms owned most of the Mexican
mining industry and their blatant disregard for Mexican laws and their workforce generated
discontent.
Scholars like Francois-Xavier Guerra have examined the dissatisfaction emerging around
mining towns, and have developed a thesis that mining towns precipitated the Revolution of
1910.18 In 1906, workers struck against the Cananea copper mine demanding an eight-hour day
and equal pay with United States foreign workers. However, Arizona Phelps-Dodge vigilantes
and Arizona Rangers supported by Díaz and Sonoran governor, Rafael Izabal, crossed the border
to put it down. Combined Mexican and North American expeditionary forces confronted miners
and killed at least fifty people. This incident created one of the outrages that sparked the 1910
Mexican Revolution despite the fact that it took place four years earlier.19 The 1906 conflict in
Cananea brought together discontent generated by the transnational racial and condescending
attitudes towards the Mexican labor force along with the presence of U.S. based political
operatives from the PLM, the Western Federation of Miners (WFM), and the Industrial Workers
of the World (IWW), in an episode that agitated Mexican workers.20
U.S. trade unions also assisted miners in the Hidalgo district in the 1920s, but not prior to
1910. Local organizations following IWW principles and with ties to the Industrial Workers of
the World)—a radical union using direct action, industrial unionism, and a break with politics to
advance workers’ power—surfaced during the 1920s. Norman Caulfield shows the IWW
18
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presence in Santa Barbara, “The IWW campaign began at the ASARCO complexes in Santa
Barbara.” Caulfield adds that IWW operatives organized a strike in Santa Eulalia (located north
of the Hidalgo district) in 1924.21 Moreover, the substantial migration from other mining centers
in the United States to the Hidalgo district, including to the ASARCO unit in El Paso, Texas,
makes it plausible to argue that many mining workers in Chihuahua were familiar with radical
labor ideologies.22
Roberto Calderón is one of a number of scholars who have demonstrated the
transnational migration of mining workers in Northern Mexico and concluded that experience
with unions in the United States transformed Mexican workers.23 Furthermore, the coal mining
region of Coahuila is located very close the Hidalgo Mining District, which makes it highly
plausible that some Coahuila miners also ended up at the Hidalgo camp. A year after the
Cananea strike in Sonora, ASARCO laid off more than one thousand workers in Santa Barbara
and closed most mining operations in Parral that same year due to financial panic and
plummeting mineral prices in the United States.24 It seemed that economic crisis, transportation
links, and general social discontent made the work of radical political leaders in the district
easier. This was the backdrop for Revolution in the mining district.
On October 5, 1910, from San Antonio, Texas, Madero circulated his manifesto calling
for armed rebellion to topple the Díaz regime. In Parral, Guillermo Baca, under the flagship of
Maderismo, surrounded the hills around the city with more than a thousand men from all over
21
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the area, including Parral and Santa Barbara.25 The district quickly fell under the control of
moderate liberals whose main interest centered on the political arena; they had no interest in
radically transforming existing socioeconomic conditions. Thus, Maderos’ new government left
existing structures of power untouched at the national level, including the military, large
landowners, and the church. Madero also failed to recognize and reward the popular wing of his
movement in Chihuahua state.26 Additionally, foreign interests in the area still enjoyed the same
privileges that they had had under the Díaz regime. Despite Madero’s reluctance to embrace
economic and social transformation, the opposition to his government, or the reaction as they
were called in revolutionary Mexico,—composed of conservatives and economic elites— had
other plans for the first president of revolutionary Mexico.
After Madero was murdered in Mexico City in late February 1913, Victoriano Huerta, a
general in the Federal Army representing the church, oligarchs, foreign interests, and the
military, seized power. Immediately those elements that had supported Madero against Díaz,
including Francisco Villa in Chihuahua, declared war against Huerta. Francisco Villa’s
prominence increased in the state due to his merits on the battlefield, which included helping
Madero take Ciudad Juárez. Villa joined the Constitutionalist Movement, headed by former
Coahuilan governor, Venustiano Carranza, against the usurping government established by
Victoriano Huerta. Constitutionalism was a movement composed of various ideologies, from
radical and reformist to conservative, with individuals from different economic, social, and racial
backgrounds. This formidable coalition quickly defeated Huerta by mid-1914. Villa soundly
defeated the armies of Huerta in Chihuahua and most of Northern Mexico, but after exiling
Huerta, Carranza bypassed him in favor of Alvaro Obregón when it came time to distribute the
25
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spoils of war. This led Villa to declare war against his former Constitutionalist leader in a
campaign that lasted two years.27
During this period, Villa controlled the state of Chihuahua from 1913 to 1915, but
retained some power throughout the state until his assassination in 1923. During the height of his
power (1913-1915), Villa made the decision to “give top priority to the revitalization of
mining.”28 Thus, Villa allowed ASARCO to operate and even provided protection for the
company’s smelter in exchange for coal. In fact, in 1915 at the behest of ASARCO, Villa
deported IWW organizers from Chihuahua.29
Historian Frederick Katz has demonstrated that Villa did have a social agenda, including
the relatively extensive land distribution that he and his troops engaged in. However, Villa
allowed ASARCO to continue production during his brief regime, an indication of his distance
from the radical labor demands of the Magonistas. He did not make significant efforts to
transform the economic and social order in the mining district mainly because his continuous
need for resources forced him to let ASARCO continue operations, as it provided him and his
troops with ”forced loans.” Villa was assassinated in Parral in 1923, twelve years after taking
Ciudad Juárez.30 However, his ability to affect national policy ended after Obregón crushed
Villa’s army in León and Celaya, Guanajuato, located in Central Mexico. After Villa’s defeat in
27
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1915, the Constitutionalists controlled the mining areas and put in place pro-labor laws that
provided them with a political base of industrial workers to assist them in cementing their
tenuous hold on power.
The chaos of the Revolution did not affect ASARCO significantly from 1910 to 1915. In
fact, it benefited the company as it allowed them to expand and eliminate competition. For
example, in 1915, while the armies of Villa and Obregon devastated the north, ASARCO
invested 2,700,000 US dollars in Mexican mines formerly owned by those bankrupted by the
disruption in smelting and transportation network caused by the Revolution.31 ASARCO’s large
pockets allowed the company to buy bankrupt and weak mines and absorb losses because of
production stoppages and transportation network disruptions during the Revolutionary period.
After the defeat of Villa, ASARCO simply negotiated with the authority at hand, in this case the
Constitutionalists, although this proved a bit more difficult than dealing with Villa due to the
Constitutionalists’ preparedness to establish alliances with workers at the expense of foreign
capital.32
Even after the nationalization of its mines in 1917, ASARCO waited six years to change
its name to Compañía Minera ASARCO to comply with a new law aimed at dismantling the
control foreign industries had over certain industries, including mining.33 To sidestep the new
law, ASARCO associated with Mexican elites, who did not have any interests in transforming
the way ASARCO conducted business.34 For example, in 1924, the company announced a ten
31
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from continuing its monopoly over the Mexican silver, lead, copper, and zinc smelting industry.
Nor did, the new legislation stop ASARCO from consolidating its dominion over smelting
operations in northern Mexico and, in fact, ASARCO expanded during the 1920s right after the
new legislation. This expansion took place despite difficulties in certain locations where local
radical unions, emboldened by constitutional provisions and radical labor state laws, had gained
ground in crucial aspects of the labor-capital relations including control of the workplace. These
difficult times prepared the company for the following decade, which proved even more difficult
in terms of labor’s increasing radicalism and the nationalist positions of the Lázaro Cárdenas
regime directed against foreign control over certain crucial sectors of the Mexican economy,
including petroleum and mining.
Throughout the period 1896-1920, Mexican workers struggled against a company whose
global power seemed to survive even in spite of the Revolution. ASARCO and its subsidiaries
faced significant obstacles in their efforts to influence workers. This was due to the Hidalgo
district’s pre-industrial labor traditions that had favored the development of worker autonomy.
The desire for autonomy was fueled by the spatial layout of the mines, which facilitated bootleg
mining. These obstacles in the way of ASARCO’s efforts to control its workforce increased with
the constant migration of Mexican workers to the United States, facilitated by the railroad. The
railway connected the Hidalgo district to Ciudad Juárez and exposed workers to radical unionism
on the U.S. side of the border. From the onset, ASARCO sought to use technological and
managerial innovations to direct its labor force. Thus, as “barreterros became perforistas
(drillers), the importance of drilling and blasting skills diminished and mine workers lost control
over the workplace, [while] outside the contratista system, [workers] also lost control over the
35
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hiring of unskilled mine workers.” ASARCO’s introduction of technology forced skilled
workers to accept automatized jobs that required little expertise. This allowed ASARCO to hire
unskilled workers to perform the jobs skilled workers used to perform. These individuals,
“members of a población flotante, comprised of unemployed and marginalized artisans,
campesinos deprived from their lands, rural and urban laborers drawn by the prospect of higher
wages, and others, roamed northern Mexico. They provided the labor force for a Mexico bent on
progress.” Most of these individuals came from the surrounding agricultural communities in the
district and from other mining centers throughout the state and the nation, including Batopilas,
Santa Eulallia, Nacozari, Guanajuato, and Zacatecas. 37
In addition to the deskilling of the workforce, managerial innovations made sure skilled
workers no longer hired unskilled workers, which allowed transnational capital to control the
hiring process, thus further breaking the potential for class unity. William French has argued that
ASARCO shrewdly exploited workers’ disunity by taking advantage of the fact that “a
substantial number of workers retained their ties to the land and maintained their loyalties to
rural communities. Members of the población flotante, they were sharply divided from those often those with skill - who came to depend completely on wage labor.”38 Thus, French argues
that the division among skilled and unskilled workers prevented them from uniting along class
lines in pre-revolutionary Mexico. Moreover, French highlights the company’s use of moral
imperatives to shape workers’ identities and consequent behavior. But we can see other
influences, including the long-standing tradition of bootleg mining in the area, which generated a
sense of solidarity among members of the mining district and, more importantly, a challenge to
private property.
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The Hidalgo district’s middle class also participated in the efforts to influence workers,
while supporting ASARCO’s goal of creating docility. A growing segment of the Hidalgo
district’s middle class sought to address moral concerns centered on workers’ alleged alcohol
abuse and widespread gambling; this social project directed workers away from class conflict.
William French argues that “waging this struggle over work habits and values in northern

Mexico were members of a growing and vocal middle class – the self-proclaimed gente decente on the one hand, and, on the other, a young, mobile, and overwhelmingly male workforce of
diverse origins.”39 The district’s middle class promoted these messages in an effort to separate
themselves from workers, shame them, and ultimately direct them towards acceptable behaviors
distancing them from class conflict.40
Historian William French acknowledges that workers in the mining region, despite their
concern for morality and manners, had a type of moral economy with underlying class concerns
serving as the basis for their identities long before the armed conflict began. French states;
“Rather than serving as a catalyst for creating new demands, the revolution provided an
opportunity for the full expression of what might be called the hidden transcript that had
remained unspoken, or at least, unheard of, before 1910.”41 Once the Revolution’s pro-labor
rhetoric made its way into the mining camp, this moral economy was effectively framed by
organized labor leadership into community-wide concerns exclusive to the working class. As a
result, workers’ demands for power increased throughout the 1930s in places like the mining
region of Parral-Santa Barbara and on the border itself.
Ciudad Juárez was connected by railroad to the Hidalgo region, and through that
embodiment of advanced transnational capital it exchanged radical ideas along the rail lines.
39

Ibid, 4.
Ibid, 84-87.
41
Ibid, 182.
40

41	
  

Ciudad Juárez was originally founded as Paso del Norte in 1659, and was renamed Ciudad
Juárez in 1888 in honor of Benito Juárez, the first indigenous president of Mexico.42 But if the
name Juárez represented independence, the city’s workers’ experience was increasingly less
geared to autonomy. The expansion of the railroad in 1884 (financed by U.S. capital) from
Mexico City to Ciudad Juárez, turned the border into a transportation hub, merging resources and
people from all over Mexico into one location situated steps away from the United States. In
addition, on the U.S. side of the border, El Paso became an important transportation and smelting
center —the only major city in the American Southwest connected by railroad tracks with the
rest of the nation.43 These developments turned the border into a transportation hub for thousands
of Mexican landless workers.
Historian Joseph Barton explores these dynamics by examining the different waves of
circular migration between Mexico and the United States that workers experienced early in the
twentieth century. Barton explains that “peasants and miners streamed northward after the
wrenching fall of the northern Mexican economy of 1907 and 1908, then rushed back to Mexico
following the sudden downturn in the United States of 1908 and 1909. A larger, more sustained
movement reached the United States in the revolutionary years between 1910 and 1917, only to
retreat south during the recession of 1920-1921. After 1923, migrants once again flooded
northward, and then suddenly reversed flow between 1928 and 1933, when in the face of longterm depression and relentless expulsion half a million fled to Mexico.”44 Barton’s research
demonstrates the transnational status of Mexican workers extending back to the 1900s, and the
significant waves of workers returning to Mexico during the 1930s, the same time period this
42
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study covers. Furthermore, his findings regarding Mexican workers’ ability to reproduce their
communities while in America in an effort to empower themselves shows workers’ proclivity to
organize communally to improve their existing conditions.
Mexican workers’ migratory, transnational patterns placed them in direct contact with
American workers who already had a long experience in unionizing.45 Mexican workers
organized and formed unions in the United States as they encountered a vibrant labor movement
harboring radical tendencies during this time.46 The Industrial Workers of the World and their
anarchist vision promoting the eventual destruction of the current capitalist system influenced
many Mexican workers at the turn of the century. Mexican workers “borrowed the organizational
form of the Western Federation of Miners, seized upon the millennial expectations of the
Industrial Workers of the World, and fused them with the nationalist symbolism of the Mexican
Liberal Party, thereby transforming disparate local movements into a class mobilization.”47 This
means that migrations led significant numbers of Mexican workers to embrace class struggle as a
complement to their quasi-radical pre-existing identities, forged by years of agrarian struggle in
Mexico and their status as transnational migrants. Many of these individuals stayed on the
border, and eventually participated in the extraordinary class struggle that took place in Juárez
during the 1930s.48
The importance of the border as a transnational hub needs highlighting. Ciudad Juárez
provided a rest stop for millions of individuals engaged in a perpetual agrarian struggle against
political and economic elites, both as labor migrants looking to improve their lives in the United
45
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States, and as returning workers fleeing from the American dream.49 These experiences prepared
many Mexican workers to eventually adopt a radical workers’ ideology. Moreover, the border’s
strategic location made it a favorable destination for radical exiles from Mexico who created a
hidden transcript highlighting class concerns among border residents, which would resurface
again in the 1930s. The railroad thus transformed Juárez into a continental crossroads utilized by
migratory workers from the central and north central states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato,
Aguascalientes, and Zacatecas. Most of them followed the Mexican Central Railway route that
acted as a launching point back and forth across the border.50
The railroad also changed the economic development of Ciudad Juárez. Thousands of
people arrived at the border every day looking for wage work opportunities, but because of the
power and control of transnational capital, which exacerbated the economic imbalance between
the two sister cities, none of the Mexican ore mined in the Hidalgo region stayed in Chihuahua.
Instead it was transported across the border to El Paso, Texas. Border historian Oscar Martínez
highlighted the distinctions: “While Juárez went through its boom and bust period, El Paso made
steady progress, evolving into a prominent international transportation center. El Paso received
early impetus in becoming a supply, processing, smelting, and refining center.”51 The economic
decline of Juárez vis-à-vis El Paso continued through the twentieth century, especially after
1905, when national authorities removed the “free zone” (tax free) status that Juárez enjoyed
from 1888 to 1905. This created resentment from people of all classes, as it had allowed the
Mexican border city to grow evenly with its sister city across the border.52 The PLM took
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advantage of this anger over the declining status of Juárez in order to garner support on the
border.53
As mentioned above, the lack of sound economic planning resulted from Mexican federal
and local authorities’ decisions to inhibit the development of self-sustaining economic policies.
The authorities sought little input from local economic sectors, including the cotton producers’
constant demands for more water in the Juárez Valley, and this generated significant discontent
on the border.54 Local Mexican elites, deprived of the ability to address these issues, began to
develop the border as a leisure and entertainment hub for Americans. Martínez summarizes, “As
the twentieth century began, Juárez changed its economic base. With its once prosperous
commerce ruined by the abolition of the Zona, its agriculture seriously affected by water
shortages, and its industry damaged by internal trade obstructions, the city turned to tourism.”55
The conflict for water rights on the border with the United States created a movement of
resistance among the Juárez Valley’s agricultural producers. The cotton producers of the Juárez
Valley formed organizations to defend their interests against the constant encroachment of the
United States regarding water rights, and it remains one of the few pre-revolutionary precedents
of class struggle in the area alongside the PLM exiles.56
Finally, the border experienced a sudden influx of U.S. capital, once Prohibition, which
began in 1920 in the United States, caused scores of restaurants, bars, whisky distilleries, ice
factories, and other related business and patrons to move into Juárez. As a result, a large new
labor force suddenly emerged made up of workers ready to organize after decades of
53
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revolutionary conflict. Prohibition in the United States also acted as a catalyst changing Mexican
workers’ identities. Prohibition brought thousands of jobs to the border, which transformed
Juárez into a border city with a large labor force, and a mecca for American tourism.57 This
generated thousands of service-oriented jobs, whose workers quickly organized into unions after
the Revolution, some of them in radical ways.
Radical Labor Organizers and Ideas in the Mexican Revolution and Its Aftermath
The radical labor movement of the 1930s in the areas under consideration certainly must
be examined within the larger historical context shaped by the activism and militancy of the
Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM), which left legacies and resonance in these areas. The PLM,
headed by Ricardo Flores Magón, paved the way for radicalism in all of Mexico. Following the
publication of its paper Regeneración in 1900, Magón was forced into exile in St. Louis,
Missouri, by 1904, and established ties to the Western Federation of Miners and the Industrial
Workers of the World. Magón’s writings, which entered Mexico via travelling migrants and
those who sought to further a radical revolution, became well known in anarchist U.S. circles.58
When Madero prevailed in the initial phase of the revolution (1910-1911), the PLM condemned
his failure to expropriate land. In 1911, Magón issued a manifesto that displayed much more
radical demands than those made by more moderate revolutionaries. Magón was an anarchist
who believed in radical agrarian reform and the complete eradication of private property. Donald
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Hodges summarized the manifesto’s content, “for a war to the death against private property,
political authority, and the established church. Not only lands would be expropriated, but also
agricultural implements and urban industries- even private houses.”59 The PLM was never
successful in implementing its large scale political agenda, but provided millions of landless
peasants, unemployed artisans, and exploited workers with a vision of a way out of the
widespread poverty they were experiencing.
Worker and peasant discontent was articulated through political organizations, unions,
guerrilla movements, and other radical forms of resistance in the pre-1910 period. The PLM’s
radicalism resonated across a poverty-stricken nation, and across different elements of the
working and middle class. While on a macro level, the Magonistas’ (as those following Flores
Magón were called) influence was seemingly marginal, for the labor movement, the dreams of a
society organized around worker control influenced a range of labor organizations and groups,
from simple trade unions to central federations, and was a catalyst long after Ricardo Flores
Magón died in a US military jail in 1922. Many of the radical labor movements’ experiences on
the border and in the mining district are a direct result of the PLM’s struggles and their long-term
resonance.
Juárez’s crucial location as a border town harboring a significant number of intellectual
exiles, and easy access to guns and ammunition from the United States, as well as opportunities
for quick escapes, allowed the PLM to launch an armed insurrection in 1906 and another one in
1908.60 In 1906, Captain Adolfo Jiménez and Lieutenant Zeferino Reyes, infiltrators from the
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Mexican military gained the Magonistas’ trust, thwarted the plan, and raided the PLM’s
headquarters in Juárez. The police arrested high-ranking PLM members including Juan Sarabia,
Lauro Aguirre, and Rafael Valles alongside dozens of other magonistas.61 This setback did not
stop radicalism on the border. In 1908, this time led by Praxedis G. Guerrero and José Ines
Salazar, the PLM tried again to launch an offensive from Ciudad Juárez. As happened in 1906,
individuals connected with high-ranking state officials infiltrated the movement and eventually
informed authorities of the planned invasion. The police again raided the PLM’s headquarters
and arrested thirty-four PLM members; however, Guerrero and Salazar escaped.62 The military
actions failed, but armed rebellion did not stand alone in the PLM’s arsenal of resistance. The
PLM also had political clubs and print media in Juárez, and evidently their influence outlived the
political insurrection.
John Mason Hart has demonstrated the presence of two anarcho-syndicalist unions,
Acracia and Ni Dios Ni Amo, agitating for direct action and the rejection of political alliances
with the moderate revolutionary government on the border in 1918.63 As in the mining district,
the presence of PLM-inspired organizations adopting the banner of anarcho-syndicalism in
Juárez before the Revolution explains (alongside widespread poverty and lack of political
openings) the success radicalism had on the border during the 1930s. Despite the fact that it lost
out in the revolutionary ferment at the hands of Villa, the PLM’s influence deserves credit for
starting the labor movement at the national level in Mexico. In addition, through the 1930s, ideas
that animated the PLM, including industrial unionism, workers’ control, and general strikes,
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influenced some national unions in Mexico, and in turn this inspired local activists in Hidalgo
and Ciudad Juárez.

Workers in the mining district also experienced the influence of the U.S. radical trade
labor movement in the 1920s. The Unión de Canteros y Albañiles (Construction Workers’
Union), comprised of skilled and unskilled construction workers, drafted a constitution in 1922
based on the model of the radical IWW. This model called for organizing into industrial-based
unions, and rejected craft unionism and political alliances, called for direct action to control the
workplace, and general strikes as a mechanism to leverage workers power against capitalism.64
The newspaper article does not specify the names of these individuals, but it does emphasize the
participation of IWW operatives from the United States in the process of framing the union’s
constitution. Furthermore, a self-proclaimed “Organización Obrera Roja” (Red Workers’
Organization), composed of unemployed workers and the local IWW representative in the state,
the Unión de Trabajadores del Mundo de Chihuahua (Industrial Workers of the World in
Chihuahua), celebrated their meetings in Parral during the early 1920s.65 Finally, as mentioned
previously, IWW operatives started their efforts to organize miners throughout Chihuahua in
Santa Barbara.66
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The Labor Movement: From Radicalization to Co-optation
The modern labor movement in Mexico started with the foundation of the anarchist
oriented Casa del Obréro Mundial on September 22, 1912.67 Colombian Juan Francisco
Moncaleano alongside a handful of Mexican nationals, including Jacinto Huitrón, Praxedis G.
Guerrero, Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama, Juan Villarreal, Juan Sarabia, Candido Aguilar, and
others—most of them former members or sympathizers of the PLM—formed the Casa.68 The
Casa disseminated radical workers’ ideology through classes, poetry, marches, and media (La
Luz). The Casa served as the platform from where most of the early unions, including those with
anarchist and socialist tendencies, started. One of its founders, Jacinto Huitrón, summarizes the
Casa’s ideological stance when first formed: “We frankly declared ourselves, with all our
loyalty, followers of Revolutionary syndicalism.”69 This syndicalism rejected political alliances,
and the church, and instead agitated for the use of direct action at the point of production to
pressure capital, as well as the eventual takeover by workers of the overall economy. Huitrón
credits the PLM as the intellectual precursor of the Casa. As a result of this connection, the early
phase of the national labor movement in Mexico had significant anarchist tendencies. Regional
studies have shown these radical tendencies among Casa del Obrero sympathizers in the states of
Jalisco, Oaxaca, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, Veracruz, and in Mexico City.70
Thus the legacy of magonismo can be seen almost everywhere in Mexico as it provided
subsequent groups and individuals with the necessary language and concepts to articulate their
67
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long standing demands for social justice. The PLM itself died out early in the conflict once
Flores Magón was exiled and imprisoned in the United States, but his heirs and principles
remained in those individuals and groups who found inspiration in the ideas and teachings
disseminated by the Flores Magón brothers.
Finally, the PCM, or Mexican Communist Party, was also influenced by former PLM
members, including Primo Tapia, who became an IWW follower while working in the United
States and then later a Communist because of magonismo. He went on to form agrarian leagues
in Michoacán in west-central Mexico.71 In Jalisco, José Romero Gómez also formed peasant
leagues based on the doctrines of the PLM, and Valentin Campa, one of the original members of
the Communist party and former railroad union leader, credits Flores Magón as “an enormous
influence that contributed to the decision to form the PCM.”72 Former PLM members started the
Mexican Communist Party at the regional level in places like Veracruz, Monterrey, Tabasco,
Puebla and Mexico City.73
From 1914-1924, reformist regimes first challenged and later co-opted unions into their
established governments. The Constitutionalists, liberal in nature and made up of coalitions of a
wide array of ideologies including a radical wing, used labor and agrarian reforms to cement
their power and curtail radicalism by convincing a large segment of workers and their leaders
that its reforms would benefit them. This group made a concerted effort to control labor
radicalism by co-opting its leaders through patronage and violence at the local, state, and
national level. From 1917-1920, before his assassination in 1920, Venustiano Carranza, a
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conservative land owner and former governor of Coahuila, led the Constitutionalists towards a
path of co-optation of the labor movement. Carranza skillfully navigated the armed phase of the
Revolution, and through military victories and popular support —the product of calculated
agrarian and labor reforms— ascended as head (Primer Jefe) of the movement. His trusted
general, Alvaro Obregón, from Sonora, became President as well (1920-1924). Obregón defeated
Villa in 1915, which eventually catapulted him into the presidency and left the latter’s army
decimated, which meant that the political future of Mexico was decided on the battlefield.
Obregón and his successor, Plutarco Elias Calles, from the north-western northern state of
Sonora, nurtured and directed a type of unionism that did not confront or question power
structures.
The Sonorans had a political vision that included the co-optation of the labor movement
to achieve political and labor peace. Historian Jeffrey Bortz writes that “political harmony is a
product of hegemony,” the consent of leaders and social groups to political and social power
structures. In an effort to achieve this endeavor, the Sonorans left an opening for organized labor
to articulate their demands and change discourse in the nation, to challenge the reigning
hegemony. Bortz credited workers’ activism with creating, “the most hegemonic, pro-worker
labor regime in Latin American History.”74He argues that the 1917 Constitution reflected this
new hegemony and that actually allowed workers to win the Revolution.75 The reformist regimes
of the 1920s in Mexico engaged in hegemonic processes to keep labor peace, and this was the
result of workers’ pressure from below. Historians Daniela Spenser and Richard Stoller concur
with this premise but note that the Constitution’s radicalism prevented workers from questioning
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existing power structures.76 In this study, both radicalizing and deradicalizing premises from the
revolution are apparent.
The northerners’ economic power allowed them to establish these hegemonic processes
to begin with. In the period 1914-1917, the Constitutionalists controlled the oil rich region of
Tamaulipas, the henequén (twine) area of Yucatán, key ports including Veracruz, and had
amicable relations with the United States, which allowed them to acquire guns and ammunition
while preventing others from doing the same, and permitted them to finance the collaborationist
sector of the labor movement, which discouraged direct action and radical dogma in favor of
cooperation.77 Later, in the 1920s, the emergent revolutionaries, or Sonorans, were political
pragmatists who saw organized labor as a tool to serve their interests, and as such, they willingly
allowed workers to articulate their demands as long as they had the upper hand. Still, labor won
specific concessions from these arrangements, which increased their power. Throughout the
1920s, Constitutionalist generals throughout Mexico had already put in place state-wide labor
codes and labor tribunals to solve labor conflicts, which allowed labor leaders to choose the
reformist wing of the Revolution as the lesser evil at the local level.
As the 1920s progressed, national elites put in place mechanisms to limit this power.
President Calles established the Junta Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje (Federal Conciliation
and Arbitration Court) in 1927 in an effort to standardize the enforcement of labor laws at the
national level. These courts set clear rules regarding whether each individual state or the federal
government had jurisdiction over any particular labor conflict, and gave the federal government
jurisdiction over the mining, railroad, plutonium, transportation, electric, and other crucial
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control emerging radical labor movements in certain crucial industries by limiting their
independence and ability to act directly. Political elites, which emerged after the Revolution,
needed these provisions to cement their still tenuous power at the national level. Kevin
Middlebrook points out that President Calles created these courts in 1927 to undermine the
radical railroad movement of the late 1920s, which threatened to destabilize his fragile
government.79 The majority of workers in Ciudad Juárez, except for those in the electric
industry, came under the control of the local boards. As a result, most grievances, documented in
the Ciudad Juárez archives, fell under the local and state boards which gave municipal presidents
and local officials more power since they had the ability to appoint arbitrators.80
In the national narrative, scholars have examined the use of tribunals and concluded that
labor took advantage of the new laws to increase their power.81 Some historians argue that these
courts truly assisted workers in transforming power structures.82 Other scholars see these
tribunals as a series of legalistic mechanisms aimed at curtailing labor’s freedom of action and
independence. Scholars also point out that these venues increased the power of the state by
allowing it to act as a mediator.83 But the best way to see the potential and limits for workers’
power is by examining the actual experience of workers in their locale. In the mining region and
on the border, workers utilized collective contracts and the labor courts to increase their power.
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Although in the short run these courts helped those workers under the umbrella of a pro-labor
federal government, as it was the case in the mining district, those courts outside the national
government’s jurisdiction that fell into the hands of local officials did not fare as well.
The Federal Labor Law of 1931 further expanded the power federal authorities had over
workers. The law placed limits on organized labor’s ability to act directly and remain
independent of government interference by giving government officials the ability to call any
strike illegal, or by refusing to officially recognize any union. Perhaps more importantly, this
legislation directed the articulation of workers’ demands through a government created agency.
Moreover, the newly created laws placed unions within the framework and rules devised by the
state precisely to curtail excessive labor militancy.84
These decrees decreased workers’ ability to act directly without the interference of the
federal government and its ability to repress or direct a labor conflict with violence, sabotage,
patronage, or co-optation. Moreover, in the mining district, high-ranking state-wide officials,
despite their lack of jurisdiction, still placed themselves as conflict mediators in an effort to
control the labor movement without the interference of federal authorities, which would have
exposed their lack of control over their provinces. Political elites also provided workers with the
necessary conditions to accept these legislative changes to begin with.
The progressive and radical wing of the Sonorans had a counterweight, which pushed for
collaboration instead of ceding to the continuous and increasingly radical demands of labor.
Instead, it pitted unions against each other by recognizing only those favorable to reform, and
more importantly, by providing economic support to some over others. These “sindicatos
blancos,” more often than not led by pseudo-leadership started to amass power at the national
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level by collaborating with conservative politicians. Obregón occupied the presidency from 1920
to 1924, before his assassination in 1928. Fellow Sonoran, Plutarco Elias Calles, also a former
general and a close ally of Obregón, held office from 1924 to 1928, and Calles’ cronies had
national power from 1928 to 1934 in what is known as the maximato. The Sonorans cemented
their power because of their ability to co-opt the labor movement and direct it towards
collaboration, which gave their post-revolutionary, tenuous hold on power some stability.
However, it is important to recognize that they had to compromise, which provided organized
labor with effective ways to articulate their demands, including collectively bargained contracts,
labor tribunals, and strikes. Nevertheless, the Sonorans effectively steered workers away from
radicalism through the creation of collaborationist federations.
The Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM) laid the foundation leading to
the eventual co-optation of the labor movement. The formation of national labor federations with
the financial and political support of the revolutionary state, starting in 1918 with the CROM,
directed the labor movement towards collaboration. Luis Morones, an obscure labor leader from
the Mexico City Electrician’s Union, founded the CROM in 1918; Morones embodies the new
labor-state dynamics of collaboration instead of confrontation, even if it meant sacrificing
workers’ gains in the name of labor peace. The CROM, from 1918 to the late 1920s,
deradicalized the labor movement nationally through economic and political means by
outspending rival organizations, and through the formation of alternative company-friendly
unions, especially in those industries where radical unions were strong. When these material
incentives did not work, CROM shock groups purged radicalism from independent labor
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federations through violence. The CROM, according to historian Alan Knight, “represented
the culmination of a long, hesitant process of detente between labor and the state: one that had
begun appreciably before the revolution (and which had been pioneered by Porfiristas) but which
the revolution served to accelerate; one that required the workers' repudiation not only of
anarcho-syndicalism (witness Morones, the ideologue and lyrical poet of yesterday, become the
labor boss of today) but also of the pristine liberalism promised by Madero, to which many had
eagerly responded in 1909-13.”86
The CROM’s distancing from radicalism, and its increasing collaboration with the
reformist regimes of Obregón and Calles, forced the most radical unions to leave the CROM.
Historian Joe C. Ashby explains that radical elements, consisting at the time of Communists, the
IWW, revolutionary Socialists and radical agrarian elements were well represented in the first
two conventions in 1918 and 1919, but all left the CROM in 1920.87
In 1921, the radical wing of the labor movement, which felt betrayed by the CROM,
formed the anarchist Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT).88 The CGT’s membership
never exceeded 30,000 members;89 however, it would be a mistake to measure the CGT’s
influence solely on membership numbers. The CGT significantly influenced certain areas,
including Mexico City (tram workers, bakers), Veracruz (tenant movement), Jalisco (miners),
Puebla (textile workers), and Tabasco (independent agrarian communities), where they organized
strikes and ensured tangible benefits for its members, including higher wages, union hiring hall,
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and official recognition. They began to increase their power largely as a result of their
continuous use of direct action and the concrete benefits it brought to workers.90 This resulted in
a concerted effort by government officials to control their rising influence and radicalism with
violence. Additionally, the CROM’s continuous attempts to undermine the CGT through
sabotage and violent acts, plus their own internal divisions highlighted by the anarchists and
Communist split, hastened the CGT’s demise.
The CGT suffered from the same problems the entire Mexican labor movement
experienced in its inception, in terms of disunity between the different wings of the labor
movement. For example, well-known anarchists in Mexico, like Jacinto Huitrón, questioned the
CGT’s credentials as stalwarts of anarchism, “by arguing that the latter’s influence was minimal
and weak, and in 1934-35, this organization fell into the hands of labor reformists.”91 Despite the
relative low number of workers adhered to its ranks, the CGT effectively introduced radical
ideology and tactics to the post-revolutionary labor movement, which at the time leaned towards
collaboration. The successful actions of CGT’s strikers in Mexico City, Tamaulipas, Tabasco,
Jalisco, Veracruz, and Puebla from 1921 to 1925 demonstrate that a large segment of the
working class in Mexico adopted radical labor tenets despite continuous harassment from
politicians and the CROM. Moreover, in February 1921, the Mexican Communist Party (PCM)
and the CGT established a brief alliance during the first couple of years of the CGT’s creation.92
The PCM’s influence at this time (1919-1924) remains a controversial topic. For some
scholars, the party in its initial stages was the product of a handful of foreigners, who convinced
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Moscow that Revolution provided ample opportunities to spread the Revolution.93 Daniela
Spenser argues that the party immediately after its formation experienced factionalism, power
struggles, low membership, and lack of funding that prevented it from influencing the Mexican
labor movement.94 Barry Carr disagrees with these views, especially at the local level. Carr
argues that the PCM did build a significant base among peasants and agricultural workers in
Veracruz, Michoacán, and Puebla and among railroad workers, and miners in Jalisco.95
In the mid and late1920s, after the turn Left of the Comintern, which forced the PCM to dissolve
their political alliances they had with the non-communist left and after the violence unleashed by
the Plutarco Elias Calles regime against communists, the party went into disarray and eventually
underground from 1930 to 1934.96
Once Cárdenas assumed national power in December 1934, the political, social, and
economic environment for workers in Mexico changed. The CROM lost most of its power
(although it retained a significant presence in Puebla and Veracruz states) , and the
Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM), formed in 1936 by Vicente Lombardo
Toledano, an organization much more radical in pronouncements, started to organize workers
with the support to the federal government. The following radical organizations adhered to the
CTM ranks immediately: The Confederación General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico
(CGOCM), the Confederación Sindical Unitaria de Mexico (Communist), Cámara Nacional del
Trabajo, Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros (Railroad Union), the SIMMMR (miners),
SME (electrical workers), Alianza de Uniones y Sindicatos de Artes Gráficas (Printers Union,
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and one of the first unions in Mexico), which meant that the CTM concentrated the radical wing
of the labor force. The CROM, with its close ties with political elites, and the CGT, which
continued under the banner of anarcho-syndicalism, continued to function but would never
regain their previous power.
The CTM’s founder, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, was a college graduate turned labor
organizer, who broke away from the CROM once its leadership prevented radicals from
occupying any position of power. Toledano’s principles changed throughout his tenure as labor
leader. Joe Ashby explains that “Toledano supported orthodox Socialism, collective owning the
means of production, and public ownership of all productive property.”97 However, he gradually
modified his radical stance towards what he referred to as multiple action, including the entrance
of organized labor into politics, something anarchists and Socialists frowned upon.
The CTM had many factions vying for power. Even though Toledano founded it, he
needed the presence of communists and of the conservative wing of the labor movement in
Mexico City to make it effective.98 The Conservatives end up taking control of the leadership
positions and the PCM slowly, but surely lost any independence once the Poplar Front era
dictated an all-out support of Cárdenas’ Revolutionary regime. In 1939-40, a purge of radicals in
the PCM took place, which saw its secretary general, Hernan Laborde and former railroad leader,
Valentin Campa, kicked out of the party. The justification to expel key leaders of the movement
revolved around corrupt practices in the party, but the main issue had to do with the total
subordination of the PCM to foreign communist parties, in this case the United States
Communist Party.99
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After 1935, the Communist Party agreed to work with government-level officials in the
Popular Front era; the Popular Front suggested that the fight against fascism worldwide
necessitated alliances with government officials. Cárdenas’ overtures wooed the PCM in this

alliance. This led the PCM to a membership of 30,000 nationally by 1939. Its peak influence was
precisely under Lázaro Cárdenas – in terms of both membership and influence. It was hugely
important in some of the national industrial unions with Railroad workers, for example, and in
some sectors of the Miners union), and among schoolteachers (where it dominated); in many
sectors of the peasant movement, intellectually and artistically, the PCM influenced workers
nationally. Despite relatively low numbers, the influence of Communist organizers on the labor
movement on the border was higher than expected. The influence was especially important, as
we shall see, among the electric and textile workers, as well as unemployed workers in a city
where radical workers’ dogma never had a significant influence prior to the Revolution.100 In
1937, most of the radical unions split from the CTM, and the latter lost a quarter of its
membership. Most of the Communist unions left once the CTM’s leadership curtailed their
ability to act independently by forcing them to accept decisions without a democratic process
behind it. However, Communist-identified unions returned to the CTM that same year after
directives from Moscow forced them to return to the CTM. The Mexican Communist Party also
experienced a split in which a significant number of their most loyal organizers (railroad
workers, miners, and etc.) left the party that same year. This break resulted from a disagreement
concerning whether to obey the mandates from the Comintern (IC) calling for collaboration with
other forces and the sympathetic state, or remain independent.101 The eventual decision to remain
an ally of the government forced CTM’s most radical unions to leave. This left the CTM as the
100
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most important labor conglomerate in Mexico, but without any radical unions in it, which meant
the beginning of the end of the CTM’s radical ways.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the material that provided the foundations for radicalism during
the 1930s. The PLM’s connection to the radical labor movement on the border and in the mining
district is a direct one. This radicalism increased with the presence of IWW operatives, the
transnational status of Mexican workers, the transcontinental railroad’s crucial role (which
allowed these migrations), and the pre-existing agrarian identity forged by the struggle against
land encroachment by haciendas and other large land owners. However, in the mining district,
workers deradicalized once high-ranking officials supported them, while in Juárez, this
radicalism grew when local elites responded with violence This section has also outlined some
key developments in the history of the national labor movement. It has also examined the
influence the U.S. and Russia labor movements had on each region and at the national level. The
following chapter will analyze the unions’ efforts to unionize workers in the region to increase
workers’ power through independent organizations and labor federations with different degrees
of success.

CHAPTER TWO: ORGANIZING FOR POWER

During the 1930s, leaders of workers’ federations in Ciudad Juárez and the Hidalgo
mining region made efforts to establish the means to increase workers’ power. They did this by
uniting workers within federation structures, and articulating demands that bridged workplace
and community interests. They sought to move beyond specific workplace concerns and
developed more broad-based unions and labor federations. Within this framework, local labor
movements articulated their demands with varying degrees of success. In both areas under
consideration, notable drifts toward radical forms of labor resistance occurred although the
degree of radicalism varied according to each locale under study. While later chapters will show
how these impulses were contained, it is clear that the labor movement in the 1930s was not
necessarily one that sought to contain workers’ demands. The coming to power of President
Lázaro Cárdenas in December 1934 affected these developments, but first, it is important to see
how the labor movement developed at the local level.
Organized labor’s growing radicalism was vibrant enough to draw comment from the
United States’ consulate in Chihuahua late in the 1930s. In 1938, American Consul Lee R.
Blohm noted labor’s impressive political and economic gains over the course of the decade,
especially after Cárdenas took office. The consul highlighted labor leadership’s determination to
develop more power; his report suggested that the leadership’s success in achieving “better
working conditions and much higher wages” that portended an effort to “challenge capitalism.”
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The consul suggested that the leadership might not always have “been properly regarded
by the workers themselves,” but his report also delivered a hopeful note to the U.S. State
Department that the Chihuahua workers were tamer than their union leadership. 1 It is difficult
with the sources at hand to know precisely whether and to what extent workers themselves
forced leaders in a more radical direction, or whether Blohm was right that there was some
distance between leaders and ordinary workers and their families.
Post-Revolution Chihuahua labor activists and radical labor federation leaders appealed
to local workers’ broad class interests to increase their influence in the region. Labor federations
undertook strategic campaigns to connect workplace-based organizations to community-based
working class movements. Thus, issues like higher wages and worker control of the workshop
were connected to local control of consumables, local rent regulations, campaigns for the
organization of marginalized workers, and other demands. In the mining district, political and
economic elites supported these endeavors as long as they felt they could still control and curtail
more radical demands that contested capitalist ownership and their own security. Workers in
Ciudad Juárez, on the other hand, faced more obstacles in creating a radical movement from the
beginning of these campaigns.
Despite hostility from local government officials, unions and federations on the border
engaged in a decade-long struggle to increase workers’ power through mass unionization.
Furthermore, certain unions and federations on the border adopted radical tactics and utilized
radical language (including mass protests, media articles and strikes) which exposed the elites’
lack of control over labor.
1
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While he was a leading obstacle to labor radicalism on the border area, Governor Rodrigo
Quevedo took a pro-labor stance in Parral-Santa Barbara. In doing so, he was responding to the
political and economic strength workers showed through massive unionization, and his efforts
were also intended to show Cárdenas that he supported the administration’s labor policies. Thus,
in general, local state officials sought to avoid conflict with organized labor. They knew that
workers and unions had the power to shut down the mining industry, generating mass
unemployment, economic hardship, and reductions in revenue due to unpaid taxes. By contrast,
Governor Quevedo’s economic interests in Parral-Santa Barbara did not clash with those of
workers. Different political and economic exigencies in the two areas elicited radically different
behavior from local officials in each region.
The Formation of Labor Federations in Ciudad Juárez
Radical labor unions and federations seemed to rise like a phoenix in Ciudad Juárez in the
1930s. As explained in chapter 1, an industrial base for unions was limited in this area, but the
border had experienced radical revolutionary movements like the Magonista movement, going
back to 1906. Beginning in the early 1930s, unions and federations started to develop from this
base and continued to steadily develop at the community level across the 1930s. The radical
Cámara Sindical Obrera, or CSO, formed on November 23, 1930, in the cities of Chihuahua,
Ciudad Juárez, and Parral. The CSO was a statewide labor federation, which sought to organize
workers regardless of skill or trade. The CSO was formed by the Union de Filarmonicos de
Ciudad Juárez (Musicians Union), La Gran Liga Textil Socialista (The Socialist Textile Union),
the Unión Gremial de Cargadores (loaders union) and the Unión de Matanceros (Butchers
Union). These constituent unions went back to the 1920s. By 1933, this organization had already

reached out to other trades. Throughout the 1930s, the CSO continued to win other member
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organizations to its federation, such as the Unión Sindical de Boleros (shoe shiners), the
Sindicato de Vendedores Ambulantes (street vendors), the Unión Sindical de Estibadores del
Norte (loaders), and the Unión Gremial de Obreros Zapateros (shoe makers). As is clear from
this listing, this was a federation that attended to workers at the bottom of the economic order.
Notably, this included women’s unions, further showing the CSO’s intentions to expand the base
of their power from the bottom-up. By 1937, the CSO eventually expanded to more than twentytwo organizations, including the Mexican Communist Party section in Juárez.2 This represented a
shift from when the CSO was started, as initially the organization denied that they had CP
affiliation. In 1931, in an El Paso, Texas newspaper, El Continental, the CSO sought to counter
the label of communist: “The Cámara Sindical Obrera affirms that their members are not
Communists. Furthermore, we would like to inform the President that the CSO follows only
those pronouncements made by the Mexican Revolution.”3 The CSO, at the time, thought it
important to disassociate from their radical colleagues, at least publically; however, their
anticommunist stance did not last long. In 1937, they had made an alliance with the Cámara
2

List of the organizations belonging to the CSO in 1935, Unión Sindical de Estibadores del Norte, Gran Liga Textil
Socialista, US de Matanceros del Valle de Juárez, Sindicato de Cantineros, Meseros y Similares, C. Femenil Obrera,
US de Boleros, L. de Camp. Y Obreros Forestales, US de Obreros Industriales de Ciudad Juárez, Unión Sindical de
Pintores, S. de Cargadores de Almacenes y Similares, US de Locatarios del Mercado Cuauhtémoc, Sindicato de
Tensorialistas y Similares, Sindicato de Empleados del Lobby No. 2, Sindicato Obrero. Manufactureros de Adobe y
Ladrilleria, Unión Sindical de Expendedores de Carbón Vegetal y Similares, Sindicato de Tablajeros y Similares,
Sindicato de Cancioneros de Ciudad Juárez, Unión Gremial de Cargadores de Cd. Juárez, Chih., Unión Sindical de
Obreros Industriales de Guadalupe DB, Unión Sindical de Hacheros y Carboneros “Ignacio Zaragoza” del Vergel
DB, Sindicato de Madereros y Similares, “Felipe Carrillo Puerto” de Madera, Chih., Sindicato de Ob. Y Camp. “Rio
Bravo,” Práxedes G. Guerrero, DB, Unión Sindical de Trabajadores De E. y Expendedores De Leche, Sindicato de
Panaderos y Similares “Libertad,” Unión Sindical de Zapateros de C. Juárez, Chih., Unión de Filarmónicos, Unión
Defensa Rio Bravo, Sindicato Industrial de Trabajadores “Francisco I. Madero,” Sindicato de Cargadores de
Almacenes y Similares, Sindicato de Obreros y Empleados de la Cia. Mexicana P. de Luz y Fuerza, box number
1932, Archivo Municipal de Ciudad Juárez, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, México, hereafter referred to as
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Unitaria del Trabajo, the organization representing the PCM, or Mexican Communist Party, in
Juárez.
By 1938, the CSO’s ranks also included electricians, textile workers, bakers, coal
workers, domestic workers, musicians, and other professional and non-professional
organizations. Miguel Oaxaca (Secretary of the Transportation Workers Union), Pascual Padilla
(of the Unemployed or Sin Trabajo Union), and Armando Pórras (Electricians’ Union) were
three of the best known and most radical union leaders of organizations composing the CSO in
Juárez. Oaxaca started as a labor organizer with the bakers’ union in the 1920s, and in the late
1930s, he organized workers in El Paso and Juárez, especially among ASARCO smelter workers
in El Paso.4 Starting in 1932, Pascual Padilla became the most visible Communist Party
operative on the border, as he led the Sin Trabajo Union into a confrontation with local highranking officials, which included the use of mass protest and disruption of government events.
Armando Pórras led the Electricians’ Union through a successful three-year ordeal (1935-1938)
to establish a collective contract against the local Power Company (as it was called) managed by
the Quevedo Clan.5
The CSO utilized different strategies to influence the community and counteract antilabor initiatives in the area. The CSO had an affinity for using print media to communicate
directly to workers, and to encourage direct action in the form of mass protests and strikes to
pressure their adversaries. It relied on public shows of power in the form of political rallies, in an
4
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effort to inculcate a spirit of solidarity among the labor force. The CSO threatened the political
elites in Juárez by having its members take their demands to the streets.
One example of the CSO’s utilization of massive political rallies and demonstrations to
project power and cultivate a sense of class pride among its members occurred in 1930.
Apparently, the mayor had issued an invitation to labor organizations from the Comite Directivo
of the ‘Fiestas de la Revolución,’ which organized the official celebrations of Labor Day. In
response, Silverio Villalobos, Secretary General of the CSO, objected to the attempt of political
leaders’ to co-opt memories of the Chicago Haymarket anarchist labor martyrs, “of the ones that
were sacrificed for us.” Specifically, Villalobos wrote that CSO objected that it was improper to
accept the invitation to the official celebration because it would be “a sacrilege to the memory of
our martyrs on the 1st of May in Chicago.”6 Instead they insisted that the CSO should organize
its own mass protest commemoration as opposed to leaving it in “profane hands.” They sought to
break with authorities by making it “a celebration by the Cámara Sindical Obrera.”7 The CSO’s
manifesto and refusal to join the official celebrations reveals its commitment to working class
autonomy, and a framework that situated their struggles within a broad global historical context.
The CSO’s embrace of mass action in the form of public demonstrations also
demonstrated the organization’s ability to mobilize their members in a projection of worker
power. Its protests exposed local and political elites’ inability to control the way workers
articulated their demands. In July 1935 for example, the CSO organized a public demonstration
in downtown Juárez to gain “support from all the resistance organizations in the city to protest
and to denounce publicly the presence of a rival company-friendly union in the Rio Bravo
6
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Textile Mill.”8 The Rio Bravo Textile Mill union, alongside the Electricians and the Unemployed
Unions, were the most radical organizations belonging to the CSO. The Textile Union embarked
on a decade long struggle with the company’s management over its collective contract. In this
particular instance, the creation of a company-friendly union by the company was the detonator
for the protest. Throughout its existence, the CSO faced the efforts of elites to contain their union
movement through establishing company-organized unions (or sindicatos blancos).
Public shows of power by unions, which essentially stopped all activities citywide,
astonished the United States Consular office. In 1936, U.S. consular officials remarked at the
effectiveness of the May 1 (Workers Day) mass meeting in the main plazas of Ciudad Juárez,
commenting that organized labors’ show of power would make Ciudad Juárez “appear to be a
dead village was almost literally true. Speeches were made by labor and political leaders in the
main plazas. The number of participants in the demonstrations was impressive and evidenced the
activity of the organizers.”9 El Continental, a Spanish only printed newspaper also noted the
success of the May 1 parade organized by the CSO-affiliated unions.10
Massive displays of political and social muscle gave impetus to the effort of the CSO to
organize sectors of the community which lacked prior experience in unionizing. This validated
the group’s claim to be the protector of revolutionary values as unions at the time defined them.
For example, in 1938, domestic workers in the area organized into the Sindicato de Trabajadoras
Domesticas de Izquierda (leftist female domestic workers’ union) and immediately affiliated
with the CSO. The Domestic Workers’ Union slogan, “for a society without classes,” illustrates

8
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the CSO adherents’ call for a revolutionary trade union movement.11 Moreover, unions among
marginalized sectors like the Domestic Workers were relatively less powerful as isolated
individual unions which lacked funds and robust numbers, but once they belonged to a
federation, their voices grew more powerful in unison with other workers of the federation.
The CSO’s determination to bring women into the ranks of organized labor in Ciudad
Juárez can be seen in another extraordinary movement — the organization of women street
vendors. This confirms the federation’s strategy to see workers who might normally be
considered itinerant petty entrepreneurs or business operators as deserving of protections and to
bring them under the umbrella of the CSO. In 1936, the Centro Femenil Obrero with the support
of the CSO, mandated that those who would “sell tortillas in this city should belong to one of the
two resistance organizations that are submitting this letter, which are the Centro Femenil Obrero
and the Sindicato de Expendedoras de Alimentos.”12 The CSO made sure that workers had
protection against the possibility that anyone who was not part of the labor federation could sell
tortillas to the public. The message was clear: all workers should be part of a labor movement,
and the city should ensure that the CSO acted as guardians of the working class.
Other evidence shows that there was a notable effort to communicate inclusiveness in
demonstrations, to address existing divisions in the labor force, and to undermine gender
barriers. For example, at an April 1935 rally, organizers noted that multiple actors would have a
voice “during the course of the demonstration including women representatives of the workers'
unions.”13
11
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The CSO utilized other tactics to instill pride among workers. One such event was the
election of a Workers’ Queen, something that might be now criticized for its reinforcement of
gender norms, but which could also be seen in the light of working class pride. The origin of this
tradition is unclear, but the meeting place for the celebration was a recognized public space, the
Juarez Monument. On May 5th, after a parade, a “little girl”, chosen from Juárez workers, was
elected as “the Queen of Workers.”14 These efforts can be seen as an attempt to claim all
festivities as a part of workers’ consciousness, and in turn, as an effort to create a kind of total
worker movement, one that united worker and community. The community’s conferring of the
title ‘Queen of Workers’ also reveals feelings of pride in being workers and reveling in their
class perspectives in public spaces. This was not local elites’ condescending attitude directing
workers to feel better about their status as workers by throwing them a parade; this was a
working class community continually reminding itself that it needed to occupy public spaces
with pride.
The CSO effort to inculcate class and community solidarity can also be seen in an episode in
which the boundaries between community and union faded, and the overall effort to unite social
justice with class solidarity was prioritized. The union representing charcoal workers, Hacheros
y Carboneros Ignacio Zaragoza de El Vergel D. B. Chihuahua, recognized that it provided
charcoal to the community at affordable prices, without which cooking and warming homes
during the winter would have been expensive and difficult.
In a letter to the mayor of Ciudad Juárez, workers noted that “hard work” through their
“exploitation of national forest,” produced a vital resource for people. They considered
themselves as much a cooperative as a union, referring to themselves as the Sociedad
14
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Cooperativa Forestal, who worked with “the approval of our regimentation by the Departamento
Forestal de Caza y de Pesca.” Workers organized within the CSO explained that they were
workers who also sold their charcoal until permission to sell the charcoal was threatened by the
H. Union de Expendedores de Cd. Juárez in June 1937, which refused to sell the charcoal
wholesale to the public. In a radical act of solidarity, and in an obvious attempt to gain favor
among the people of the community, the cooperative argued that they were planning to defy
authorities by selling charcoal directly to the consumer. They declared: “we are organized
elements, and to be organized means that we have the duty to protect our class brothers, and at
the same time protect our interests in legal ways and without harming the community.” After
justifying their actions by appealing to the community’s interest, the union agreed “to sell it
directly to the consumers at a price of eight cents per kilo, as with this the producer and the
consumer will benefit and according to us they are the ones that most need it, being all of them
working people.”15
The CSO in Ciudad Juárez sought to assert working class interests as their purview,
emphasizing the right of labor organizations to regulate the local political economy. In May
1936, the leaders of the CSO complained of the hardships that confronted working class families
because of speculation “by the wealthy merchants from the city and outside the city, and the
‘monopolies of SUGAR, RICE, FLOUR, which increased in an extraordinary way the prices of
staple articles of food.” The CSO leaders inquired whether “the regulatory prices commission of
this city was formed and if not, to hope it will be constituted as soon as possible, also to inform
us of all the things that according to the Commission are in the interest of this union and the
people in general,” thereby asserting that politicians should attend to restraining the power of the
15
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conception of the reach of union campaigns. If not revolutionary take-overs of business, these
were certainly strong counters to private capitalist marketplace control of the political economy.
By 1937, the CSO made a bold move by establishing an official alliance with the PCM.
The latter was acting under orders from Moscow, under the Popular Front, which called for
alliances with non-communist leftist organizations and the sympathetic state. The U.S. consul in
Chihuahua reported on the alliance formed by the CSO with other organizations in the city: “A
meeting was called by the Cámara Sindical Obrera for the purposes of ‘definitely consolidating
the proletarian unification of the frontier.’ The organizations signing the ‘Pact of Solidarity’ were
the Cámara Sindical Obrera, Comité de Acción Social Ejidal del Distrito Bravo, Cámara Unitaria
del Trabajo (communist), Comité Seccional del Partido Comunista de México (Mexican
Communist Party), and the Bloque Obrero y Campesino.”17 This alliance by the Cámara
Unitaria and the Communist Party with the CSO was a direct result of the Popular Front. The
decision by labor on the border to support the national government coincided with the
communists’ agenda to enter into political alliances once Cárdenas proved sympathetic to labor.
The Cámara Sindical widened this gap with elites by cultivating radical class perceptions, which
made them vulnerable to attacks by connecting them with communism.
Radicals in the CSO faced competition from the more established federation, which also
wooed workers into state-sanctioned federations with more conservative directions. The
Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana or CROM’s presence in Juárez was also significant. It
represented workers in almost every economic activity in the city during most of the 1930s, and
competed against the CSO for workers’ adherence. In many instances, workers in various jobs
16
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could choose from competing unions; one representing the CSO, and the other, the CROM. But
most of the CROM’s membership was made up of workers in the service sector that dominated
the city’s alcohol, cabaret, restaurant, and bar businesses. Unlike the CSO, CROM federation
officials in Juárez collaborated with local elites as most of their members worked in businesses
connected with local political and economic elites. The CROM’s ties to powerful figures
extended to the office of the mayor. Ricardo Espinoza, a CROM leader, became municipal
president on October 9, 1935, when Dr. Daniel Quiroz quit; however, he lasted only three
months before José Quevedo was elected. Nevertheless, his political ascendance shows the
CROM’ ties to local political power. This suggests that the CROM’s access to local political
power had more to do with the co-optation by local and statewide officials looking to
deradicalize the movement in Juárez than a victory for workers.
The ultimate winners of this contest between styles of unionism were not clear until later
in the 1930s. Would the CROM prevail, and a more tame form of union based on political
alliances with ruling interests dominate Ciudad Juárez, or would the more radical form of
unionism triumph. Part of the answer to this was worked out in a broader setting in which the
nature and scope of unionism in other areas of Chihuahua were determined. A critical area in this
respect was the Hidalgo mining region. Would that region join a radical agenda as a legacy of the
Revolution, or would it be tamed?
Parral-Santa Barbara
After the Revolution (1910-1920), labor unions and federations in this important mining
area sprang up seeking to increase workers’ power by uniting and emboldening them to pursue
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their class interests and resist capital, when necessary, through walk-outs, strikes, boycotts, and
legal actions. Labor unions’ and federations’ successes in improving their workers’ living
situations transformed Santa Barbara-Parral into a labor-friendly space throughout the 1930s.
Workers’ support for these initiatives led many of the labor federations’ leaders to gain access to
the corridors of power and become influential actors throughout Chihuahua. Political elites
realized that they needed the support of unions to get elected and to maintain political and
economic stability.
The Cámara Regional del Trabajo (CRT), a regional federation, formed in the area in
1933 by Union de Mecanicos Electricistas y Similares (Electricians and Mechanics’ Union),
Sindicato de Panaderos Ignacio Zaragoza (Bakers’ Union), and Sindicato de Trabajadores
Mineros Benito Juarez (Miners’ Union), represented the types of labor unions that sought to
bridge divisions across trade and skill throughout the mining region. These federations provided
an outlet for workers to articulate their demands within the legal framework established after the
Revolution. How much workers could achieve by contesting employers through that legal
framework was unknown at the time, but it is clear that they used these mechanisms to extract all
that was possible from that framework through threats and political connections. The limits were
not known until later.
The CRT did not join either the CTM or the CROM during the 1930s, which allowed
them to remain independent of directives from the national labor leaders’ mandates from Mexico
City calling for collaboration and rejecting radicalism. The “Benito Juárez” Miners’ Union
(predecessor of Parral Section 9 of the National Miners’ Union established in 1934) and the
“Ignacio Zaragoza” bakers’ union had both been part the CROM, but joined the CRT. CROM’s
influence in the mining region eroded as the 1930s advanced, both in Parral and Santa Barbara
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and at the national level. The fact that miners joined with other workers in the area represented a
break in continuity with the more passive resistance or lack of solidarity that William French
argues was the dominant position of skilled mine workers towards their fellow unskilled workers
throughout the rest of the community before the Revolution.18
In a manifesto published in the local newspapers immediately after their formation in
1933, the CRT quickly made its presence known in the mining area. The two largest and most
powerful miners’ unions in the area, the “Benito Juárez” and “Vicente Guerrero,” from Parral
and Santa Barbara respectively, joined the CRT. This decision by the local miners’ unions
strengthened the labor federation, since miners had a long tradition of resistance and
unionization. The entire region depended on the mines, which in turn, provided a potential base
to negotiate on behalf of others. Isaac Marcosson demonstrated this dependency in his landmark
study of ASARCO.19 Furthermore, the foundation of the National Miners’ Union, the Sindicato
de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalurgico, Siderurgicos y Similares de la Republica Mexicana
(STMMR) in 1934, could have drawn miners toward a perspective that saw their interests as only
connected with other miners and with ASARCO; miners in Santa Barbara-Parral remained in the
CRT and its ethos of local and regional solidarity through uniting workers across trade and skill.
It was Salvador Santana, Secretary General of the CRT, who announced to ASARCO that
the state-wide radical federation represented the majority of workers and requested a new
contract. The CRT leadership boldly declared its intentions to defend “all workers as one.”20 The
CRT highlighted that the organization cut across trades and skills, that it would refuse to allow
division among the working class in the mining region to dominate the workers’ agenda, and that
18
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it sought the means to unite in order to bring a new regimen to the company’s operations. As the
CRT acknowledged, “The hope in forming this federation was due to the current state of
disorganization that has been perceived and after recognizing and embracing the times, we have
made the resolution to join in a single flag and goal.”21 The phrase “embracing the times” needs
highlighting as it shows the CRT’s decision to establish connections with the Cárdenas
presidency, and places them in the larger context of the national labor movement.
The CRT used class-struggle rhetoric to frame its intentions in the area: “The chamber
accepts class struggle as a fundamental premise. It does this without any hatred or spite, and it
expects cooperation from other organizations that are alike in thought and action.” CRT made it
clear that it sought to bridge workers’ interests across trades and skills as a means to assert their
power. Perhaps more notably, the CRT shows a clear expectation that other organizations in the
mining region would join them in making this a class-based struggle. They labeled their
adversaries (captains of industry) as greedy individuals with opposing interests.
Nevertheless, the manifesto also acknowledged workers’ apparent lack of preparation to defend
the values of the Revolution, which the federation embodied. The newly formed chamber argued
regarding socialist education, “We accept the reforms proposed in the educational system to
establish in elementary schools the obligatory teachings of advanced doctrines that can prepare
the youth for their logical incorporation in the new (national) regime.”22 This statement reflects
the CRT’s decision to support Cárdenas’ educational reforms, further showing its alliance with
progressive national and statewide elites.23
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The CRT also expressed agreement with the long term agenda to reduce the hold of
alcohol in workers lives, and sought to involve the political system to provide for “physical
activity” as well as “concern for the welfare of the elderly and defenseless.” The manifesto
announced an agenda to prevent wage devaluation, and expressed concern with addressing issues
of mechanization and the preservation of “the advances achieved so far by the working class.”24
These successful efforts at the local level to keep the value of wages at the same rate as inflation
does not coincide with the depreciation of wages workers suffered throughout the 1930s at the
national level.25
The CRT was not the only organization competing for workers’ allegiance in Parral. The
Frente Revolucionario Obrero y Campesino (FROC), which originated in the late 1920s, was
composed of the oldest unions in Parral, the Sociedad de Obreros “Miguel Hidalgo”, the
“Ignacio Zaragoza” Union (bakers), and the “Benito Juarez” union (miners) before they left to
form the CRT.26 The Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM) eventually coalesced
with the FROC, combining their ranks in 1936, which strengthened the CTM in the mining area
as the FROC also made efforts to broaden workers’ demands beyond the workplace.
This does not mean the FROC avoided issues that would make local officials uneasy,
such as raising the wages of local municipal employees. In 1939, Manuel Gradea, Secretary
General of the FROC reflected this inclination when he sent a letter “asking if you can tell us the
reason that wages have not increased for our fellow workers, members of this union, who work
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for this municipality, a list of whom we sent weeks ago.” Kevin Middlebrook explains in his
book, Paradox of Revolution (1995), that government employees had their own organizations to
articulate their demands. Nevertheless, federations like the FROC in the mining district sought to
speak for state workers by organizing them into a union.28
Federations in the mining district used their influence by reach beyond demands for
higher wages. They defended community-wide interests by speaking against inflation and
merchant abuse. This concern for food and other essential items coincides with President
Cárdenas’ food policies designed to control rising prices at the national level. Local officials in
the district assisted these initiatives.29 In a letter to the President of the Investigatory Commission
which regulated the prices of food essentials, the mayor of Parral indicated that the unions in the
area had made him aware that the regulatory authority needed to “intervene in an effective way
in favor of making those articles of prime necessity affordable. Our members have made us
aware that local merchants have raised their prices in an exaggerated and extreme manner. Since
it is the obligation of this authority and those commissions created for this precise purpose to
curtail merchants from profiting immoderately, we have no doubt that the local authority will do
what is within its power to avoid the inaccessibility of those products consumed by the working
class.”30 At the local level, labor leaders took advantage of the favorable political context to
increase unions’ power in a way that reached beyond the workplace.
Labor federations recognized the unregulated increase on prices of different products
widely utilized by the community, and swiftly acted accordingly. Thus, they joined forces with
27
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the local government to counteract inflation and businesses’ speculation with essential food. The
letter confirms unions’ expectations that authorities would assist in their efforts to regulate
certain products and services in their favor.
Merchants’ price speculation drew attention and ire from Section 11, a newly formed
National Miners’ Union in Santa Barbara in 1934. Officials of the organization sought to prevent
harm to their members and the working class in the area. The union pressured local officials and
demanded to know “the cause or causes of why certain merchants have significantly raised
prices. This union leadership believes and expects, given your record, that you will stop the
abuse of some merchants. We expect an answer as soon as possible to our request.”31 The
union’s expectation of a quick resolution from local authorities shows the changes in the
relationship between workers and government officials that the Revolution catalyzed.32
As in Ciudad Juárez, unions and federations in the district realized the importance of
inserting their voice into price regulation of articles of basic necessity. This influence among
workers also demonstrated the federations’ newly found power in respect to local businesses and
operators. Throughout the 1930s, union federations accomplished much by regulating the prices
of meat, milk, transportation, and housing, and engaged in concerted efforts to keep them
affordable, a tactic which improved the lives of workers.
The following excerpt is an example of unions’ involvement in controlling rising meat
prices. In 1930, the FROC demanded action regarding the “exorbitant price of meat being sold to
the public, despite the fact that the animals sold to the slaughterhouse are inexpensive.” Now it
was organized workers, not companies, whose voices was heard in municipal halls. The FROC
31
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thought the same way and “agreed to force those trafficking with this product to reduce the price
of meat, since this product is considered an article of prime necessity.”33 In the same year, the
FROC wrote to local officials that they felt compelled by their membership to help the federation
intervene in rent issues: “We have agreed to make the local authorities aware that most of the
owners of properties in this locality, taking advantage of the minimal raise in wages that workers
earned, have disproportionally increased rents that were already high.”34 Four years later, Section
9 of Parral continued to argue that housing was an essential right and demanded authorities
legislate against landlord abuses. Section 9 sent the above quoted letter to pressure local officials.
The union argued that no regulatory limits existed, so Section 9 lobbied the state congress
pressuring them to draft legislation regulating this matter. Section 9 added that they would not
recognize these increases.35 The union added that workers would refuse to pay the difference in
rent. Their alliances with high-ranking municipal officials gave workers hope to influence
legislation.
Local municipal authorities shared the unions’ concerns regarding soaring rent prices.
Gabriel Chavez, the mayor of Parral, responded, agreed and added that the municipality would
take “steps to solve it.” 36 The response by local authorities illustrates the collaborative effort
between them, which provided unions and federations with the necessary credibility to continue
organizing around community and class concerns among workers in the area.
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Labor federations’ concerns over increasing transport cost boosted their credibility within
the community and among local authorities. In January 1935, the miners’ unions put pressure on
local officials who “energetically protested” that the “owners of the transportation system have
since the 16th of this month increased their rates to the excessive amount of 1.50 pesos for each
trip to the city of Parral.”37 The miners’ union recognized that some of their workers resided far
from certain mines, and the evidence suggests that the demand was coming from rank-and-file
workers, who warmed to the union agenda regarding community concerns. The mine union
officials explained that they were responding to the serious protest of workers of this union due
to the scarcity of food and housing in this mining locality. The union added that a lack of
increase in wages, and unreasonable costs in housing and articles of basic necessity, had
significantly damaged the working class.38
Price and rent control were not the only community-based items on the agenda for the
unions in the Hidalgo region. Organized labor in the area demanded the establishment of a
minimum wage and profit sharing for all organized workers in the region as early as 1930. In a
letter to the mayor of Parral in 1930, the FROC proposed that a Minimum Wage and Profit
Sharing Commission be established in each year on the first day of January in every main
municipality. The unions wanted these commissions to be composed of a representative of each
party, one for workers and one for owners.39 Unions pressured local authorities to ensure a
minimum wage and the ability to share corporate profits as an aspect of the Revolution’s
granting of rights. The FROC expressed its frustration by writing, “Since the entire month has
37

Secretary of the Industrial de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalurgicos y Similares de la Republica Mexicana, Section
9, to the mayor of Parral, Valentin Chacón Baca, January 7, 1935, 1935/AHMP.
38
Jesus Najera, secretary general of the Sindicato Industrial de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalurgicos y Similares de
la Republica Mexicana, Section 9, to the mayor of Parral, Valentin Chacón Baca, January 7, 1935, 1935/AHMP.
39
Frente Regional Revolucionario Obrero y Campesino to the mayor of Parral, Joaquin Aguirre, January 29, 1930,
1930/AHMP.

82	
  

passed and the municipality has failed to name such representatives, we are asking you to please
install such a board in accordance with the law.”40 Legislation contained in the Federal Labor
Law of 1931 called for the creations of a minimum wage and profit sharing commission
composed of workers and capital. Capital owners and operators, it appears, did everything to
obstruct the law since they dreaded such interference with their private prerogatives and the new
assertiveness on the part of unions; as a result, they made significant efforts to refuse to
participate by failing to send representatives to meetings and commissions. Owners’ use of
delaying tactics over a core and legislated working class demand created a context for more
militancy on the part of workers, as it established clearer lines of division and revealed the class
interests of each group. Finally, this document concludes with an energetic demand by the union
to uphold the law.
Workers’ influence in the mining area through their unions and the federations allowed
them to assert their voice into the regulatory mechanisms of labor conflict resolution. In some
instances workers demanded the removal of inspectors whom the respective federation or union
felt did not perform their duties as they would have liked. In June 1933, the CRT asserted its
right and determination to remove local officials from office if they failed to adhere to the goals
of the law. Apparently the union felt that a local inspector, Dolores Hernandez, was more
interested in political advancement over workers’ health and safety. They wrote to Gabriel
Chavez, the mayor of Parral:
We request that you intervene so that the state executive would answer two notes that we
sent on the 14th and 16th of May which pertain to the accusations that organized labor
has presented against Mr. Dolores Hernandez, the local inspector. He has completely
missed the purpose of a regulator of industry and instead has concentrated his efforts on
40
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politics. Since this acutely affects the working class, we have requested his immediate
removal, but we have not received an answer.41
The archival file was incomplete so we do not know if authorities removed the inspector. But
compared to what had been possible before the Revolution, we can see a developing assertion
that politics should mean significant increases in power and more control over selection of
officials to ensure the well-being of workers and an improvement in their working conditions in
the 1930s.
Collaboration, Support and Deference
It is clear that the relationship between workers and government underwent significant
changes throughout the 1930s, and expanded beyond material concerns. Various celebrations
taking place in the community showed elements of collaboration, support, and deference
between labor federations and local officials. One might argue that deference did not exhibit the
presence of revolutionary class values, and that the close relationship with local officials in many
ways only tamed the labor movement. Historian Alan Knight has argued as much, suggesting
that “the labor leaders who emerged out of the decade of revolution …traded independence and
ideological fidelity for access to power.”42 But on the ground in the Hidalgo mining region, we
can see that the political context after the Revolution, which led local officials to respond to the
most popular grievances or risk losing their positions, and transformed workers’ and official’s
consciousness. For the Hidalgo district, local officials were testing new ground, and initially, it
was not clear that taming would result from some degree of collaboration.
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Such a process is seen when examining festivities, such as May 1, Independence Day,
Cinco de Mayo, or the Revolution’s anniversary celebration in November. Unions, labor
federations, and authorities worked together to make festivities meaningful and to construct a
community identity, which acknowledged unions and workers as a central players in the nation
and community. In October 1934, the Sindicato Industrial de Trabajadores Mineros,
Metalúrgicos y Similares de la Republica Mexicana wrote to the mayor of Parral stating that the
union had “agreed that the celebrations commemorating the revolution were to be conducted at
the municipal building, while at the same time expressing our most sincere efforts to cooperate in
them.”43 In the first place, this response by the union shows the changes taking place in the
relationship between workers and government because prior to the Revolution, this would have
never taken place in other celebrations, like Independence. Also, this meant that contrary to what
took place on the border, where local officials and a segment of the working class celebrated in
competing venues, organized labor and local officials joined in the celebrations reaffirming their
ties to the community in the mining district. Labor federations enthusiastically organized
festivities for cultural events in an effort to shape workers’ identities along class lines. In May
1935, Section 11 of the miners’ unions in Santa Barbara invited local officials to an evening of
culture, and justified the invitations as going to local officials “who have cooperated with this
organization in anything that has to do with workers’ improvement and in the social struggle that
it has taken on.”44
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Whenever unions established new headquarters or offices where they could congregate,
there was a celebration of this spatial presence that included municipal officials. These
inaugurations took place in both Parral and Santa Barbara, and the entire community received
invitations, making them large events that included music, poetry, and socialist education in the
form of speeches and workshops promoting it.
The buildings in which workers could congregate contributed significantly to the success
of unions in this area by providing a space to inculcate revolutionary working class values and
shape identities. For example, the bakers’ hall became a space used by different unions to
celebrate, meet, and hold discussions. This hall turned into a symbol of workers’ influence in the
area. Unions recognized that having a space to create a culture and basis for unity was crucial for
their ability to influence workers in the mining area. They made sure local authorities received an
invitation as well. For example, in June 1936, Section 11 sent a letter inviting local officials “to
the inauguration of our social building to take place on the 17th of the current month and asked
them ‘honor [us] with your presence, and thus our thanks in advance.”45 Workers utilized the
space for a comprehensive view of the meaning of unionism and for a vast number of varied
collective events, including funerals. This means that intimate and important events took place in
these spaces alongside labor organizing.
The control of local space to congregate remained a crucial variable in the ability of
unions to spread their message effectively, since these gathering spaces turned into an important
mechanism to cultivate ideas of class solidarity among workers in the area. The unions’ ability to
gain spaces in which to congregate owes part of its success to their relationship with local
45
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authorities, which expropriated most of these buildings from previous private owners so that the
unions could use them. They did this with various churches in both Parral and Santa Barbara.46
The education of workers in the 1930s was another core part of union federations’
strategy to shape workers identities. The goal of expanding educational opportunities for workers
and their families strengthened the federations’ credibility among their members. Unions
embraced the idea of education based outside the Catholic Church. This approach was the
cornerstone of the Cárdenas government’s efforts to transform the nation. As a result, unions
continuously supported local, state, and federal efforts to establish public education in the
Hidalgo district. This coincidence in agendas allowed unions to enjoy shared goals beyond the
workplace with the authorities because the support they gave to local officials in their
educational reforms paid off once workers needed support to sign collective contracts or to stop
merchants’ abuse.
Local teachers and education officials became powerful allies of unions in the mining
area. This contrasted with Ciudad Juárez, as previously noted. Outside of the formal state-based
education system, unions set up their own schools to teach workers basic skills as well as
connecting those basic skills to the workers’ struggle. In early 1930, the CROM affiliated,
Federación de Obreros y Campesinos del Distrito de Hidalgo, which competed with the FROC
for workers’ allegiance, painted a picture of how their education curriculum would range over
basic household skills to political economy and other topics:
With the wish that the workers’ movement develops and realizes its projects regarding
the preparation of their leaders, as well as to lift the cultural level of the labor class, the
Federación de Obreros y Campesinos del Distrito de Hidalgo agreed to organize the
workers’ college, which will be under the vigilance and direction of the Education
Department of the Federation; its curriculum will include the following courses:
46
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mathematics, Spanish, political economy, workplace law, anatomy, and accounting.
There will also be electives, such as English, household economy, seaming, painting,
music and oratory.47
Organized labor clearly sought to make these schools’ curricula the basis for class identity.
Unions controlled the school curricula and personnel. They set out in 1930 to ensure that these
workers’ schools paid enough to keep the best teachers in their midst. Apparently Roberto
Quiroz, a well-regarded principal of School no. 32, also helped to establish the “Nightly Cultural
Center for Workers” after the Revolution. He found it difficult to commute from his residency in
Chihuahua to the mining district and so did not show up for work. The remaining faculty “carry
on their backs the heavy burden of educating workers” who had been enthusiastically signing up,
the union noted, and demanded the reinstatement of Mr. Quiroz and additional compensation to
pay for his transportation. We do not know if Professor Quiroz was reinstated in his post;
however, organized labor continued to assert itself forcefully into education issues.
As William French demonstrated in his study of the same area before the Revolution,
concern regarding morality on the part of workers goes back to the nineteenth century as an
influential part of workers’ identities in this region.48 French’s study suggested that concerns for
morals and manners came from middle and elite directives, including ASARCO.49 Middle class
concerns about issues of drinking and correct behavior were used as a control mechanism. After
the Revolution, workers directed these moral definitions, incorporating some elements of what
had been a middle class ethos into a working class perspective. Part of the context was also the
government’s attempt to curtail alcohol abuse among workers.
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After the Revolution, concern over alcohol abuse came from organized labor’s leadership
and had a different tone to it. Instead of delineating class differences and accepting
condescension from elites, labor’s leadership utilized temperance as a way to solve workers’
problems and enhance their potential power. In late 1930, the “Benito Juárez” miners’ union
wrote to the mayor of Parral in response to an invitation from President Pascual Ortiz Rubio for
an anti-alcohol campaign.50 The union leadership felt that alcohol abuse prevented workers from
the full realization of their potential as human beings due to the substance’s addictive nature.
Union leadership also raised concerns regarding the way that money spent on alcohol caused
deprivation for workers’ families.
This letter from the Miners’ Union to the mayor of Parral, Joaquin Aguirre, indicated that
the unions embraced attempts for legal safeguards against abuse of monies distributed under the
Revolution’s profit sharing provision; they wanted alcohol consumption and distribution locally
curtailed on the day workers got their shares from the profit sharing mandated by the 1917
constitution. They demanded that the mayor “strictly prohibit the consumption and distribution
of alcohol during that day. This small favor we ask, for you could do a great favor to humanity.”
Their rationale held up the ideal of the nuclear family and its well-being as part of Revolutionary
heritage: “So we have decided that your authority is the only one that can effectively assist us so
that the small amount of money can be used to alleviate the suffering of many families.”51 The
letter shows an expectation by the unions that local officials would exert authority on their
behalf.
The local union representing miners in Santa Barbara, “Vicente Guerrero,” similarly
called for controls over gambling and alcohol. In February 1934, it called for “bulletins placed in
50
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strategic locations,” and police enforcement to ensure that “underage individuals do not enter any
place of vice, with the warning that parents and tutors will be punished severely, and so will
local merchants.” The miners’ union also wanted these establishments closed at an early time.
They vehemently opposed those businesses’ passing as grocery stores as a way to sell alcohol on
the side. Finally, they raised concerns over the welfare of children and women.52
Union concerns regarding workers’ abuse of alcohol turned on class power issues as
opposed to middle class condescension towards workers’ manners and morals, since worker
leaders controlled the narrative and the arguments used against its consumption, and not middle
class and ASARCO officials trying to control their so called vice-riddled lives. Still, the line
between employers’ condescension and unions’ lack of support for well-engrained working class
habits and behavior might have distanced some workers from the unions. In industrious
Monterrey, also located in the North of Mexico, Michel Snodgrass has demonstrated similar
paternalistic dynamics in his study of workers during the 1930s. These types of condescending
efforts effectively prevented workers form joining unions.53 In any case, unions supported
authorities’ attempts to rein in drunken and rowdy behavior that both parties felt was detrimental
to moral rectitude.54 Local authorities swiftly answered the unions’ concerns: they notified the
unions that the law did not favor a particular group, and that they couldn’t change the law just
because the union felt they should.55
The FROC also sought to curtail gambling among a significant number of workers who
visited gambling establishments frequently. In April 1939, the federation denounced the “bars
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and other establishments [that] are breaking the law by having gambling on their premises; since
this greatly damages the interest of our fellow workers adhered to this Central, we are requesting
that you send people to watch these establishments and other public spaces so that this kind of
gaming does not take place and those that are caught doing it are punished to the full extent of
the law.”56 These places in which gambling, prostitution, and other prohibited activities took
place had a significant presence throughout the mining areas of Parral and Santa Barbara.57 In
fact, each city had a red-light district going back hundreds of years. Labor federations and
authorities alike made efforts to regulate the areas in an effort to prevent these types of activities
from getting out of control. After the Revolution, labor leaders sought to tame some of the worst
abuses without condemning workers.
Conclusion
Workers formed local and statewide labor federations to increase their power in the
workplace and beyond. As a result, workers sought a voice in almost every aspect of the cities’
future. Organized labor in Juárez successfully formed combative and radical labor federations
like the CSO. This process was cemented once Cárdenas took office and by the Popular Front
era. Moreover, the presence of communist organizations in this federation signified the
radicalization of the movement in Juárez.
In the mining district, workers effectively projected their power throughout the
community by organizing other workers into federations. Unions’ actions beyond the workplace
allowed them to turn Parral-Santa Barbara into a union-friendly town in which organized labor
had a voice in the everyday decisions of the community. They achieved this by forging alliances
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with political elites. The nature of Parral-Santa Barbara as an enclave connected to the
worldwide markets allowed officials to force concessions from ASARCO by taking advantage of
the anti-foreign sentiment caused by Cárdenas’ nationalistic policies. Local officials proved
amenable to making the local community a place where workers felt they could expand their
power as long as it did not question the elites’ place in the economic structure. The next chapter
will look at the way workers utilized the labor courts to enforce collectively bargained contracts,
which also increased their power.

CHAPTER 3: COLLECTIVE CONTRACTS AND THE USE OF CONCILIATORY
COURTS TO INCREASE WORKERS’ POWER

Chapter two examined workers’ efforts to establish combative and independent
federations on the border and in the mining district, which increased workers’ power beyond the
workplace and into the communities. This chapter examines how unions and federations in
Ciudad Juárez and the Hidalgo Mining District utilized collective contracts and the Conciliation
and Arbitration Courts (Juntas de conciliación y arbitraje) as a cornerstone of their overall
strategy to build greater strength in the workplace throughout the 1930s.
Scholars have emphasized the importance of the courts as “a significant political victory
for labor,” in Mexico because the courts enforced collective contracts by obliging owners to
comply with the law.1 The power of these courts resulted in higher wages, hiring halls, job
security, retirement benefits, and a sense of dignity among workers, which is difficult to
measure. The Constitution of 1917 increased workers’ power at the local level by giving
organized labor the mechanisms necessary to take away crucial elements of the production
process from managers and owners, including control of rate of work and the ability to hire and
fire workers. At the same time, however, the labor rights granted by the Carta Magna also
prevented workers from making demands beyond workplace and community-wide concerns.
Daniela Spencer explains that “the constitution guaranteed that worker mobilization would shy
away from attempting to destroy the established order and would instead concentrate on turning
1
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realities because they potentially gave workers control of the workplace through the provisions
stipulated in them. This provided some of the legal ground rules to increase workers’ power, but
it was social activism around those legal rights, including solidarity strikes, boycotts, and mass
protests that changed the labor-capital social relations.
Workers utilized the local and federal conciliation and arbitration courts to enforce
contracts in situations where owners refused to honor them. The 1917 Constitution’s article 123
had established labor tribunals to resolve conflicts. However, the actual enforcement of article
123 varied from state to state, since there was a lack of consensus until 1927 over whether states
or the federal government should preside over labor conflicts. This created many inconsistencies
affecting labor law, since individual states enacted various laws ranging from progressive
legislation (in Yucatán, Veracruz, Chihuahua), to outright authoritarian versions (in Chiapas).3
As mentioned in chapter one, in an effort to standardize the enforcement of these laws at the
national level, the Calles government, in 1927, established the Junta Federal de Conciliación y
Arbitraje (Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Court), which took away the jurisdiction of local
officials and gave the federal government control over the outcome of labor conflicts in certain
crucial sectors including mining and electricity, two important industries in the Hidalgo district
and on the border respectively. This immediately introduced federal authorities as mediators
when any of the parties in conflict requested it, although in many instances, these conflicts were
resolved at the local level. This increasing control of the national state over labor affairs reached
its climax with the passage of the Federal Labor Law of 1931. As Kevin Middlebrook has
argued, “the enactment of a Federal Labor Law in 1931 was a milestone in the expansion of state
2
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administrative authority over labor affairs. It symbolized the maturation of post-revolutionary
political beliefs advocating active state interventions in socioeconomic affairs.”4 The 1931
Federal Labor Law placed real limits on workers’ ability to unionize and strike, a situation which
allowed political elites to direct and tame radical labor movements.
At the same time, the Federal Labor Law also provided workers with legal rights,
including collective bargaining and conciliatory courts, which irrefutably increased their power
at the local level. Since the struggles over collective contracts took time, organization, and effort,
extending for years, in the case of the mining region and Ciudad Juárez, business owners’
resistance to sign and abide by collective contracts galvanized workers into organizing and
exerting their power. This meant that workers’ sense of class interest increased as business
owners and operators refused to provide what workers considered essential revolution-granted
rights. While Kevin Middlebrook and others have argued that tribunals eventually took agency
out of workers’ hands, this dissertation suggests that at the local level, the tribunals were a
vehicle through which workers expressed and expanded their class identity and struggle for
power, especially in the short term.
Throughout the 1920s in Chihuahua, competing political and economic elites took turns
controlling political power, which made establishing alliances with labor important in building
popular support for elite efforts to hold on to power.5 Thus, political elites often made
concessions to workers by providing them with legal mechanisms for articulating their demands.
For example, the radical state labor law of 1922 enacted by Constitutionalist governor Ignacio
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Enríquez was the result of his tenuous hold on power. The law provided workers with the
mechanism necessary to solve conflicts under the protection of a pro-labor code. Workers in the
Hidalgo mining district and Ciudad Juárez relied on the local conciliation courts to increase their
power a decade before national political elites used the newly established Federal courts to
increase workers’ power after the armed phase of the Revolution. During the 1920s, workers in
Chihuahua made the state one of the first in the nation to enforce friendly labor codes, including
collective contracts and conciliation courts.7 For example, already in 1925, the “Ricardo Flores
Magón” Miners’ Union from Santa Barbara requested the establishment of conciliatory courts,
primarily to defend workers against violations of collective contracts.8 In the 1925 case of a
worker killed at his workplace, the union demanded enforcement of the Chihuahuan state labor
law introduced in 1922, which provided mechanisms for redress of contract violations whenever
unions represented a majority of workers exclusive of managerial positions. ASARCO had
refused to pay the family of Maximino Avita compensation for his workplace death. The
company attempted to use legal niceties to suggest the union had no grounds for bringing the
case; it argued that “the union did not have Avita as a member in their most recent list, therefore,
6
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Avita was not a member of the union.” The union responded that there was no law requiring
unions to register every single new member to local officials. The courts ruled in favor of the
union, and Avita’s family received compensation.9
The existence of the local courts and their coercive enforcement of contracts in favor of
workers suggest that in the areas under study, workers’ power derived from their organized
status, not from concessions made by political elites, which reacted to this massive organization
of workers by their federations going back to the 1920s. The creation of collective contracts and
the establishment of courts to enforce these contracts a decade before the federal government’s
decision to do so nationally support this assertion. The continuous high turnover in gubernatorial
politics that Chihuahua experienced during the 1920s, in which not a single state governor
finished his term, allowed workers to exert their influence by using collectively bargained
contracts and conciliation courts before President Lázaro Cárdenas’ rise to power in December
1934.
Once Cárdenas took office, negotiations around collective contracts led to radical action.
In the Hidalgo mining district, conflicts over collective contracts resulted in important strike
movements. In 1934 and 1935, Sections 9 and 11 (Parral and Santa Barbara respectively) of the
National Miners’ Union started strike movements when ASARCO refused to sign a new
collective contract demanding the final say in crucial aspects of the workplace, including higher
wages. Miguel Felix, original founder of National Miners’ Union (Section 11) in Santa Barbara,
years later recalled matter-of-factly that if “the company did not respect the contracts, we would
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strike (pues nos íbamos a la huelga).” Workers’ willingness to strike, as reflected in Felix’s
statement, captures the value that workers placed on these contracts as a means of expanding
their authority. This was especially true after the election of Lázaro Cárdenas to the presidency in
1934 and the Popular Front era inaugurated in late 1935. An example of these enhanced
expectations took place in 1935, when the statewide labor federation, the Cámara Regional del
Trabajo, wrote to the local Conciliation and Arbitration Board arguing that “it was aware that
some owners of local establishments in Santa Barbara have refused to sign the collective
contracts formulated by our fellow workers. With that purpose we request that these merchants
be forced to sign the contracts, since the majority of owners have already signed. This chamber
wishes strong measures to be taken in defense of the working cause.”11 The fact that the CRT
demanded the establishment of these contracts for the entire community showed its elevated
expectations, as it felt emboldened by the struggle over these contracts, the arrival to power of
Cárdenas, and the support of local authorities. This context turned collective contracts into a
vehicle to increase workers’ power.
Again, in the Hidalgo district, but also in Ciudad Juárez, strike movements grew out of
the struggle over collective contracts. The strike movement of 1934 in Hidalgo was the result of
solidarity in support of unionized workers at the AVALOS smelter in Chihuahua City over their
struggle to establish a collective contract. In Ciudad Juárez, refusal of the local power company
operators, the Quevedos, to abide by the collective contract proposed by the Electricians’ Union
in 1935 led to a three-year strike movement. These long conflicts over collective contracts
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illustrate the value workers placed in them as mechanisms that provided workers with the most
power against owners and business operators.
Hidalgo Mining District
Unions and federations in the mining district used the conciliation courts to increase their
power, beginning in the 1920s and reaching a high point during the Cárdenas administration.
These contracts took significant control of the workplace away from business owners and
operators, and placed authority in the hands of organized labor. They gave unions official
recognition, raised wages, and established a closed-shop, which gave unions control of new hires
and the ability to prevent unjustifiable layoffs, among other provisions allowing workers to
control many aspects of the workplace. This section will focus on the largest and most important
labor organizations in the district: these were the National Miners’ Union (Section 9 and 11), and
the Bakers’ Union. In order to understand the miners’ combativeness, one needs to go back to the
pre-revolutionary era.
First, as mentioned previously, the Hidalgo region had a long tradition of bootleg mining,
which created a culture highlighting independence, manliness, and a challenge to private
property in the district. According to William French, miners in the mining district did not have a
tradition of identifying themselves in terms of a single, homogeneous working class before the
1920s.12 However, this did not mean they did not possess a long tradition of organizing. Mutual
aid societies in Parral, like the Sociedad Mutualista de Obreros “Vicente Guerrero,” formed by
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skilled miners only, had existed since the turn of the last century.13 After the 1910-1920
Revolution, the “Ricardo Flores Magón” union in Santa Barbara was founded (sometime in the
early 1920s), but it lost its official status throughout the decade in a couple of cases due to its
inability to demonstrate that the union represented the majority of workers.	
  Lack of recognition
forced unionized workers from the Magón union to constitute a new union. Miguel Felix
Camacho indicated that the union reconstituted itself because of the legal provisions and
ASARCO’s challenge over the union’s rights to represent workers. He noted that ASARCO “was
not respecting the contracts with the pretext that we did not have the majority when the contract
was signed.” Workers decided to create “a new organization and made sure that this time the
majority was registered with the proper authorities,” he recalled.14 Felix’s memories illustrate the
importance workers placed on these contracts and their active attention to their legal rights. It
also highlights the importance the conciliation courts had in balancing power structures, as
owners were bound by the law to negotiate collectively with unions if the latter had more than
fifty percent of the labor force excluding managerial positions. The Flores Magón union was
replaced in 1932 by the Vicente Guerrero union for the same reason; the Magón union was
dissolved after ASARCO had argued that it did not represent over fifty percent of the workforce.
Another powerful mining union was the “Benito Juárez” Miners’ Union formed in 1922 in
Parral. By 1934 in the newly established National Miners Union (STMRM), Section 9 and
Section 11 of the new Union were founded with more than 3,000 members from the district.
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Felix recalled that Section 11 in Santa Barbara alone had more than 2000 unionized
workers in 1934.15
Along with regional developments such as the strengthening of mining unions in
Chihuahua, at the national level the establishment of the CTM also made the achievement of
labor contracts for all workers—not only miners—a priority. Established in 1936, the CTM, at
its first National Committee hoped to build on the pro-labor political climate cultivated by
Cárdenas and the Popular Front which “offer wide perspective to the masses.”16 Thus, the
CTM’s decision to vigorously defend collective contracts among their adherents responded to a
changed national political environment. However, labor’s use of the courts had a precedent, as
we have already seen, in legislation in states like Chihuahua originating ten years earlier, but
once the federal government adopted the idea, unions’ power increased again.
The Popular Front changed the way unions identified themselves and the way they
conducted labor relations vis-a-vis capital. This power brought about by the alliance with the
federal government augmented in 1934, when local organizations of miners across Mexico,
including the two unions aforementioned, formed the National Miners’ Union, which also
included those working outside the mines in other related industries, including smelters,
carpenters, and electricians. After 1934, the Benito Juárez and the Vicente Guerrero unions
became Sections 9 and 11 of the National Miners’ Union, the Sindicato de Trabajadores Mineros
y Metalurgicos de la Republica Mexicana (STMMRM) respectively.17 According to Felix, in
1934, these two sections brought together more than 3000 workers into one federation. Its
predecessors had established a blueprint regarding the use of the courts, collective contracts, and
15
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direct action to maintain the power brought about by the Revolution. Although the National
Miners’ Union joined the new CTM in 1936, it quickly abandoned the national confederation
after the latter tried to impose a political alliance with the national government on its affiliated
unions. Miners were not opposed in principle to the Popular Front. However, the undemocratic
processes that came to dominate the CTM compelled unions like the miners and railroad workers
to abandon the CTM in 1936.18
Moreover, whether it was the Benito Juárez union or Section 9, organized miners in the
Hidalgo district had utilized the courts to increase their power despite the national context going
back to the 1920s. Just months prior to the formation of Section 9 of the STMMRM in 1934, the
Benito Juárez Miners union in Parral requested a hearing from the federal conciliation court to
defend Alberto Falcón, a miner who had fallen victim to silicosis. Falcón’s case was a typical
one. ASARCO refused to pay severance packages to Falcón after he was no longer capable of
working. The company argued that Falcón was already sick when he started working at
ASARCO and denied that his sickness was due to employment as a miner given that he worked
at the surface of the mine. The labor federation (CRT) countered that Falcón had worked inside
the mines for more than a decade before being transferred to a surface job. It presented medical
reports as evidence of the silicosis contracted by working inside the mines. The Conciliation
Court ruled in his favor and Falcón was awarded the entire severance amount of $1,606.50. The
resolution took a bit over a year, but Falcón received what the law established.19 The collective
contract guaranteed that Falcón would get a severance package, and the courts enforced the
obligations stipulated in that contract. As a result, workers like Falcón received tangible benefits,
extremely important in a community comprised mostly of workers. The fact that ASARCO
18
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would attempt to deny basic rights in a case involving silicosis, which was a virtual death
sentence, went a long way in building loyalties along class lines. Although labor federations and
unions in the mining area used the courts extensively, as the Falcón case shows, it took pressure
from workers and their representatives to wrest concessions and keep government officials
actively on their side. Labor federations possessed more influence than individual unions, and
throughout the 1930s, labor federations gradually increased their political and economic
influence throughout Mexico.
Immediately after its formation, Section 11 notified ASARCO that the contract
negotiated by the previous local union was invalid because the majority of workers did not agree
to it. This was not a condemnation of the contract signed by the previous unions as much as it
was a reaffirmation of the newly increased power that the National Miners’ Union brought to the
local sections. The newly formed National Miners Union sought to ensure that ASARCO
recognized that more militant demands could be expected from the new alliance being created
across Mexico. National Miners’ Union Federal Secretary, and a Communist, 20 Agustín Guzmán
informed the company that “Vicente Guerrero” did not have “a true majority of workers,” and
that “despite the fact that the contract was fair, it lacked collective responsibility.” In any case,
the union cancelled the contract. The National Miners’ Union announced that it represented “the
majority of workers in this company,” and that the former “Vicente Guerrero” local is now
“extinct.” Noting that the price of silver worldwide had recovered but that this had not benefitted
workers of the mining centers, they demanded that a percentage of the profits be distributed
among workers, “who are the producers.” The miners’ federation also informed ASARCO that
Section 9 had the right to hire, that the “conditions for hiring must not be below those stipulated
20
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in the existing contract,” and that “it must be done as a fair measure as the establishment of those
prerogatives and conditions that have already been negotiated as irrefutable precedent in other
ASARCO operations throughout Mexico.”21 In short, the national miners’ union made it clear
that it controlled the hiring process and that it demanded standardization of wages and other
benefits in all ASARCO operations.
This exchange shows a determination to challenge ASARCO even when a collective
contract with them already existed. This challenge to ASARCO needs highlighting since the
smelting giant had, for centuries, never acquiesced to labor’s demands when an existing contract
was still valid. The letter also demonstrates the union’s cognizance of the global political
economy and the argument that workers should benefit from the recovery of the price of silver.
The STMMRM demanded an evaluation and implementation of the wage scale, which was also
annexed from the previous contract. In the meanwhile, the union demanded a complete halt to all
kinds of readjustments or new hires, the implementation of a wage scale, and a halt to layoffs
until the rules were set to permit this. Moreover, Section 9 contested ASARCO’s efforts to
divide the union by demanding recognition as the official representative of workers in the
Chihuahuan plant.22
The Popular Front era allowed Section 11 and 9 to continuously rely on the courts to
protect their contracts. Several examples can serve to illustrate. On January 10, 1935, Section 11
in Santa Barbara again requested the establishment of the local conciliation courts in behalf of
Nazario Barrera, who was laid off by the Compañía Minera Fundidora y Afinadora de
Monterrey. The federal government intervened right away and set up the federal conciliation
21
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courts to reinstate Barrera.23 On November 18, 1936, Jesus Najera, Secretary of Section 9 in
Parral, sent a letter to Jesús Sierra, the federal government’s mediator, thanking him for the most
recent verdict in favor of the widow of Ceferino Torres, a former union member who received
$1,123.00 for the wrongful death of her husband.24 On December 24, 1937, Section 11 in Santa
Barbara denounced the hiring of contractors not approved by the union bargained contract. The
regional delegate of the National Miners’ Union immediately sent a letter to the Labor
Department in Mexico City asking them to put an end to this practice.25
Contracts in one sector could also provide support for other workers in the area. The
Miners’ Union, for example, supported bakers, which allowed the latter to successfully negotiate
with business owners and operators in the mining district. In its defense of the bakers, union
leaders argued that capital’s division of labor was its most effective mechanism for preventing
radical pro-labor changes. The following pronouncement by the Miners’ Union in 1930 shows
support for the bakers and for the idea of collectively bargained contracts as a crucial component
of this cross-union solidarity. Toribio Reyes, secretary of the Miners’ Union, wrote that the
union members, “after listening to our fellow bakers,” were “driven to support the fair efforts by
the Bakers’ Unions that are doing this to fulfill their duty as organized workers.” Reyes closed
the letter by announcing that “this miners’ union supports the actions of our fellow workers and
will be forced not to recognize the actions of those that are betraying their fellow workers by
unconditionally serving capital and intending to divide.”26 Reyes’ use of the term “capital” to
23
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identify adversaries demonstrates the influence class perspectives had in shaping the behavior of
workers and unions alike, especially in the Miners’ Union. Furthermore, in this manifesto, the
miners responded to the interests of other workers, not just themselves. In its condemnation of
“serving capital,” the miners asserted a class awareness in the quest for a contract; it illustrates
the extent of change in the identities of post-revolutionary miners in the Hidalgo Mining District.
This transformation reveals itself again through the sense of solidarity that the miners expressed
towards the bakers.
Bakers relied on the municipal and state-wide courts to enforce contracts even before
Cárdenas’ pro-labor regime came to power as there was not a national bakers union. Even the
most radical unions, including the Bakers’ Union, used the conciliation system. Bakers’ historian
Robert Weis has shown that bakers “were among the most radical and largest contingent of the
post-revolutionary movement.”27 They were one of the original organizations which came out of
the previously discussed Casa del Obrero Mundial, and they had significant anarchist tendencies.
Bakers in the Hidalgo mining district were known for their radicalism. In Parral, the “Ignacio
Zaragoza” bakers’ union was formed on October 4, 1920, and located the Juan Rangel Street in
downtown Parral. This made the bakers one of the first and only unions to acquire a space in
which to congregate, and evidently they used it to promote radical visions of what the revolution
should bring to all workers.
The bakers belonged to the national CROM labor federation throughout the 1920s, but
adhered to the more radical CRT when the latter was created it in 1933. Bakers had joined
anarchist federations in large numbers after the 1910-1911 Revolution, but that did not preclude
27
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their acceptance of government’s intrusion.28 Bakers in mining districts followed the path of
other bakers’ unions, including those in Mexico City, who combined radicalism with political
alliances formed to secure contract enforcement. The fact that one of the unions with the most
radical pedigree among workers nationally accepted local officials’ role as mediators of labor
conflicts indicates that they felt the alliance with the state would not diminish their quest for
expanding workers’ power. The bakers in turn pressured local officials to force owners to
comply with the law.
In 1930, when the bakery owners refused regulations submitted by the union, the
Sindicato de Panaderos’, Ignacio Zaragoza called on the mayor of Parral to form a “local
conciliation board to solve the conflict between some members of the union and the owners of
local bakers [stores].” Citing the “current labor code,” the mayor in turn appointed José Reyes as
an owners’ representative, ordering him to show up at the municipal offices at an appointed time,
recognizing that he could pressure this particular owner to comply.29 In 1930, when a rival
Bakers’ Union, formed by bakery owners, was established in Parral, the CROM denounced the
rival union as a potential threat to worker unity and demanded that local officials take sides.
Other unions, such as the mechanics’ and chauffeurs’ unions, expressed solidarity with the
bakers as well. The mechanics’ union pressured the Mayor of Parral, Joaquín Aguirre, who wrote
to assure them that “this presidency is willing to support, within the limits of the law, the
necessary assistance to the Sindicato de Panaderos Ignacio Zaragoza so that the conflict
regarding the collective contract will be solved satisfactorily.”30 With this solidarity and as the
28
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threat of a strike developed and local officials began to put pressure on business owners, the
bakers signed a contract and the rival union was removed.31
The Parral mayor’s response was consistent with most of the local officials’ actions when
it came to organized workers in the district throughout the latter part of the 1920s and the 1930s.
In 1935, the Bakers’ Union was still adhering to these strategies when it asked for assistance
from local officials, while holding out the threat to strike; once again the bakers successfully
pressured local officials to assign a business owner to represent the bakery owners and this
eventually forced the rest of the area’s business owners to sign the contract. Mediation resulted
from the Bakers’ militancy and capacity to mobilize their members to strike. Thus local
authorities had to act or risk radicalizing them even further. In Santa Barbara, Lorenzo
Magallanes of the “Benito Juárez” Bakers’ Union also requested conciliation courts, especially
in the late 1930s.32 More often than not, workers in the district found support from local officials,
as well as federal officials, at least up until 1940. Workers’ success in the court system during
the 1930s caught the attention of the United States. In the U.S. consular report of June 1936, the
American representative noted, “Labor continues to win practically all disputes going before the
government authorities.”33
Local officials assisted workers by making sure owners and operators respected contracts,
especially under Mayor Gabriel Chávez’s tenure (1932-1933), and under the administration of
Valente Chacón Baca (1933-1934).34 The Chihuahuan governorship, controlled by the Quevedo
family, also supported workers’ establishment of collective contracts in the mining district. The
31
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defense of collectively bargained negotiations continued after Quevedo left the governor’s office
in 1936 and Gustavo Talamantes replaced him. After a decade of political turnover, a consistent
policy to support miners against the global behemoth, ASARCO, had developed very clearly
under Quevedo and Talamantes, who were also the first two individuals to finish their
gubernatorial terms after years of political instability. Workers in the Hidalgo Mining District
had, therefore, friends in the political arena, but only if they remained organized. Workers’ use
of the federal conciliation courts during the Cárdenas administration emboldened them because it
increased their power vis-a-vis capital. Overall, organized labor’s use of local and federal courts
in the mining region to ensure respect of collective contracts demonstrates that these behaviors
responded to class interests since the essence of these contracts remains collective in nature.
These local histories also contribute to the ongoing discussion in Mexican labor historiography
concerning the unforeseen consequences of accepting the state as an arbitrator. The experiences
of workers in the Hidalgo and Ciudad Juárez areas of Chihuahua suggest that the outcomes of
union negotiations with local, state and federal arbitration tribunals varied according to particular
circumstances and, above all, the combination of combative unionism and the existence of
sympathetic or politically weak authorities at all levels of government.
Ciudad Juárez
In Ciudad Juárez, workers used collective contracts to exercise a degree of control over
the workplace. Collective contracts gave weaker unions comprised of less profitable trades the
ability to exert a degree of control in the workplace and beyond. The struggles to ensure the
fulfillment of collectively bargained contracts augmented workers’ power: workers in the
electric, textile, and baking industries utilized these contracts to eventually organize strike
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movements in the 1930s. This section will focus on the efforts of the Cámara Sindical Obrera
(CSO), the Gran Liga Textil Socialista (textile union), and the Bakers’ Unions “Union de
Panaderos y Similares,” part of the CSO, the most radical organization on the border, and the
Sindicato de Panaderos Libres, which was affiliated with the CROM.
After the Federal Labor Law of 1931, unions in Ciudad Juárez strove to master all of the
various rules that could give more power to workers. For example, Juárez’s bartender and
waiters’ union, members of the CSO federation, demonstrated their expertise in handling labor
laws and their ability to navigate the courts as illustrated in a 1932 case against a local brewery.
Union officials complained to Juárez Mayor Quevedo about the refusal of Tomás F. Blanco,
owner of Cía Cervecera de C. Juárez, S.A., and Israel Chavira, manager of Cía, Cervecera’s
ancillary Juárez Beer Garden, to abide by a contract’s provisions. From the union’s perspective,
the labor law made it clear that these workers should fall under the provisions of the general
contract for the establishment. The union objected that the company would not comply with the
agreement established by the Municipal Conciliation Board in an earlier case between the ‘Cía.
Cervecera de C. Juárez, S.A.’ and the union in which the company had agreed to abide by the
collective contract, including the provision of services to the business’ Beer Garden. But because
workers were already doing the job under a collective contract that the representatives of the
Cervecera, through its dealers, refused to sign, workers appealed to the Municipal Conciliation
Board to implement the agreement forcing the company to abide by the law. The courts forced
the owners to abide by the contract and its stipulations.35
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Unions belonging to the CROM, like Juárez-based Sindicato de Empleados de Hoteles
and the Restaurantes y Cantinas (SECHRC), are often considered more collaborationist; most
consider that the CROM continuously collaborated with business and authorities alike and
prevented radical action by their members.36 But in Ciudad Juárez, the local unions belonging to
the CROM mobilized their members to defend the sanctity of collective contracts in the early
1930s. At the local level, workers began to mobilize in defense of the contracts before the federal
boards.
This unexpected shift in the behavior of supposedly conservative unions might have been
anticipated earlier because by 1930 local unions representing employees from hotels, bars, and
restaurants had rejected a tame approach, instead threatening direct action when contract
violations took place. In April 1930, constituent affiliates of the FSON, or the “Unión de
Empleados de Hoteles, Restaurants y Cantinas,” and the “Unión de Filarmonicos,” had struggled
for two months with the bar and cabaret owners of the city in order to create a stable set of
collective contracts. These unions in the entertainment sector wrote to Mayor Gustavo Flores:
“Although until this date we have not been able to reach an agreement despite efforts through
diplomatic means, we do not want to make use of the last resource which is given to us by the
active Ley Federal del Trabajo in our state, which is to strike; we don’t want to go to that
extreme, so with all our respect and with your attention, we turn to you asking for your
cooperation, to avoid, if possible, reaching the last extreme, which is harmful to both parties.”37
The CROM, as shown above, did not hesitate to strike, if necessary to protect its workers, further
showing a rift between Mexico City CROM officials and local cadres in Juárez. Unions
belonging to the CROM organized cross-union support for their cause in an effort to pressure the
36
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mayor to intervene. CROM’s unions gathered in the central plaza of Juárez to demonstrate
against the performance of some authorities who “are enemies of organized labor” and from
there walked along major avenues, finishing up at the building of the Unión de Cantineros on
Abraham Gonzales Street.38
Owners and business operators understood that these contracts affected their economic
interests and undermined their presumptive authority over workers. As a result, contracts
generated a considerable level of animosity among owners and business operators. For example,
the Unión de Filarmónicos (Musicians Union) de Cd. Juárez, Chihuahua denounced its working
conditions with language appealing to nationalism, thus condemning foreign employers that did
not respect Mexican law and regulations. In 1933, the union condemned the attitude of Mr. Hugo
Bonaguidi, owner of the ‘Hugo’s Café’ night club (Río Grande) who refused to sign the
collective contract, and instead answered back in an abusive and arrogant way to workers, and
apparently insulted authorities by arguing that “not even the President of the Republic or any
labor code will force him to sign a collective contract that was presented for him to study.”
Trying to put a stop to this behavior, he pushed a group of workers out onto the street.39
The tone used by organized labor in their manifestos and contractual language grew more
contentious and demanding as the 1930s progressed. Unions directly addressed these concerns to
the owners by demanding “compliance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement.” The loaders’
union, the Sindicato de Cargadores de Almacenes y Similares, argued in 1935 that its contract
stated that only union members could work in the Maderería Rio Grande, a transport company.
Thus, it was inserting itself into a fundamental relationship that businesses considered private.
38

Esteban Flores, Secretary of the Federación de Sindicatos del Norte, to Baltasar Adame mayor, May 16, 1931,
1931/692.1191/AMCJ.
39
Unión de Filarmónicos de Ciudad Juárez to the Municipal Conciliatory Court, April 25, 1933,
1933/735.1302/AMCJ.

112	
  

For the union, the closed shop meant that it could ensure that the contract was enforced. A closed
shop also meant that employers could not intimidate workers as easily because they would not be
able to control firing procedures unless workers committed an act that violated the bargaining
contract.40
Workers sought closed shops, control of layoffs, and other provisions to control the
workplace. Even unskilled workers realized the importance of having a closed shop. The ability
to control hiring increased federations’ power since the ability to control the hiring of nonunionized labor forces provided labor conglomerates with more ammunition to present in cases
regarding unionization. A 1935 case by the Industrial Workers’ Union, a CSO affiliate, against a
local beer company that fired a worker without cause illustrates this phenomenon. The local
brewery, Compañía Arrendataria de la Cerveceria de C. Juárez, S.A., had enduring connections
with local authorities, particularly the Quevedo clan, a political family who owned various bars
in Juárez.41 The fact that the union confronted elite political power in the area in this case
illuminates critical choices made by organized labor, including the decision to openly confront
business elites’ political connections. This boldness coincided with Cárdenas’ entrance into
national politics, demonstrating growing confidence by organized labor that had no precedent in
the area.
Labor’s efforts to establish collectively bargained contracts caused a reaction from
political and economic elites. Business owners’ and operators’ strategies revolved around
delaying the labor conciliatory process at the local level and taking the cases to the state level
where perhaps more sympathetic officials would determine the outcome. This usually involved a
40
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long conflict that could take a year to resolve. This tactic of delaying the proceedings occurred in
the case of the La Gran Liga Textil Socialista, the union representing workers at the Textile Mills
Commission and Co. in Juárez.
La Gran Liga, created on March 26, 1929, originally was affiliated with the CROM, but
quickly changed allegiance once the CSO, more radical than the CROM, was formed in 1931.42
Throughout the 1930s, the Liga had a history of conflict with the Textile Mills Commission and
Co. due to the latter’s refusal to accept a collective contract. In 1930, the company laid off
workers in violation of the contract and then locked out the workers. The union secretary,
Antonio Castro, wrote to seek assistance from the local arbitration tribunals as part of a strategy
to defend collective contracts and to subvert the mill’s anti-labor policies. The company,
represented by a Mr. Murguía, apparently the company owner, had argued that the local
arbitration board had no right to rule on the issue because the local boards lacked legal standing.
To justify his argument, Murguía argued that the municipality had the authority to decide the
legality of the board only, but did not have the power to make a decision about specific cases.43
In the La Liga conflict, owners’ delaying tactics did not succeed since the board agreed
with the workers and announced that the “Municipal Board will give a verdict of legality or
illegality of the business lockout.”44 In 1932, La Liga again used the courts to force the Textile
Mills Co. to honor its collective contract, and threatened to strike if the company failed to
comply. The latter defended itself in the tribunals and was granted a temporary injunction;
however, La Liga rapidly demanded the nullification of this injunction and the company was
42
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forced to recognize the contract.45 In 1934, La Liga again requested the intervention of the local
conciliation courts against the Textile Mills Co. for damages incurred by worker, Francisco
Martínez, and invoked articles 460, 500, and 501 delineating workers’ compensation of the
federal labor law to justify their demand.46 In 1935, La Liga charged the Textile Mills Co. and
the company union, “Industrial Rio Bravo,” for infringing on the existing contract by failing to
recognize La Liga as the only official union. The case went all the way to the federal conciliation
courts once the local courts could not resolve the issue. This decision automatically placed the
federation representing La Liga, the CSO, and the CRT in the state, which was the Cámara de
Obreros y Campesinos del Estado de Chihuahua, as workers’ representatives.47 Months later, La
Liga again requested the intervention of the local conciliation courts to denounce the unjustified
layoff of Francisco Martínez, which demonstrates that La Liga prevailed over the other union.48
La Liga’s ability to take the Textile Mills Co. to court and win increased the union’s power.
Collective contracts and the conciliation courts allowed La Liga to defend its status as the
official union. La Liga forced owners to negotiate collectively, nullified injunctions, and ensured
that their workers received the benefits accorded by the law.
As in the mining district, the bakers in Juárez were also known for their reliance on
courts to increase their power. The bakers were represented by the CROM‘s “Sindicato de
Obreros Panaderos de Ciudad Juárez,” and by the CSO’s “Unión Sindical de Panaderos y
Similares.” Throughout the 1930s, these two organizations worked in concert to increase Bakers’
power through alliances, which allowed them to present a united front against business owners
45
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and operators. Again, the CROM in Juárez defended collective contracts through the use of local
tribunals much like the other federations in the area.
The radical Unión Sindical de Panaderos y Similares, part of the CSO, and the Cámara
Sindical Unitaria de México, a known Communist organization, which had as its letterhead the
slogan, ‘Against Capitalist Oppression: The United Peasant and Workers Front,’ sought to use
the Conciliation Courts early in the decade. On October 8, 1929, Miguel Oaxaca, the Bakers’
representative, threatened to strike if bakery owners continued to reject recognition of the Unión
de Panaderos y Similares as the official union representing the majority of workers laboring in
bakeries on the border.49 The threat of a strike forced local owners to recognize the union weeks
later.50 At the same time, even the most self-proclaimed radical unions seemed not to fear
negotiate with the state or to prefer direct action rather than work within the state. Instead they
followed the legal mechanisms available to them to resolve labor conflicts peacefully, as the
following case demonstrates: “The Bakers’ Union of the city, according to the Ley Federal del
Trabajo active in the state, which in chapter 13, article 144, gives us the right, request of you a
Conciliation Municipal Court formed by workers and employers. It is left to your judgment for
its establishment.”51 But again, when collaboration did not work, bakers acted. On August 28,
1934, the Sindicato de Obreros Panaderos lifted the threat of an eventual city-wide strike only
after owners accepted the new collective contract.52 This new strike threat took place four years
after the previous strike threatened to stop bread production in the city. The local conciliation
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court defended the contract by forcing owners to comply with the law but this would have never
taken place if workers did not pressure the courts.
The municipal archives in Juárez provide evidence of many factors that led unions and
federations to request assistance from conciliation courts; one was unjustified layoffs. This
particular aspect of collective contracts generated significant tension between owners and
workers since business owners and operators felt it was their managerial prerogative to hire and
fire employees. But organized labor clearly felt it was their prerogative to control layoffs. This
was the case when Máximo Montañez and Trinidad Olibares, from the “Sindicatos de Panaderos
Obreros” (CROM), were fired from the La Espiga de Oro bakery. The union argued that it was
without justifiable cause and without consideration of the requirements of the Federal Labor
Law. The union immediately protested the unjustified layoffs by arguing that they would never
have taken place if these contracts were honored.53 The Bakers’ Union also requested
intervention of arbitration tribunals when a business owner refused to pay his workers’ severance
benefits. When the owner of the La Antigua bakery, Juan Gonzales, closed the business without
giving his employees their severance packages guaranteed by law, the union immediately
requested that the mayor, Jesús Quevedo, set up a hearing by the Municipal Conciliatory Court.54
Bakery owners used the same tactics that the textile mills relied on to delay these
procedures. Baltasar Adame, owner of the La Fáma bakery, wrote to the Sindicato de Obreros
Panaderos, challenging the jurisdiction of the local conciliatory boards: “in view of the fact that
the Labor Code has just been put in place throughout the country but still lacks confirmation by
the Cámara Local de Diputados del Estado of the appropriate sanctions and clauses deemed
53
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necessary, and as long as this does not happen we cannot take any steps regarding labor
issues.”55 These delays, although bothersome and lengthy in some cases, did not preclude
workers from relying on the courts as an instrument to increase their power.
On January 2, 1936, the Sindicato de Obreros Panaderos, citing articles 501 and 502 of
the federal labor law, requested the establishment of the local conciliation courts for the
unjustified layoff of Clicertio Velázquez by the owner of the Antigua bakery, Juan Gonzales.56
On March 31, 1936, the owner of the Antigua closed the establishment without notifying his
employees. As a result, on April 3, 1936, the Communist Cámara Unitaria del Trabajo in Ciudad
Juárez sent a letter to the local Conciliatory Courts supporting the bakers of the local “Antigua”
bakery over the violations they suffered as a result of actions by the Antigua owner, including
the unjustified layoff of the entire workforce.57
On May 27, 1936, the CSO demonstrated its power against bakery owners when the
Sindicato de Obreros Panaderos y Similares Libertad accused the bakery employers of violating
the collective contract regarding issues of workplace control. The CSO made it clear that the
contract stipulated that the unions had control over the price of bread. They also insisted on the
“removal of the local inspector who has neglected his job and has made grave errors”58 On May
25, 1936, the Bakers’ “Libertad” union demanded the removal of the local labor inspector in
charge of bakers due to his inability to enforce the contract upon owners.59 On February 20,
1938, the CROM and the CSO joined together and threatened to strike local bakery owners if “a
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new collective contract was not established.”60 On February 24, the strike was averted once the
bakers got a new contract.61
Conclusion
Collective contracts increased workers’ power. The usage of the courts, a product of the
Revolution, allowed workers to enforce these contracts. The main source of conflict between
organized labor and business owners and operators in Ciudad Juárez revolved around the issue of
collective contracts.62 The struggle for collective bargaining rights in Ciudad Juárez and in the
Hidalgo Mining District upended power hierarchies and pointed the way to a more radical
direction for labor unions that used the new constitutional provisions. However, these provisions
began to be asserted well before Lázaro Cárdenas came to power. The cases examined in this
chapter show that workers’ utilized the local and federal Arbitration Courts to protect these
contracts.
In some instances, contracts radicalized workers and this radicalization took place both
on the border and with the miners in the Parral-Santa Barbara region. On the border, the rise of
worker militancy generated a reaction from local political and economic elites that took a violent
turn. And this response significantly weakened organized labor’s capacity for resistance when
employers used force to in the internal processes of certain unions, especially those with a
reputation for being combative. Chapter Four will examine how unions responded with direct
action on the border and in the mining district.
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CHAPTER 4: DIRECT ACTION AND CO-OPTATION

Throughout the 1930s, workers used strikes to pressure owners and operators into signing
labor-friendly collective contracts, which allowed the former to dictate conditions in the
workplace thus tilting the balance of power towards workers. For example, the Miners’ Union
forced the American Smelter and Refining Company (ASARCO) to sign new collective contracts
in 1933, 1935, and 1937; threats and strikes preceded each new contract by Section 9 and 11 of
Parral and Santa Barbara respectively. As shown in the previous chapter, these contracts
increased workers’ power because they allowed them to control crucial elements of the laborcapital relationship previously controlled by foreign interests, including the hiring hall, removal
of foremen, and workers’ compensation. In some instances, strikes turned radical once the
Miners’ Union demanded universal contracts throughout all ASARCO units in 1937. In Ciudad
Juárez, the Electricians’ efforts to force company operators into accepting the contract (19331938) turned radical when the union increased the scope of their demands to include taking away
control of the means of production from local political and economic elites. Direct action in the
workplace encouraged workers to undertake activities that threatened the power structures of
crucial industries like mining and electricity generation. In the Hidalgo district, this union
pressure forced elites to intervene in favor of workers in three cases where threats of strikes,
thereby creating a form of hegemony coming from workers themselves. In Ciudad Juárez, by
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contrast, there was no working class hegemonic process; political and economic elites used
violence to control workers.1
On the border, strikes exposed political and economic elites’ lack of control over workers
and delegitimized their authority. Moreover, the Electricians’ demands turned radical and
affected the economic and political interests of local elites, who responded with violence to
defend themselves. In the mining district, local political and economic elites made sure the
Miners’ Union demands were met because it was in their best interest to do so, or risk further
radicalization.

Workers’ Power in Parral-Santa Barbara
Workers’ power and potential for further radicalization in Parral-Santa Barbara showed
in the frequency and magnitude of strikes, walkouts, boycotts, and other radical methods of labor
resistance throughout the 1930s. As a response to this newfound radicalism among workers,
local and state-wide authorities sided with workers in an effort to prevent them from radicalizing
further.
The Transportation Workers’ Union strike threat in 1930, illustrates the potential for
radicalism in the early 1930s among workers in the district, since the strike threat responded to
the needs of workers in other cities. The importance of these workers’ actions lay in the fact that
they transported the entire labor force throughout the various mines connecting Santa Barbara
and Parral. In the absence of transport workers, mine workers could not get physically to the
1
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mines. This strike threat took place in February 1930, four years before the Cárdenas presidency,
which shows that unions in the mining district relied on direct action to pressure local elites long
before federal authorities supported unionized workers in most of their strikes. The union
announced in a circular to the public, “We are forced to support our fellow workers from
Chihuahua and Ciudad Juárez, so we will suspend service for that reason in a show of protest.
We are encouraging transportation owners to support this demand; otherwise we will remove
their vehicles from the street.”2 The union warned that if owners replaced them with non-union
drivers, they would remove them forcibly. A day later, the union made the decision to strike. In
doing so, they defied the pleas of the Chihuahua state governor, who had urged workers not to
strike. This showed workers’ resolve to flout authority by supporting their fellow members of the
working class against civil authorities’ attempt to temper their demands. Perhaps more notably, it
shows workers’ willingness to strike before President Cárdenas’ support was available.
Solidarity strikes like the one above took place throughout the district early in the 1930s. Such
actions illustrate the level of unity obtained by workers who willingly risked their own security
for the benefit of others, which made elites uneasy. Transportation workers’ threats of strike
resonated across the community due to the crucial role they played in the local economy.
However, their power and influence did not compare with that of the more than 4000 workers
belonging to the two local Miners’ Unions in the district.
The “Benito Juárez” and “Vicente Guerrero” unions threatened to strike in 1933, before
ASARCO ceded to workers’ demand for a new collective contract. In 1935 and 1937, after the
formation of the National Miners’ union, Section 9 (Parral) and Section 11 (Santa Barbara)
threatened to strike again if the company refused to sign new contracts. These threats forced
2
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ASARCO to renegotiate its existing collective contracts, which among other things, included
raising workers’ wages and ceding crucial aspects delineating control of the workplace. More
notably, the unions’ successes showed the community and the local elites that workers were able
to rely on radicalism for the first time.
The first strike threat took place in 1933. The Cámara Regional del Trabajo (CRT),
representing the “Benito Juárez” Miners’ Union, voted to strike against ASARCO in Parral. The
twelve hundred striking workers demanded an increase of twenty percent in their wages. The
CRT argued that this demand was justified because a year earlier the federation had accepted a
twenty percent reduction in wages corresponding to the decrease in the price of silver; however,
now that silver prices had gone up, workers wanted to return to the wages paid prior to May
1932. The CRT in the “presence of 300 workers, the municipal authorities and the federal labor
inspector approved the strike unanimously.”3 Governor Rodrigo Quevedo intervened and
personally led the workers’ negotiations with ASARCO. When the corporation acquiesced,
workers halted the strike threat.4
In 1934, miners’ unions across Mexico founded the National Miners’ Union in Pachuca,
Hidalgo, with the presence of Section 9 and 11 as original founders. Their two locals represented
over 4,000 workers. The National Miners’ was a diverse organization, but most of the local
sections had a long history of independence and use of direct action to pressure elites, including
the sections in Sonora, Guanajuato, Chihuahua, and Nuevo León.5 The Miners abandoned the
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CTM in 1936, after the latter’s’ co-optation by conservative labor leaders, but the Miners’ gladly
embraced the Popular Front both at the local and national level.6 The Popular Front increased
local sections’ power once federal authorities supported them in return for labor’s acceptance of
their place in the economic structure as subordinate to capital. However, at the national level and
in some sections, some of the unions’ leaders’ rhetoric, and in some instances, actual demands
bordered on radicalism.7 If unchecked, this radicalism could have spilled out of control and
exposed the elites’ lack of hegemony. Again, Section 9 (Parral) and Section 11 (Santa Barbara)
engaged in various strike movements against ASARCO throughout the 1930s, which brought
workers tangible benefits. Governor Quevedo realized the potential for further radicalization, so
he immediately intervened in favor of workers by enforcing existing labor laws. This placated
workers. Miguel Felix, one of the original founders of Section 11 in Santa Barbara, explains that
workers “focused on our rights provided by the Constitution.” When asked about ASARCO’s
place, he recalled “we were not going to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.”8 Felix, despite
his revolutionary spirit, was not able to perceive a world without ASARCO.
Nevertheless, conflicts persisted and while the aggressive tone also increased, workers’
demands never questioned the capital-labor relationship. For example, another strike threat took
place during October in 1934. Section 9 (Parral), took advantage of a strike threat from workers
of the ASARCO-owned AVALOS smelting company, located in the state’s capital, to propose
changes to the existing collective contract previously agreed to by both sides. Section 11 in Santa
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Barbara followed suit. Workers demanded an increase in their wages ranging from forty to
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seventy percent and the construction of housing for 1,800 workers.9
ASARCO was perplexed at the new militancy of workers, despite the fact that workers’
demands never questioned ASARCO to begin with. The company objected that “these increases
would significantly affect the yearly company’s profits and the cost of housing construction
would be in the millions of pesos.”10 Finding no sympathy from local and state-wide authorities,
ASARCO appealed to the federal level, requesting help from President Abelardo Rodríguez,
whom they thought, might sympathize with the company. The President had issued support for
“harmonious” relationships throughout his brief tenure. ASARCO’s legal representative wrote:
“We beg you to intervene so that workers will stop their strike threat, since workers hastily acted
by giving us only a 16-day deadline. This contravenes your wishes regarding the avoidance of
labor agitation disrupting the harmony between capital and labor.”11 The fact that ASARCO
requested presidential assistance before the Cárdenas regime took office means that foreign
corporations expected assistance from the federal government against workers’ direct action. The
entrance of Cárdenas into national politics changed this presumption.
During the 1934 strike threat however, ASARCO found that the federal government’s
role in the negotiations was minimal; state governor Quevedo’s political and economic clout
trumped the national government’s authority in the state. Once Quevedo intervened, the conflict
ended. The negotiations also illustrate that ASARCO failed to ensure the assistance of local or
state authorities to fend off workers’ increasing power. ASARCO eventually accepted the
workers’ demands. This outcome also demonstrates local and state high-ranking officials’
9
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hostility to ASARCO and other foreign transnationals in the mining region, a stance which
evidently brought them popular support. More notably, by merely enforcing existing labor codes,
governor Quevedo effectively placed himself as an integral part of the negotiation, which in turn
deradicalized workers who did not feel the need for further militancy once they had the support
of high-ranking officials.
In this particular conflict, the presence of Governor Quevedo as arbitrator convinced
workers to backtrack on their strike threat. A telegram details workers’ intentions to end the
strike threat once the authorities named an arbitrator whom they thought was favorable to
workers’ demands: “We inform you that workers have proposed the following arbitrators to
avoid movement of strike, the President, the chief federal labor inspector, or General
Quevedo.”12 The 1933 and 1934 threats of strike against ASARCO are two examples of how
high-ranking officials intervened in labor conflicts on behalf of workers. In both instances, these
conflicts ended when ASARCO agreed to renegotiate the existing contract with Quevedo as
arbitrator. The outcome placed state governor Quevedo as one of the beneficiaries because it
allowed him to build popular support by picking and excluding labor federations in a way that
would advance his political career. However, pressure from organized workers from the mining
sector, and the Cárdenas pro-labor presidency, also forced the governor to acquiesce. Ideally, he
would have never ceded to workers, considering his conservative credentials.13 His pro-labor
initiatives in the mining district showed President Cárdenas that he supported his labor policies
and his overall mandate. As mentioned previously, Quevedo was a political and military ally of
former President Calles, Cárdenas’s main political adversary, so after December 1934, he needed
12
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to demonstrate his loyalty to the new president. Therefore, labor peace in the mining districts
remained a priority, and while conflicts continued, they never reached radical proportions.
On December 14, 1934, General Quevedo sent a telegram to Cárdenas explaining that
miners in San Francisco del Oro, located between Parral and Santa Barbara, had threatened to
strike against ASARCO if the latter did not match workers’ wages with those of the rest of their
operations in the state. Quevedo highlighted the fact that a strike would affect “2,500 organized
workers…The company claims that it is losing money, but in my view and that of other experts
in the mining business, this might not be the case, thus, I will personally go, or name a
representative to see if the company accepts and we can avoid the strike.”14 The strike was
averted and ASARCO ceded to workers’ demands again, including having to match wages
among all its labor force in the state.15 The outcome demonstrates that Quevedo’s intervention on
behalf of workers placated them to the point that it prevented them from striking. This shows
workers’ power because their pressure forced Quevedo to act. But, it also shows the shrewdness
of Quevedo and his political operatives at the local level. They intervened in a pre-emptive way
to stop the conflict from escalating in 1933, 1935 and 1937.
Parral Mayors Gabriel Chávez (1932-1933) and Valente Chacón Baca (1934-1935)
supported local federations in the majority of their strike movements against ASARCO and other
businesses in the Hidalgo Mining District by taking part in the negotiations with the smelting
giant and by pressuring Quevedo to intervene. The support of local and state-wide government
officials in the Hidalgo Mining District unequivocally assisted in ensuring that the majority of
threats and actual strikes, especially those against ASARCO, did not spill out of control.
14
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Officials intervened to prevent unrest when workers at AVALOS (located in the state’s

capital, Chihuahua City, north of the Parral-Santa Barbara mining area) first threatened and then
went on strike. This conflict north of the district, brought the two local sections into another
clash against ASARCO. The strike movement (1935-1937) by ASARCO unionized workers
throughout Chihuahua remains the largest strike movement in the state during this century
because it galvanized thousands of workers in different locales against the smelting giant. This
strike movement started as a solidarity strike in support of AVALOS’ workers. Mobilizing
thousands of workers willing to confront this industrial behemoth shows the potential for
radicalization. As workers engaged in these direct actions by the thousands, they set forth a new
definition of rights and ideals as a component of the Revolution. This conflict resonated
throughout the other mining districts in Chihuahua once all of ASARCO units throughout the
state also threatened to strike against the company if the latter continued to refuse negotiations
for new collective contracts, which led to a threat of a general strike.16 Anti-imperialist sentiment
during and after the Revolution made ASARCO an easy target as well, which allowed local
officials to posture pro-labor sympathies and still keep their conservative credentials by
appealing to nationalism. Silverio Sierra, secretary of the miners’ union Section 9 in Parral,
stated clearly and directly in a letter to Parral Mayor Valente Chacón Baca that “the
intransigence of American Smelting and Refining Company towards the AVALOS workers
forced them to radicalize their movement.”17 Chacón Baca, despite his conservative credentials
as a Quevedista, supported workers with the ultimate purpose of containing them. Here we can
see that what started out as a local issue turned into a state-wide movement to establish new
contracts throughout the state and eventually the nation. This situation would have exposed
16
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elites’ lack of control and support of workers in the eyes of the Cárdenas regime. Workers’
consciousness of the need to act as a united working class was growing in this period, and
instead of reacting with violence, political elites supported workers and defused an already tense
situation.18
Political elites sided with labor in the Hidalgo region not out of an inherent sympathy
towards their cause once the Revolution ended, but because they realized that the miners’ use of
direct actions could easily exceed the reach of their control and become politically damaging.
This potential for radicalism among workers existed since the Miners’ Union had sections
throughout Mexico with the ability to significantly affect a crucial industry of the Mexican
economy. Thus, their source of labor and their high degree of unity made them dangerous. Parral
Mayor, Valente Chacón Baca, responded to the threats of strike by making it clear to the miners
that “this municipality over which I preside has resolved to express to you that in response to the
exchange of ideas that it had with the union, local authorities sympathize with the agreement
taken by miners of this locality to strike against ASARCO.”19 This favorable response to the
strike movement illustrates how local elites gave up some things in order to keep miners from
turning further to the left.
Local authorities did more than offer verbal support; they backed it up with actions
designed to support the strike in other ways. Furthermore, the mayor added that he would
provide the necessary guarantees to ensure the success of the movement by agreeing to a total
closing of bars and billiard halls in Parral for as long as the strike continued. Critically, the
mayor “ordered that each one of the local government employees assist with one day’s wages
18
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from their monthly checks; we have also requested monetary assistance from the local aldermen
as well as the support and cooperation of local merchants so that they will not raise prices of
first-necessity items.”20 Given that ASARCO paid significant taxes to the local government,
which was critical to the municipality’s daily functioning, local officials’ positions need
highlighting. Officials’ support for this strike went a long way in expanding the unions’ power in
the area, since it left ASARCO with no other recourse than to agree to workers’ demands
throughout the state. Their previous allies, who were local authorities, now supported workers.
In 1935, Section 9 in Parral and Section 11 in Santa Barbara supported this state-wide
general strike against ASARCO, which briefly paralyzed the mining industry - the state’s main
economic source of profit. As a response to the potential threat surrounding the general strike,
the governor acted immediately. Governor Quevedo arrived at the Hidalgo Mining District
promising workers new contracts if they stopped their efforts to paralyze the industry, but this
time ASARCO did not stop there.
As previously mentioned, ASARCO’s long and profitable presence in Mexico allowed
them to have direct communication with the highest ranking officials in the Mexican
government. They considered the labor situation in Chihuahua so dire to capital that in 1937 they
sent a letter to President Cárdenas denouncing the National Miners’ Union. ASARCO argued
that workers demanded the establishment of one contract for all of ASARCO’s operations in the
nation; otherwise, they threatened to strike. The company explained to the president that the
existing contract was previously negotiated only a few months earlier, and that it was not set to
expire until sixteen months later. ASARCO also flexed its muscle by telling Cárdenas that it
20
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employed 18,810 workers and that wages had gone up fifty percent since 1934.21 As it happened
with the powerful oil companies and railroad corporations, Cárdenas did not succumb to their
pressures. This radical positioning provided workers with resounding victories. A 1937 report
from the U.S. consul in Chihuahua reveals how the threat to strike and the show of solidarity
among workers forced ASARCO to comply and meet the union’s demands: “On July 27, 1937,
labor leaders through the local press announced that a general strike involving some 17,000
employees of this concern would be called if the company should fail to meet their demands.”22
As a result of this state-wide threat of strike, workers won their new contract in 1937. The U.S.
Consulate in Chihuahua underscored labor’s victories: “Other new contracts with labor were
signed by the Santa Barbara unit of the same company and the San Francisco Mines of Mexico
in Parral, both contracts calling for an increase in wages and other concessions.”23
ASARCO’s efforts fell on nationalistic ears with Cárdenas, as had happened with the oil
companies’ cries not to nationalize the industry.24 On March 18, 1938, Section 9 workers at
ASARCO’s Parral operations walked off their jobs for four hours in what they called a
“revolutionary walkout” in support of Cárdenas’ order to nationalize the oil industry. Operations
at the plant were completely suspended.25 The fact that miners called this walkout
“revolutionary” shows how workers connected radicalism with the Revolution and the Cárdenas
regime. More notably, it shows the potential for radicalization if miners suddenly emulated their
21
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oil industry counterparts. Historian Myrna I. Santiago argues that the unions in the oil industry
were significant contributors in the nationalization of the industry in1938.26
The success of workers in the Hidalgo district did not result only from authorities’
support, but from their degree of organization, unity, and class identification, which matured
when local authorities did not engage in violence because it was personally beneficial not to do
so. Without the federations’ and unions’ abilities to mobilize constituent workers along class
lines, utilizing direct action as their main instrument to generate pressure, local officials’
interventions would not have reached the level they did.
As emphasized early, Governor Rodrigo Quevedo’s significant economic, including
numerous bars, distillers, the local power company, restaurants, gambling establishments, and
political interests in Ciudad Juárez, meant that in this border city, workers’ power threatened his
own personal and family profits. Ironically, Quevedo’s assistance to the miners in Hidalgo gave
him leeway to exercise violence against workers in Juárez. In this respect, the two areas are
critically linked, and a comparison of the state governor’s behaviors towards worker actions in
both areas provides us with grounds to consider the ultimate limit of workers’ solidarity in this
period. Local and state authorities’ responses to workers were different in the two areas under
study despite comparable levels of workers self-activism.
Ciudad Juárez: Radicalism, Violence, and the Elites.
Workers in Ciudad Juárez used many dramatic strategies, including strikes and boycotts,
actions that paralleled and in some ways exceeded the level of class consciousness of their
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comrades in the Hidalgo mining district. Textile workers, the Cámara Sindical Obrera (CSO), the
Sin Trabajo union (Unemployed Workers’ union), and the bakers engaged in strike movements
throughout the decade which pressured local political and economic elites into ceding to
workers’ demands. For example, the textile boycott in April 1935, against the “El Progreso”
manufacturer illustrates the types of actions the CSO engaged in at the border to pressure local
merchants. The CSO supported the boycott of the ‘El Progreso’ for the unjustified layoff of 32
workers and encouraged all of its members to abstain from buying any of its products; they
“invited” workers to stop buying goods from that manufacturer.27 In order for boycotts to work,
unions and federations mobilized class sentiment and interests, including mobilizing against
layoffs, and garnered wide class support for union demands. The use of boycotts by the CSO
demonstrates the level of unity reached by the working class on the border, and the way workers
utilized direct action to ensure tangible benefits. The use of boycotts complemented the
utilization of strikes, which generated more pressure than any other form of direct action.
The 1938 Bakers’ strike movement, seeking one universal contract throughout all
bakeries on the border, remains one of the more important movements at the time. It galvanized
both the CROM and the CSO in support of this demand. The bakers threatened to close all
bakeries in the city if their demands, including the ability to control bread prices and sales in the
community, were not met. They announced their demand on February: “At 3’oclock of the 27th
we will decree a work stoppage in all bakeries in Juárez. We are demanding that the bread be
sold in spaces made exclusively for this purpose, and that none of the bakeries share that same
space with other businesses. We are also asking to revise the existing contract, a code of
regulation for the industry, and have Sundays off with pay.”28 The union protested that other
27
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businesses not licensed as bakeries were selling bread, which affected bakeries’ ability to
compete. The Bakers’ Unions from the CSO and the CROM, when combined, had the ability to
paralyze the entire community’s food supply, which depended heavily on bread, and they used
this power accordingly. The threat was averted once local bakery owners acquiesced to the
united bakers’ demands.29 The fact that bakers forced owners to comply after paralyzing the
industry shows workers’ power in the late 1930s.
Although most of the strikes took place in the private sector, Juárez did experience a
strike movement by public employees, which affected crucial areas of the city. In 1935, one
strike occurred under the presidency of Cárdenas, who made concerted efforts to exclude
government workers from unionizing.30 In 1935, a local water company employees’ strike
threatened the city’s water supply. Workers demanded better working conditions, higher wages,
and the removal of the existing contractor. In this case, workers launched a hunger strike to
achieve their demands. This dramatic action culminated with employers’ acceptance of most of
the workers’ demands, including the removal of the contractor.31 The fact that even government
employees had a union shows the magnitude that the culture of unionization achieved on the
border by using direct action as their primary weapon.
However, Communists conducted the most notorious, energetic, and radical actions in
Juárez. On the border, the presence of Communists launching strikes, organizing sit-ins and
walkouts, and engaging in mass protests reveals the significant influence radicalism, even under
the Popular Front which attenuated it, had on the border. The height of Communist presence in
Juárez came in the last years of the 1930s, which coincided with the Popular Front. In 1937, the
29
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CSO openly allied with the Cámara Sindical Unitaria del Trabajo and the Comité Seccional del
Partido Comunista de Mexico (Mexican Communist Party).32 This alliance formally came after
years of working de facto on the border to organize workers in solidarity. However, the
Communist presence on the border goes back to the beginning of the decade. In 1930, Chihuahua
Governor Andrés Ortiz issued a manifesto regarding the presence of Communists within the
CSO in Juárez, which illustrates the fear that Communism inspired, and how politicians used it
as a scare tactic to misrepresent organized labor in the state. Ortiz noted at the time that the CSO
member organizations had “no communist elements” and warned that “those that will be
discovered will be terminated from the organization eventually.”33 In reality, Ortiz’s
announcement contradicted the reality in Ciudad Juárez. Two important local labor organizations
with communist affiliations, the Centro Agrícola e Industrial and the Cámara Sindical Unitaria
del Trabajo, greatly influenced the city during the early 1930s through political manifestos
published in local newspapers and through the distribution of “El Machete,” the national
Communist newspaper created by the Mexican Communist Party. This union and federation
formed alliances with other workers’ organizations in the area, including the CSO later in the
decade, which increased their visibility and made them widely accepted throughout the
community. Chapter two has already demonstrated the massive show of support from workers in
those instances, including marches, meetings, strikes, and others, in which the CSO called for
their support.
The Communist-led Cámara Sindical Unitaria, which had been part of the Confederación
Sindical Unitaria de México, the national federation of Communist-led unions- until 1936, was
active in Juárez throughout the 1930s. It had twelve organizations by 1937, including the radical
32
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Centro Agrícola Industrial (Peasants and Industrial Workers’ union), Plumbers’ union, the
Unemployed committee, the Deportivo Juvenil Unitario (Youth Athletic League), the Sociedad
Femenil de Izquierda (Women Leftist Association) and others.34 In addition to the Cámara
Unitaria, the other, and larger federation, the CSO, allied with Communist, Socialist, and
anarchist organizations. Both federations utilized widespread direct action in the form of strikes,
walkouts, wildcat strikes, boycotts, massive protests, and public manifestos to increase workers’
influence. These actions provoked intense reaction from political and economic elites on the
border. The CSO was the most important federation in Juárez in terms of membership, boasting
thirty-two unions among their ranks, and perhaps more importantly, it galvanized the most
radical groups at the border, including the Mexican Communist Party.35
Pascual Padilla was the best- known Communist organizer on the border. He initially
belonged to the CSO and later headed the Centro Agrícola e Industrial (1932-1937) as well as the
Unemployed Committee (1932-1940). The presence of individuals like Padilla assisted the CSO
in its rise as a political force at the border due to the visibility its tactics garnered, which
emphasized direct action. Historian Barry Carr has argued that “the Mexican Communist Party
played a vital role in the spectacular mobilizations achieved by popular sectors during the middle
and late thirties.”36 Pascual Padilla, also known in Juárez as the ‘apostle of the proletariat’ led
numerous protests, marches, boycotts, and sit-ins on the border. His eloquence and energy
attracted workers towards him and the communists’ cause, at least according to local media.
After one of his multiple arrests, workers identifying themselves as communists came out to
34
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protest: “Yesterday in Juárez, a colorful manifestation of Communists took place to protest the
arrest of Pascual Padilla,” noted El Continental.37 The article suggested that Padilla’s attraction
had to do more with his ‘blue eyes’ than with his communist ideology, but local authorities did
not think so lightly of his potential to further radicalize workers on the border, so they arrested
Padilla more than twenty times from 1930 to 1935.38
Finally, and perhaps in an effort to get rid of him permanently, state authorities in Jalisco,
where he apparently also organized, charged Padilla with murder in 1935, suggesting
collaboration between governors at the time to tame workers. This explanation seems more
plausible when one looks at the fact that the local federal military commander, Major Loyo,
refused to serve the warrant, which suggests that perhaps some federal officials supported
Communists in Juárez as a counterweight to the Quevedos’ power; this was after all, the Popular
Front era. These repressive actions demonstrate the level of violence that local authorities
exercised against organized labor in general, but specifically against individuals promoting
communist ideology in the state of Chihuahua, whose persecution by the Mexican state extended
into the 1960s. 39
Communist leaders like Pascual Padilla made crucial contributions to the process of
radical class formation at the border. They achieved this primarily through the distribution of the
PCM’s national newspaper, El Machete, among workers and by engaging in massive protests.
The following case, led by Padilla, gained notoriety on the border due to the extended media
coverage it received. As previously mentioned, Dr. Daniel Quiroz Reyes, Juárez’s Mayor in
1934, responded to Quevedistas’ interests. In 1934, months after taking office, he ordered the
37
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repression of workers even after providing verbal permission for workers to protest in the first
place. This authorization meant that they should have been able to protest without the harassment
of the police; however, despite being granted permission, the police still acted violently.
A November 1934 Juárez district attorney official’s report illustrates the persecution that
Communists experienced on the border from local authorities who accused Communists of
rebellion for merely delivering their newspaper to the public at a political rally: “Relating to the
warrant that you will serve on Pascual Padilla, José Gonzales, Cenaido Valle, Gilberto
Rubalcaba, Julián Meléndez, y Jesús L. Oñate, allow me to express to you that I have dispatched
the aforementioned persons to the second district Court as alleged perpetrators of the crime of
rebellion. Likewise, I communicate to you that we received in this agency under my direction the
copies of the newspaper, ‘El Machete,’ the fliers, and letters that you refer to in the memo.”40
The police report never mentions the specific reason that necessitated police presence at the rally
and the subsequent arrest of Communist operators. The following report from the local police
explains that they arrested these individuals for having disseminated Communist publications:
“Yesterday during the demonstration organized by the Partido Nacional Revolucionario with the
purpose of celebrating the 24th anniversary of the Mexican Revolution, the police arrested the
same individuals that were distributing Communist propaganda, and whose names are the
following: Pascual Padilla, José Gonzales, Cenaido Valle, Gilberto Rubalcaba, Julián Meléndez,
Jesús L. Oñate. The propaganda consisted of some editions of the Machete newspaper, as well as
fliers targeted to workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, and teachers.”41 With regards to the
40
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arrest of Pascual Padilla, the police attested that Padilla tried to burn the evidence.42 The
newspaper article covering this same incident goes into more detail regarding the types of
propaganda that the alleged Communist individuals had in their possession. The confiscated
manifesto attacked corrupt labor leaders, the religious upheaval in central Mexico (Cristero
rebellion), and the socialist education promoted by the federal government, which in the local
Communists’ minds, did not represent true socialist values.43
In addition to distributing propaganda on the streets, Communists at the border made
efforts to inculcate a sense of internationalism among workers. In 1934, the Centro Agrícola, led
by Padilla, issued a manifesto to the federal government, promoted in the local media, asking for
the re-establishment of relations with the U.S.S.R. Padilla requested “that the federal government
restore diplomatic relations with the US.S.R as indication that Russia has provided a unique
example by showing that workers can hold national political power, which is a slap in the face
for Imperialist nations.”44 The manifesto exhorted certain segments of organized labor on the
border to have the confidence to take control of the national government through direct action
and strike techniques; such demands exposed them to violence by local authorities. Radical
unionists associated with the Communists in the Centro Agrícola e Industrial wrote to Josephus
Daniels, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, in support of local textile workers: “In our rally
celebrated by this organization of workers on the 17th, we agreed as a majority to energetically
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protest against the hostile actions that our comrades in the textile industry on strike are suffering.
As a result, we express solidarity with our partners and unconditionally support the strike.”45
After the Popular Front was inaugurated (end of 1935) Mexican Communists modified
communist objectives somewhat and they no longer called for the takeover of the means of
production as their ultimate goal. In 1937, therefore, the U.S. consulate observed that “Labor in
Chihuahua is not manifestly communist in principles, and confiscation of property with or
without indemnification is not the present design of labor leaders. Many of the latter are,
however, radical Socialists and have indicated their views by expressing frequently sympathy
with the Russian and Spanish (loyalists) ideology.”46 This examination of Communism in
Mexico responded to the Popular Font era, which saw an alliance between the Cárdenas
presidency and the Communist party, which inevitably led to a gradual decrease in tone and
substance of the latter’s demands, something the Consulate picked up on.
As mentioned previously, the Popular Font created a rift in the labor movement that saw
the strongest and largest industrial unions, including the National Miners Union and the Railroad
Workers Union, briefly leave the CTM. The Popular Front weakened the labor movement by
forcing the newly created industrial unions to leave the recently formed CTM after the latter’s
undemocratic practices became more apparent. Juárez had no industrial unions, except for the
electricians’, and their influence, although significant, did not compare with that of the Miners.
The Popular Front on the border worked, as it was young communist operatives who injected life
into the movement and symbolized Cárdenas’ government efforts to increase workers’ power.
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This support was not reciprocated fully by the national government since Cárdenas never made
concerted efforts to stop state governor Quevedo’s violence.
In 1937, the general secretary of the Communist party (PCM), Hernán Laborde, visited
Juárez from Mexico City. The U.S. consul noted that Laborde talked to a rally about, “the urge to
join in masse the Communist Party in Mexico.” The consular report also highlighted the
presence at the rally of SIMMR (National Miners’ Union) Secretary, Agustín Guzmán, and the
Chihuahua City’s mayor, Manuel López Dávila, a known radical and an ex-member of the
teachers’ union. Their presence alongside Laborde reminds us of the influence Communists had
in certain spheres of the state government, including the municipality of Chihuahua, and in the
teachers’ unions. Finally, the report emphasized that participants ended the rally by singing the
‘International’ and delivering the communist salute, which also supports the argument regarding
the use of class elements by labor leaders to educate the masses.47 The presence of high-ranking
communist officials in government position at a labor rally in Juárez signified the Popular
Front’s victory on the border.
Communists in Juárez made efforts to forge alliances with their counterparts in El Paso,
Texas as well. On March 9, 1940, a committee investigating subversive activities in El Paso,
Texas revealed a letter in which Fran Sener, a Communist Party organizer for the Southwest,
expressed the necessity to form alliances with Juárez’s workers and their federations: “In line
with the general policies of our party today… urging the establishment of an International CIOCTM committee to have the CIO seat one fraternal delegate from the CTM in their inter local
committee and vice versa…urging organizers to promote more house to house agitation and to
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promote small meetings at workers’ homes.”48 The U.S. communist party had a strong influence
in some CIO-affiliated unions in the United States.
Workers’ efforts to organize labor transnationally were met by American officials with
hostility. On March 11, 1940, local authorities in El Paso arrested Miguel Oaxaca, a CTM
organizer in Juárez and former leader of the Bakers’ Union, and turned him over to immigration
officials for deportation. According to the Mexican Consul in El Paso, immigration officials held
Oaxaca without probable cause.49 CTM officials in Juárez clarified that Oaxaca was in El Paso at
the invitation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which wanted him to help them
organize Mexicans in El Paso. Apparently, none of the current organizers spoke Spanish. On
March 12, 1940, immigration officials released Oaxaca and he returned ‘voluntarily’ to Juárez.50
The arrest of Oaxaca and the letter by Sener in which he reveals the attempt to establish a
transnational Communist organization demonstrate the importance that Communism had in
transforming workers’ identities at the border. Historian Monica Perales has shown the
importance transnational collaboration among workers had in transforming workers at ASARCO
in El Paso. In fact, U.S. workers changed the way ASARCO perceived them by organizing into
unions.51 In the political and economic elites’ mind, this transnational collaboration threatened
their power.
In April 1937, the CSO and the Centro Agrícola Industrial sent letters to Antero Torres,
interim mayor of Juárez, clarifying that Pascual Padilla no longer belonged to the CSO or the
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Centro Agrícola.52 Padilla immediately formed the Genuino Centro Agrícola Industrial, which
quickly adhered to the Cámara Sindical Unitaria. He also continued his involvement with the
Unemployed Committee and the Sindicato de Carboneros (coal workers). The importance of the
Centro Agrícola’s statement distancing itself from Padilla, who throughout the 1930s remained a
valuable member of the union, signaled the beginning of the co-optation of the CSO and the
Centro Agrícola by local elites. Padilla’s removal coincided with the abandonment and eventual
coercively induced return of the PCM to the CTM in 1937, which eventually led to the first
serious rift in the radical labor movement that saw the Miners’ and the Electricians’ unions walk
out. In Juárez, the Electricians’ struggle against the local power company needs highlighting due
to its length, magnitude, and eventual outcome.
Electricians Union’s Strike Movement
The efforts by the Electricians’ Union to compel company operators to honor an existing
collective contract and the union’s eventual demand to establish a different contract serves as an
effective case which illustrate how radicalism shaped workers’ attitudes. It also reveals the level
of violence that some labor-capital conflicts reached in Juárez. In 1930, the local Electricians’
Union proclaimed that its purpose in establishing the local section in Juárez was “for the rights
and justice of the workers.” The Confederación Nacional de Electricistas emphasized to
authorities that the union represented the nationwide conglomerate of electricians in Juárez: “the
section will be the only representative in this capital before the corresponding authorities for the
solution of all the issues that are required through this Executive Committee.”53 The local section

52

Miguel Lopez Valencia Secretary of the Cámara Sindical Obrera, to Antero Torres, interim mayor of Juárez,
September, 13, 1937, 1937/1392.733/AMCJ.
53
Confederación Nacional de Electricistas y Similares to the mayor of Ciudad Juárez, Gustavo Flores, October 8,
1930, 1930/156/AMCJ.

143	
  

resisted anti-labor measures and garnered the support of its members by promoting class
identification to shape workers’ behavior through unity. In fact, in its first pronouncement to the
border community, the union expressed precisely these concerns to justify its formation. The
conflict between the union and the local power company in Juárez began in 1933 when company
operators and owners, in this case the Quevedos, refused to recognize the new collective contract
presented by workers from the local union representing electric workers. This standstill lasted for
three years until 1936, when the Confederación Nacional de Electricistas organized a strike
movement against business operators who refused to sign the new collective contracts in certain
sections of the country, including Mexico City. This quasi-national strike added to the already
existing tension between operators and the unions over their own contracts. It conveniently
complemented the local section’s desire to establish new contracts as well, which had taken
place for three years already without any sign of ever getting completed. The strike began in the
central part of Mexico and quickly spread throughout the nation.54
In Ciudad Juárez, after years of going back and forth, the negotiations took a violent turn
since the Quevedos operated and owned the power company while simultaneously occupying
high-ranking positions in the local and state government, including the governorship and the
office of mayor. The electrical workers’ union’s main demand centered on honoring the existing
collective contract which the union felt the Quevedos ignored. The union’s leadership used strike
threats in addition to manifestos published in local newspapers, which exposed the Quevedos’
ability to control workers, especially those employed directly by them. This only exacerbated the
animosity between both parties since union members staunchly refused to compromise on what
they considered essential rights, including the ability to have a closed shop and higher wages.
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Moreover, as high-ranking officials, the Quevedos could not afford to look weak, so they
determinedly refused to cede.
This particular labor conflict between the Quevedos and the electricians remains unique
because of the Quevedos’ simultaneous presence in local business and government, which
allowed them to repress the union without any consequences. Jesús Quevedo, one of the
governor’s siblings and a former mayor himself, and José Quevedo, Juárez’s mayor at the time,
sought to undermine the collective contract by infiltrating and placing trusted individuals in
crucial positions throughout the company without the union’s approval. The union had a hiring
hall and wished to control new hires; the company opposed the union’s attempts to control who
was hired and fired, no doubt feeling this should be their prerogative.
The specific disagreement began when the company’s operator, Jesús Quevedo, hired his
stepson as an accountant and Juan Montes to perform jobs requiring prior union approval. The
union announced to “the Federal Conciliatory Court, that the Cía. Mexicana Productora de Luz y
Fuerza S. A. has again violated the agreement made between that Company and this Union, since
it has allowed two persons to work in the Company. You [the federal court] told the Manager,
Mr. Jesús Quevedo, the seriousness of this violation.”55 Jesús Quevedo promised to withdraw
these two individuals, but that was just for a few days, “since it has allowed Mr. Juan Montes to
make charges and cut-offs to the services, and a stepson of Mr. Quevedo, whose last name is
Martínez, works the account books of the clients, and all this with full labor rights.”56 The union
utilized the collective contract as the basis for its threats; however, the unions’ protestations and
the labor code made no difference to the company’s operators who still continued to hire
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whomever they wished: “As is well known to you, the agreement signed between this Sindicato
de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica de Cd. Juarez and Cía. Mexicana Productora de Luz y
Fuerza S. A. with your intervention as federal authority of Labor clearly establishes that the
company cannot hire anyone who is not proposed by the Union. Therefore, this union exposes
the violation of the agreement by the Company.”57 The union later added that those individuals
will not be recognized as part of the union: “The union does not recognize labor rights for Mr.
Montes and Mr. Martínez, nor anyone that the company employs in violation of the Agreement.
The Company conducts business with lack of respect, despite your being a federal authority with
which all other companies comply.”58 Again, this letter shows the significant animosity present
between union members and the Quevedos in Ciudad Juárez over control of the workplace.
However, these same individuals operated the power company and held high-ranking positions
locally and state wide, augmenting the tension since the company’s operatives had a carte
blanche to use state resources to solve this conflict to their advantage. On the other side, it shows
how unions utilized the existing laws to safeguard their rights despite hostile authorities.
Despite this imbalance of power, the union frequently used the threat of direct action to
pressure the company to accept the new collective contracts presented to them at various
instances throughout the 1930s, albeit to no avail.
Weeks later, operators in the Chihuahua City’s power company refused to sign the new
collective contract proposed by the local section there, which caused the threat of a strike to
resurface in Juárez. Therefore, in addition to their show of solidarity towards their fellow
laborers in Chihuahua, workers in Juárez eventually demanded a new contract for the third time
in the 1930s. Power company operators initially refused for the third time, which initiated
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Quevedo. At the beginning of the conflict, the company defended its position through the local
media: “It is inexact what the union claims regarding our lack of observance with the labor codes
delineated in the Federal Labor Law, since this would constitute an act of rebellion, and a lack of
respect for our laws.”59 Operators from the company later added that the demands made by the
union went beyond those stipulated by the law. The union kept up the pressure and announced in
the local newspapers that they would strike if the power company did not agree to the provisions
delineated in the collective contract sent to them months earlier: “The Sindicato de Trabajadores
de la Industria Eléctrica in Ciudad Juárez made the company, Productora de Luz y Fuerza, aware
that they will strike if the collective contract was not signed by the 27th of February at 12 am.”60
Armando Pórras led the negotiations with the power company, acting as the union’s
representative. He was later killed by Quevedo’s operatives in front of his family. His eloquence
and energy in many ways symbolized the entire labor movement of the era.
The following excerpt captures the conflict from the perspective of workers, who felt that
the company did not listen to their concerns and so striking remained the only viable option:
“The company has shown complete intransigence since it refuses to accept any of the petitions
made by workers who have shown themselves to be more than willing to reach an agreement and
since it has not been possible, they deemed it necessary to strike.”61 On March 6, 1938, days
before Cárdenas nationalized the oil industry, the union announced that it would no longer strike
since the power company had accepted the majority of the provisions delineated in the collective
contract presented to them months earlier. It also thanked other organizations, including the
CSO, for their support. The federation argued that “This union has decided to suspend the strike,
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since we are aware that the company’s representative has accepted most of the provisions found
in the contract and as a result we have lifted the movement of strike. We would like to thank the
Cámara Sindical Obrera and other organizations for their cooperation.”62 However, this apparent
victory for the union did not last. Weeks later, the Sindicato de Trabajadores of the Industria
Eléctrica stopped working for an hour to protest the “lack of compliance with the collective
bargaining agreement.”63 The electricians used walkouts to pressure the Quevedos, in this case
Jesús Quevedo, despite the Quevedos’ important positions in local and state government.
The union’s actions and especially those of its leader, Armando Pórras, enraged the
Quevedo clan to the point that individuals closely associated with the clan murdered Pórras four
months later. The murder of Pórras effectively ended the union’s decade- long struggle to garner
respect for the collective contract devised by the workers, and their subsequent use of direct
action to enforce the contract once new leadership was introduced at the behest of Quevedo.
A year after the murder, Jesús Quevedo, the power company’s operator, made the
following announcement: “There will be no strike at the company. The first act of the new
leadership will be to make sure all previous contracts of the old leadership will be revoked. The
majority of workers voted for this.”64 One can only infer how many of the so-called workers’
votes really happened. More notably, after the assassination of the union’s negotiations leader
and with a climate of fear enshrouding the elections, one can question the validity of such a
process at the very least. In addition, Jesús Quevedo pressed charges against Conrado Alvarez,
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the treasurer and a known union sympathizer, for corruption, and instead appointed one of his
relatives, Arturo Quevedo, to the position of treasurer.65
Furthermore, while the local union had previously championed Pórras as their
representative, after Pórras’ murder, the local section in Juárez quickly changed position, now
denigrating Pórras and others who challenged business operators by labeling them ‘rebellious’
and seeking to ‘delegitimize the new leadership.’66 The new leadership of the union dissipated
any doubts regarding the Quevedos’ ability to control the new union leadership: “The Sindicato
de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica de Ciudad Juárez does not recognize the National
Electricians Federation for supporting a few rebellious members of the section in Juárez, who
have blatantly ignored the laws of this organization and far from trying to improve it, have
buried it by trying to delegitimize the new leadership.”67 This decision to distance themselves
from the national federation resulted from the arrival of national inspectors in Juárez to
investigate the election, during which the new union leadership overthrew the old one. However,
this decision by the new leadership of the Juárez section to sidestep their national federation
went deeper than the presence of inspectors in the area questioning the election’s results. The
failure of the local section to recognize one of the most radical and worker-friendly unions in the
nation signaled to the rest of the workers in Ciudad Juárez that times had changed.
Conclusion
The threat of strikes, actual strikes, walkouts, boycotts, and other manifestations of direct
action shows workers increasing power, and the limits of this new found agency. The mining
65

El Continental, March 3, 1938.	
  
El Continental, March 3, 1938.
67
El Continental, February 8, 1939.	
  
66

149	
  

district workers’ alliance with high-ranking local and state-wide politicians brought important
victories to workers in their strike movements against ASARCO. However, this alliance also
prevented their further radicalization once authorities at all levels acquiesced to workers’
demands leaving them without justifications to further radicalize. They also turned the other way
to the violence workers experienced in Juárez.
On the border, Communists, the CSO and unions representing the bakers and the
electricians engaged in strikes, which paralyzed the city. Throughout the 1930s, organized labor
in Juárez utilized direct action frequently and effectively, which helped develop a strong labor
movement based on class interests for the first time in the border city.
This militancy was met with violence from local government officials. The latter had
powerful economic interests in the city who used their positions to unleash an aggressive
campaign against some radical segments of Juárez’s organized labor, including the CSO, the
Communists, and the Electricians’ Union. As a result, the role local and state authorities played
in both regions ultimately decided outcomes for workers regardless of the latters’ militancy and
use of direct action. The comparison between the National Miners’ Union in the Hidalgo Mining
District, and the Electricians’ Union in Juárez, illustrates this assertion. At the same time, the
level of state-wide unity that miners achieved, and the importance of the industry for the state’s
economy curtailed the Quevedos and other political elites’ ability to violently repress them.
Miners had more than 10,000 workers state-wide adhering to the SIMMR, and had shown a
willingness to strike to help other sections. However, they traded benefits at the expense of
radicalism and solidarity with workers other than miners. The Electricians’ Union in Juárez,
despite the support of its national federation, the CSO, and other organizations, never achieved
the degree of unity at the state-wide level that their counterpart in the mining district achieved
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and this made their violent repression and eventual co-optation by authorities easier to achieve.
The same held true for the Communists, who failed to garner any assistance from the pro-labor
Cárdenas regime and the Popular Front and also experienced violence and arrests. This chapter
examined the way direct action increased workers’ power. The next chapter will analyze
workers’ political alliances with economic and political elites locally, statewide, and nationally.

CHAPTER 5: LABOR’S POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND ITS LIMIT—A SPECTRUM
FROM COOPERATION TO REPRESSION

Political alliances operated in vastly different ways for organized labor in the two
communities under examination in this study, mirroring the way these coalitions functioned
throughout Mexico during the 1930s. In the Hidalgo Mining District, workers formed alliances
with local and state-wide high-ranking political elites and with the Cárdenas regime. They did so
to promote their pro-labor agenda and to offer workers access to local, state, and national
political power structures for the first time in the nation’s history. These political alliances
brought tangible benefits to organized workers in the district. Once high-ranking officials forced
owners and business operators to comply with the law, workers’ power increased. At the same
time, the mediation of high-ranking officials prevented the conflict from radicalizing since
workers saw immediate and significant gains once the state became involved. This diminished
the movement’s ability to further its demands beyond control of the workplace to include issues
of power and self-determination.
By contrast, Ciudad Juárez organized labor remained remote from the key bastions of
private and public power. This reality forced labor to establish coalitions with oppositional
political forces in the city, including an alliance with a large sector of the middle class affected
by the Quevedo monopoly on local power, in an effort to dismantle the Quevedista political
machine in the municipal elections of 1931, 1933, and 1936. After each election, this coalition
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continued to pressure elected municipal officials to uphold the law forcing owners to abide by
the collective contracts.
Historians have demonstrated the power that high-ranking local and state-wide officials
had on organized labor’s ability to articulate their demands and eventually obtain access to
power structures. Historian Adrian Bantjes demonstrated such dynamics in the case of
neighboring post-revolutionary Sonora during the 1930s. There high-level state-wide officials
prevented organized labor from increasing their power at the expense of longstanding elites, even
when federal officials supported organized labor.1 In the same state, but during the late 1910s
and early 1920s, other historians have shown that alliances between the radical wing of
organized labor and political and economic elites resulted in tangible improvements for
workers.2 Statewide elites ceded once workers’ pressure forced them to do, just as happened with
the miners in the Hidalgo region. But most of the time, elites made efforts to curtail workers’
militancy without relinquishing anything as took place in Juárez.
Political and economic elites in post-revolutionary Chihuahua utilized a wide array of
mechanisms to curtail workers’ potential for radicalization. The Federal Labor Law of 1931,
while it gave workers the ability to organize and mandated conciliation mechanisms, limited
unions’ and federations’ independence by barring them from “intervening in political and
religious affairs.”3 These electoral restrictions prevented unions from running candidates
independently of political parties. Thus, organized labor sought out coalitions with political
parties since they were the only channels available to articulate their political aspirations. This
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also led labor leaders to step away from their union’s position, join an official political party, and
run for office, which also exposed them to conflicts of interest and patronage once political
office entered the equation. Thus, labor legislation like the 1931 labor law granted organized
workers access to political power, but it also extended the government’s power over labor by
limiting their ability to strike and perform other forms of direct action.4 Moreover, it effectively
established the state as the main channel by organized labor could present and resolve its
demands. As a consequence, a lack of uniformity (usually the product of elites’ economic and
political interests) determined the way political elites dealt with workers. The contrast between
the mining region and Ciudad Juárez lies in the reactions of local officials to the federations’
rising political influence. This reaction generated extraordinary amounts of violence at the
border, something that did not happen in the Hidalgo Mining District.
The Benefits of Cooperation
The Hidalgo Mining District did not experience significant electoral conflict during the
1930s in municipal elections which took place every two years, suggesting that workers in the
area did not perceive the election winners as an imposition by political and economic elites. The
candidates running for mayor in Parral and Santa Barbara throughout the 1930s supported
organized labor in their numerous strikes because it was in their best political and economic
interest to do so. Workers’ use of direct action certainly shaped this political context.
The relationship between political elites and unions in the mining area after the
Revolution helps explain how organized labor there attained so many victories in their numerous
strikes, including those against foreign giants such as ASARCO. This was especially true during
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the administrations of Gabriel Chávez and Valente Chacón Baca, known Quevedistas, who
supported organized labor’s quest for collective contracts and their numerous strikes which took
place during their tenure. In turn, organized labor supported Quevedistas during their respective
campaigns, and did not question the validity of their victories after the elections. Chacón Baca
was a state representative for the Hidalgo Mining District before winning the election in 1933 for
mayor of Parral, which also reaffirms the argument that workers supported those who had
previously supported them. In short, in the mining region, organized labor helped individuals
who had shown solidarity with workers get elected.
The mining district was one of Governor Rodrigo Quevedo’s political bastions, and he
enjoyed widespread support from organized labor in the area. He intervened in favor of workers
during the strike threats to establish new collective contracts against ASARCO. In both
instances, Section 9 and Section 11 credited Quevedo as a “true revolutionary.”5 Gustavo
Talamantes, who succeeded Quevedo as state governor, also won workers’ endorsement in the
Hidalgo Mining District by supporting their continuous negotiations of collective contracts. In
fact, during one of his numerous trips to the region, Talamantes was called a “friend of workers”
by local labor organizations, including Sections 9 and 11.6
Organized labor continued to cultivate its relationship with local officials after they were
sworn into office. Undoubtedly, organized labor realized that the next individual running for
mayor would have some kind of political or economic connection with the incumbent official.
This was true even among those federations considered radical, like the CRT.
The Cámara Regional del Trabajo (CRT) supported local authorities in an effort to build
political capital. This context facilitated the CRT’s continuous litigation in the local courts. The
5
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CRT gave credit to local officials for the improved conditions of the working class throughout
the 1930s. Community celebrations became a vehicle to highlight the benefits brought about by
the mutual relationship between labor and politicians. In the short run, this closeness brought
organized labor tangible benefits; however, in the long run, it pushed them further into the realm
of collaboration and patronage.
Prior to the Revolution, ASARCO organized most of the community gatherings and
celebrations. Evidently, the majority of the community did not participate in these elitist
gatherings; only foreigners and trusted Mexican nationals, including local officials, participated
in them. At the time, foreigners had their own facilities, including schools and housing, enclosed
in an area close to the mines and isolated from the rest of the community.7 The Revolution
changed some of that. Throughout the 1930s, local authorities invited unions and federations to
different events organized by the municipality, which evidently benefited them as well.
Organized labor attended these events in significant numbers as a show of strength and
reciprocity, including the fourteenth anniversary of the Revolution: “The Cámara Regional del
Trabajo recommends to all its organizations to attend to the invitation made by our mayor to
celebrate the anniversary of the Revolution on November 20. We have no doubt that our
organization will cooperate to make this a great showing.”8 In the same letter, the CRT connects
local officials and the union as representatives of the Revolution. This also showed organized
labor’s expectation of support from local officials after the Revolution.
The CRT ensured that local authorities remained cognizant of the unity among workers in
the area, including peasants, further showing the CRT’s electoral power and ongoing efforts to
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increase their power. In 1934, it announced that it had “invited all the agrarian committees and
all workers’ unions without any distinctions of credo or political party to show a united front that
demonstrates our support for the government and the Revolution, so that it can continue and
advance with more resolution the decrees of our socialist education and other important reforms
that fortify workers’ standing.”9 Federations and unions in the mining region also used their
organization’s anniversaries to bring the community and local officials together in an effort to
reinforce the connection between unions and local officials. This harmonious collaboration
began in the late 1920s, further showing unions’ ties with political elites after the Revolution.
For example, in one letter addressed to local authorities, the Obreros Libres (Free Workers)
union invited them to “an evening of music and reading,” illustrating the fact that these
gatherings included activities aimed at furthering the interests of the working class.10
Organized labor and elected officials also utilized certain national holidays, including the
Revolution (Nov. 20), Independence (Sept. 16), and Workers’ Day (May 1) to advance their
interests and those of the workers. For example, in 1930, the Sindicato de Obreros Libres used
the anniversary of Mexico’s independence to address class issues through poetry, music, and
orations about the life and ideals of Miguel Hidalgo, a priest considered the father of Mexican
Independence in 1810. The evening ended with the national anthem. For the workers’ movement,
power seemed to be implanted by connecting their cause and a class agenda to nationalism and
the legacy of the Revolution.11 These cultural events increased both the federations’ and the
authorities’ standing in the community by connecting nationalistic symbols, including
Independence Day, with pro-labor values. Unions realized that promoting their organizations as
9
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bastions of nationalism resulted in tangible gains. When organized labor took advantage of
important national celebrations, like Cinco de Mayo, to conduct grandiose festivities in which
the entire community participated, they were in effect suggesting that labor and unions would
advance with the nation instead of being subjugated by capital and the nation. The usage of
nationalistic symbols showed workers’ ability to connect the emerging nation as a promoter of
working class values. For example, the union connected their colors with the nation: “This union
agreed yesterday and with the objective of addressing the municipality invitation to solemnly and
with our colors to attend the civic procession to celebrate the glorious Cinco de Mayo Parade that
will take place in this city at 10 a.m. on that precise date.”12
After the Revolution, unions invited local authorities to similar events throughout the year.
In April 1933, the local Miners’ Union, “Benito Juárez,” invited local authorities to the union’s
anniversary, which they described as an ‘epic journey’ and encouraged members, “to assist in
large numbers at the assigned time.”13 Their anniversary coincided with the commemoration of
the famous battle of Puebla in 1862. Here the union connected this benchmark in Mexican
history with their own struggle.
Unions also expressed deference to ensure that local authorities did not feel undermined
by organized labor’s significant political and social clout in the area. Unions made the decision
to defer to authorities instead of business owners and operators to guarantee that they had the
local authorities on their side, or at least, unbiased towards their interests.14 Workers for example
asked local authorities for permission to gather, illustrating this deference. In one instance, the
mayor responded: “In response to the note dated today, the presidency, under my leadership, has
12
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granted permission so that on the 6th of the current month a gathering followed by a dance can
take place at the Bakers’ hall.”15 At first glance, asking permission to celebrate certain events
clearly delineates power structures in the region, since one might infer that without their
permission, the union’s meetings might not have taken place. However, unions deferred to
authorities as a tactical strategy since they knew local officials would side with them. More
notably, unions deferred selectively, and only in issues of minor to regular importance, including
procuring permissions to hold a dance. In other instances, like the times in which workers sought
higher wages, organized labor simply responded by using direct action, as previous chapters
have shown. Unions’ expressions of deference came in various forms and tones, including the
de-facto acceptance of the new regulations imposed by the government regarding unions. This
suggests that this decision resulted from pragmatism, not subordination. Again, workers never
abandoned other forms of resistance, like the use of direct action. Having said that, they also did
not fight in unison against the limits placed upon them.
One of the mechanisms instituted to regulate labor after the Revolution required
organizations to register the names of the representatives on their executive boards with the local
authorities every six months. In 1931, the mayor wrote deferentially to the “Benito Juárez”
Miners’ Union regarding the change in the union’s leadership: “Thanks to the memo dated on the
third of the current month, the municipality is aware of the newly elected leadership of this
union. We wish the new leadership success.”16 In another letter exchanged, the union praised the
nation’s military as the safeguard of a post-revolutionary nation connected to their pro-worker
agenda. “We are very thankful to let you know that we have received the 15 volumes of books
15
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edited by the Chief of Staff honoring soldiers. This union has taken into consideration the
reasons and its thankfulness to the Chief of Staff. We can only praise his good intentions and
hope that the working class realizes the distinction made to the soldiers.”17 This pronouncement
also shows organized labor’s loyalty to the federal government and the workers’ recognition of
the military’s revolutionary ideals. Federations’ and unions’ utilization of deference
supplemented their other endeavors to influence local officials.
Political elites’ alliances with labor sometimes brought violence upon them. On April 13,
1938, unknown assassins killed former mayor Gabriel Chávez in the streets of Parral. A day
later, state Representative Ismael Falcón accused Governor Gustavo Talamantes of Chávez’s
murder. Falcón insinuated that the reason for the murder had to do with Chávez’s refusal to work
with the Talamantes administration because Chávez continued to sympathize with Quevedo,
which meant “a death sentence.”18 Talamantes denied any involvement in the murder and
announced in the state media that he would do everything in his power to find the perpetrators.
He added that Falcón’s accusation had no merit, and that everyone in the state knew Falcón’s
reputation as a Quevedo ally so he did not worry about his accusations.19 Chávez’s murder
highlights the political value that officials placed on workers’ support. His presence in Parral
impeded the new state administration from ensuring workers’ allegiance because Chávez
presumably remained one of Quevedo’s political operators safeguarding his interests in the
mining area, at least in Falcón’s eyes.
Workers in the Hidalgo Mining District did not experience any type of systematic
violence from local, state, or federal officials during this decade; however, this does not mean
17
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that workers, or their leaders, did not experience any violence in the mining district. In August,
1935, Parral’s Section 9’s leader, Juan Macías, disappeared in the middle of a conflict between
ASARCO and Section 9 over the implementation of a new collective contract.20 Macías was
never found. Local officials assured organized labor that his disappearance had nothing to do
with the ongoing negotiations over the contract. The fact that these assurances were made shows
that workers certainly harbored doubts that their fight for rights in the area was unopposed.21
Except for Macías, workers and their leaders experienced only isolated episodes of
violence in Parral-Santa Barbara, which corresponded to Governor Quevedo’s recognition of the
region’s high political and economic value. The district was one of organized labor’s bastions in
the state because of the high level of unionization in the area, which made union members a
formidable electoral force. Furthermore, the Miners’ Union had shown the ability to disrupt the
mining industry through direct action early in the decade; this forced Quevedo to support
workers in the Hidalgo district during their various threats of strike against ASARCO, despite his
conservative credentials. Moreover, local officials in Parral-Santa Barbara assisted unions and
federations in their process of class formation and during most of their strike movements because
their own political future depended on workers’ support. More notably, this approach allowed
political elites to keep workers from radicalizing.
Ciudad Juárez: The Limits of Alliances
By contrast, organized	
  labor’s inability to maintain or influence local political power in
Ciudad Juárez explains in large part the independent and radical unions’ eventual demise in the
city. This fallout occurred despite their attempts to influence local elections by supporting certain

20
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La Voz de Chihuahua, August 23, 1935, El Correo de Parral, August 23, 1935.

161	
  

candidates and creating political alliances with other sectors of Juárez’s political classes. In one	
  
of these alliances, a cross-class coalition formed	
  with the Margarito Herrera political faction. The
latter was the former head of the local chamber of commerce in Juárez and the candidate for
municipal president in 1929 against the official party candidate for the Revolutionary Party
(PNR), Gustavo Flores. The latter was a known associate of drug kingpin, Enrique Fernandez,
and the Quevedos, who at this point had not yet separated from the Fernandez drug gang.22
Despite his alliance with organized labor,	
  Herrera lost the election to Flores and would lose again
to José Quevedo in the 1935 election for mayor in Juárez.
Violence from local authorities, in this case the Quevedos and their allies, stemmed from
their significant political and economic interests in Juárez. Historian Nicole Mottier summarizes
the clan’s reliance on violence in her examination of the Quevedo political group during the
same period, likening them to the vicious contemporary drug cartels: “Before the Juárez cartels,
there were the Fernández and the Quevedo gangs.”23 Mottier’s comparison of Quevedismo with
the current drug cartels illustrates the degree of violence the Quevedos exercised against their
political and economic adversaries. Besides their interests in the drug trade, the Quevedos
operated the local power company in Juárez, which pitted them against one of the most radical
and active unions in Mexico, the Electricians’ Union. They also had interests in gambling,
restaurants, bars, distilleries, and other similar enterprises. Furthermore, they controlled political
power on the border throughout the 1930s. Governor Rodrigo	
  Quevedo provided his siblings
with carte blanche to harass and eliminate radical unions from the city. By the end of the 1930s,
the Quevedos’ decade long public posturing as revolutionary midwives and protectors of
22
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workers’ rights, which in large part allowed them to get elected, no longer deceived workers in
Juárez.24
The Quevedo clan’s use of electoral fraud, patronage, nepotism, and violence to
perpetuate their power at the state and local levels significantly affected organized labor’s ability
to resist anti-worker measures and policies in Ciudad Juárez. Jesús Quevedo occupied the highest
municipal office from 1931-1933 and his brother, Rodrigo Quevedo, became governor of the
state from 1932-1936 later in the decade. José Quevedo occupied the office from 1936 to 1937
before his removal by Governor Talamantes. Known Quevedista, Dr. Daniel Quiroz, served as
municipal president from 1934 to 1936.25 In short, the Quevedo political machine dominated
local politics in Juárez throughout most of the 1930s. The clan established a climate of fear in the
city that	
  curtailed labor’s expressions of meaningful resistance.	
  	
  
This accumulation of political power at the state and local level allowed the Quevedos
and their allies to impose substantial control over Ciudad Juárez throughout the decade. The
United States’ consulate conducted extensive surveillance on the Quevedo family’s political
involvements, establishing both the family’s and Juárez’s prominence in Chihuahuan political
developments. As U.S. consul in Chihuahua Leo Blohm, affirmed in one such consular report:
“The brother of Governor Quevedo (José Quevedo) controls Ciudad Juárez, the most important
city in the state outside the capital.”26 The report fails to note that the Quevedos’ dominance at
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the border started with the presence of his brother as governor, and it does not clarify that this
control goes back to early in the decade. 	
  
Jesús Quevedo won the 1931 election for mayor of Juárez with a comfortable lead, at
least officially, as the election was shrouded with accusations of electoral fraud. The final tally
found Jesús Quevedo victorious with 6,227 votes over Vázquez’s 337.27 Vázquez quickly
questioned the legitimacy of the electoral process and called for the election’s invalidation: “We
consider the election null due to the fact that some authorities pressured voters so that the voting
would be partial to Quevedo.”28 Needless to say, Quevedo took office later that year despite
allegations of fraud. The other sibling, José, won the 1936 election. The U.S. consular report on
that election explains the role fraudulent elections served in the latter’s ascendance to the city’s
highest office. The report noted that Quevedo got elected despite representing only a minority of
the party’s members, which inevitably led to questioning the legality of the election, since no one
can get legitimately elected by representing only a minority of the voters in a two candidate race.
It also noted the fact that José Quevedo ensured that he had a trustworthy man for the prominent
position of chief of police, since troubled times loomed on the horizon as questions of illegality
engulfed the election: “The new mayor of Ciudad Juárez, José Quevedo Jr., who had been
elected by the local political machine representing a minority (of the PNR in Juárez), took office
on January 1st 1936. He kept his right-hand man, Chief of Police Jesús Chacón, but changed
probably 90% of the other municipal employees.”29 The U.S. consular report describing the
second election exposed the inability of the Quevedista political machine to maintain the
electoral advantage of almost six thousand votes that they had enjoyed only five years previously
27
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in the election of Jesus Quevedo. As a result, during the 1936 election for municipal president in
which the other sibling, José, won the election, the clan relied on electoral fraud to win, or at
least in the eyes of their adversaries and those observing in the U.S. consulate. More notably,
notwithstanding electoral fraud, the net loss of almost six thousand ballots shows the degree of
discontent among the Juárez community with the Quevedos’ reign of power.
Their political adversaries described the Quevedos’ “family-power” relationship as
ruthless and violent. The Quevedos personified the nepotism existent in Mexican politics,
especially at the state level, after the Revolution. The fraternal concern of Governor Rodrigo
Quevedo towards his brother, Jesús Quevedo, because of the latter’s blatant intervention in the
electoral process, shows the varying dynamics at work in their relationship. A seamless blend of
nepotism and cynicism follow:
My dear Brother:
The reason of the present is to confirm everything in the telephone conversation that I
had with you today, recommending that you once again act with energy to influence the
behavior of the employees of the municipal administration regarding their active
participation in electoral politics, considering that if you coolly analyze the implications
to your administration from the failure to correct the municipal element, you will have no
doubt in eliminating the ones who don’t correspond to the confidence of the official
positions they hold. If in any regard your administration could be accused by your
political opposition, maybe this would be the strongest charge to be made, I am pointing
this fact out to you because I wish you to be wise and respond by correcting the actions of
your immediate collaborators.
Receive my regards with love, your brother.30
Jesús Quevedo did not heed the advice of his brother, as numerous irregularities in subsequent
elections demonstrate. These illegalities and continuous intrusions from the Quevedos prevented
those coalitions in which workers participated from winning one single election. Again, these

30
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charges of electoral fraud go back to the beginning of the decade. In the primary elections of
1931 to elect the party’s candidate, the Plutarco Elias Bloc, a cross-class political alliance formed
within the PNR to defeat the Quevedos, supported Francisco Vázquez as candidate for the
municipal presidency. However, Jesús Quevedo won the primary elections within the PNR
without having a wide-base support, and as mentioned previously, Vazquez denounced electoral
fraud.
Early in the 1930s, before the Quevedos muscled their way into local politics, eventually
taking control of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), which is today’s Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the PNR had two factions vying for political hegemony in
Ciudad Juárez. The Quevedo family and their allies represented the Quevedista interests and the
Plutarco Elías Calles Bloc, the other. The reformist wing of organized labor and other local
movements of resistance, including the widespread neighborhood action groups in the area and
business’ interests who felt like outsiders in the close-knit Quevedista regime, represented the
Plutarco Elías Calles Bloc.
The Bloc crossed class lines in an effort to defeat the Quevedos and quell their business
interests in the alcohol, nightclub, gambling, and alleged drug enterprises, which they protected
through their political offices. The group made a strong complaint against the Quevedo campaign
of terror prior to the election of 1931 for municipal president: “Jesús Quevedo’s followers have
committed outrageous acts with the sanction of the law. They assaulted the offices of the
Plutarco Elías Calles Bloc, intending to set the symbol of the great National Revolutionary Party
on fire. Last night, the bar inspector Daniel Sánchez was drunk in the Cantina Modelo in Juárez
Avenue, when he fired a gun trying to force the people who were there to say cheers for Jesús
Quevedo. He also fired a bullet at the ceiling of the bar. A man whose last name is Aparicio has
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dedicated the last few nights to the abuse of his neighbors, accompanied by a group of drunken
persons frightening the neighborhood.”31
The clan utilized violence ubiquitously against all adversaries. The following letter shows
the political persecution unleashed against those who did not support Quevedistas’ interests,
even when the former conducted sanctioned political demonstrations throughout Ciudad Juárez.
These acts showed the influence that the Quevedos exercised throughout the electoral campaign
even before they officially assumed office, since this repression took place before the first
Quevedo sibling reached office. Local authorities clearly favored the Quevedista protest, since
the following letter warns the Elías bloc to cease their opposition or else face violent repression.
In fact, the Elías Bloc received the brunt of the repression and a number of arrests despite the
fact that their demonstration took place in an area where the Bloc was allowed to protest. Local
authorities’ warnings showed the level of tension that the 1931 elections generated in Juárez.32
The letter also reveals the degree of control that the Quevedo political group already enjoyed in
the city in the early 1930s, even before gaining office. Moreover, it shows how workers, via their
coalitions, expressed their discontent with the Quevedos.33
The conflict escalated to such an extent that the Plutarco Elías Calles faction of the
opposing party warned the authorities that they would answer similarly and “punish those
responsible for this outrage.”34 Furthermore, public officials’ involvement in illegal electoral
practices further reveals Quevedo’s hold on local power: “The Liga de Resistencia del Norte,
Partidos Plutarco Elías Calles, and Revolucionario del Norte complain that the councilmen,
31
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Chief of Police, and other municipal employees participated last Sunday raising propaganda in
favor of Guadalupe Díaz, destroying the advertisements that other parties were making. By
agreement of the governor, I remind you of the memo ordering authorities in municipal and state
government to abstain from participation in electoral issues.”35 Needless to say, the numerous
complaints by the opposition to the Quevedos were ignored as they continued winning elections
throughout the 1930s despite their reliance on illegal electoral practices. Furthermore, these
dynamics show the federal government’s lack of power, which despite their efforts to intervene
in Juárez, were no match for local elites’ hold on power.
Subsequent Elections and the Limits of Political Alliances
In 1935, Margarito Herrera, the former head of the chamber of commerce in Juárez, ran
for mayor again. In his acceptance speech, he summarized the political environment present at
the border. Herrera declared the following; “I have the resolve to include in the new government,
the principle of no nepotism so that we can finally end one of the most grave and shameful
mistakes, in which most government locally engaged in.”36 The message Herrera promoted,
which consisted of disseminating the truth of the Quevedo reign of power and illegality,
resounded among the different forces in Juárez who rallied behind Herrera’s anti-nepotism
message and included a vibrant socialist base. The following organizations, present throughout
the city, supported Herrera’s candidacy: Partido Socialista del Norte (Socialist party of the
North), Partido Felipe Angeles, Centro 10 de Mayo de 1911 de los Veteranos de la Revolución,
Centro Juvenil Juarenze, Bloque Socialista Juarenze (Juarenze Socialist Block), Alianza de los
Trabajadores de Norte, Partido Francisco Villa, Centro Agricultores Unidos de los Partidos and
35
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the Bloque Socialista del Norte (Socialist Block of the North). These groups represented the
reformist wing of organized labor showing Herrera gave workers a space to articulate their
demands.
Besides the traditional business connections, support for Herrera also came from
underprivileged, but organized, sectors of the community, including many Socialist
organizations. These coalitions show that a cross-class alliance among different sectors of
Juárez’s political and economic life coordinated in an effort to defeat the Quevedos. It also
shows organized labor’s attempts to mobilize their members across class lines in an effort to
access political power. The following document comes from The Bloque Socialista del Norte
faction, under the umbrella of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario party, supporting the

nomination of Margarito Herrera: “We have the honor to communicate to you that the members
of the ‘Partido Socialista del Norte’ agreed to hold a large demonstration the 22nd of this month
in honor of C. Don Margarito Herrera, the candidate nominated for the municipal presidency of
this place, which is going to be organized at the Monument Benito Juárez; it will march through
the principal streets and avenues in order, and will end with a rally at the same place it began.”38
Margarito Herrera enjoyed popular support from the organized labor wing of the PNR as
expressed in the union’s manifesto, which showed profound discontent with the candidacy of
José Quevedo: “The traditional masquerade that was held in the Pan-American last Sunday,
where authorities that are sustained by taxes paid by the citizens have conspired against social
interests to support a candidate repudiated by public opinion, a person who has no merits, and the
drawback of the support of his brother, the governor of the state, so that this is the right moment
to show with your participation in this great popular movement justified discontent at the
37
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perpetuation of government by a single family in the municipality, pretending through electoral
fraud to inherit political offices as if they were family fiefdoms.”39
The Cámara Sindical Obrera did not support Margarito Herrera publically during the
election process of 1935, perhaps due to the CSO’s reputation as radical stalwarts of labor ideals.
The other radical organizations in the city, such as the electricians, the Centro Agrícola, the
Cámara Sindical Unitaria, and the Bakers’ Unions, did not publically support Herrera either. This
lack of support illustrates the division between reformist organizations, and unions with
Communist connections, and the latter’s refusal to go along the National Communist Party
directive to enter into political alliances during the Popular Front era.
However, four years earlier, the CSO felt Mr. Herrera had the revolutionary credibility
needed for a municipal post, in this case the National Prosperity Committee: “According to the
agreement formalized at the meeting that was called through the initiative of the Cámara Sindical
Obrera regarding the municipal presidency, with the participation of the workers’ organization,
yourself, and representatives of this Institution, we have designated Mr. Margarito Herrera and
Arnulfo Vázquez as members of the Comité Permanente de Prosperidad Nacional, as soon as
you call its members for the inauguration meeting.”40
Herrera’s widespread support from the various allying forces present in Juárez quickly
felt violent repercussions from the Quevedo political machine. The following incident took place
in the barrio of the Chaveña and the official report has many inconsistencies, including blaming
members of the PSN for aggression towards some Quevedista supporters. The authorities
admitted that the Quevedistas acted violently as well. Regardless of who initiated the incident,
the report illustrates the level of violence that these elections generated, and demonstrates the
39
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police and local officials’ involvement in them. According to local officials, members of the
PNR gathered at the Chaveña to begin their demonstration, and after marching through the
streets, they ended their march at the Bellavista neighborhood. Moments later, a group of
approximately 150 people of the Partido Socialista del Norte attacked them with shotguns and
rocks. This version contradicts the PNR’s members’ testimony alleging Quevedistas shot first.
The report later adds that the PSN shot at the police, so they shot into the air and sent the PSN’s
members scattering.41
Local police arrested high-ranking members of the PSN in the struggle, which shows that
this protest included important individuals within the coalition against Quevedo. Later in the
letter, the police tried to minimize another attack in the same area. They also argued that
Herrera’s supporters murdered a member of the PSN, which seems unlikely since they belonged
to the same group.42 In light of the events publicized in the newspapers, this report seems
erroneous. Nevertheless, the repression by the Quevedos continued to escalate until its
culmination with assaults on the houses of Margarito Herrera and Guadalupe Díaz, the president
of the Socialist Party. In a letter to Mayor Quiroz, the Chihuahua City mayor and a known
radical, Manuel Dávila made an effort to set the record straight. He explained that the gunmen
were hired by José Quevedo. He added that the chief of the military denied Herrera and the PSN
protection without approval from the federal government. He ended the letter by warning Quiroz
that they would seek federal intervention because their lives were in danger.43
The radical wing of the Herrera coalition faced most of the violent repression. The news
of the Quevedo political machine’s intervention in the electoral process and the violence against
41
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the Socialists quickly reached Governor Quevedo officially, he distanced himself from his
brother (at least when it came to the paper trail) by deciding that his sibling’s actions did not
warrant a more energetic denunciation or action. The following letter, written by the secretary of
the state government, shows Quevedo’s effort to separate his administration from his brother’s
actions:
. . . the Secretary of the Interior in memo number 38290, First Section, From Ciudad
Juárez of that state, Second Table, Exp.2.311.M (6) 37, says the following:
From Ciudad Juárez, of that state, two messages were received from Mr. Roberto Calvillo
and Juan Garcia, stating that the authorities of that place have put them in prison for
being Herreristas. Due to this complaint, I would appreciate your initiating an
investigation and, if the facts presented are true, enforce the rights of these persons and
other citizens of that state in the present electoral struggle. I write this at the order of the
Governor . . .44
Only pressure from the federal government concerning the Quevedo clan’s actions in Juárez
forced Governor Quevedo to respond to the numerous voices arguing against the illegalities
occurring throughout the campaign: “Through a message addressed to the Presidency of the
Republic and given over to this Secretary, we are informed that Mr. Arturo R. Silva, from Cd.
Juárez, has been again put in jail, just for the reason of posting propaganda for the next
municipal elections of that state. - I am pleased to inform you of the latter and I ask you please to
give orders to the corresponding authorities of that federal entity with all dignity in your charge
to maintain absolute neutrality in the present electoral struggle.”45
Despite continuous protests, the violence did not cease. The clan often forced people to
flee Mexico, fearing for their safety. Some of Herrera’s supporters had to cross the border to
ensure their security as happened with known PSN members, Ramon Morfín and Justo Acosta,
44
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Impunity reigned on the border. So despite the many violent acts perpetrated by the Quevedo
political group throughout the election process, José Quevedo started his term without major
distractions or massive protests.
So on January 1, 1936, at 11:00 a.m., José Quevedo Jr. took the oath of office as the new
municipal president of Ciudad Juárez at the Alcazar cinema in front of a significant crowd. The
ceremony went without incidents despite the announcements of rival groups’ intentions to
disrupt the ceremony.47 The election of 1936, won by José Quevedo, displayed the degree of
power that the Quevedista political machine enjoyed in Juárez despite coalitions across class and
ideology that galvanized to defeat them. It also meant that workers’ political involvement was
met with violence and electoral fraud coming from the highest echelons of state and local
political power. These aggressions prevented federations and unions from engaging in actions
that worked more effectively, such as the use of direct action.
Political elites targeted main labor leaders with the hope that by taking a leader out, the
organization would follow, as happened with Electricians’ Union representative, Armando
Pórras who will be discussed in detail alter in this chapter; but he was not the only one. On
March 31, 1936, unknown assailants killed labor leader Manuel Pineda in the state’s capital.
Pineda was one of the original founders of the CSO in Chihuahua and in Ciudad Juárez and
associated with known Communists, including Pascual Padilla. At the time of the killing, Pineda
was the state’s secretary of the Cámara Nacional de Trabajo (National Labor’s Chamber), a labor
conglomerate closely associated with the federal government. The CSO removed Pineda from
the organization when he was accused of theft by the radical Sindicato de Carboneros (Coal
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Workers Union) in 1933, led by Padilla.48 He continued working with other labor organizations,
but he never returned to the ranks of the CSO or any other radical organization. Nevertheless, his
death resonated among most of the labor organizations in the state, including the CSO, which
protested his murder.49 Pineda supported the election of Talamantes, and he was shot by a
supporter of General Merino, Talamantes’ opponent for the governorship.50 Although Pineda’s
murder took place in the state’s capital, most of his organizational efforts, which included the
CSO’s founding, happened in Ciudad Juárez. The radical wing of the labor movement in Juárez
had already expelled Pineda three years prior to his death. Nevertheless, the murder of a highprofile labor leader inevitably created a climate of intimidation and fear throughout the entire
movement.
Moreover, political elites on the border specifically targeted leaders of known
Communist organizations. The Centro Agrícola and the Sin Trabajo (Unemployed Committee)
led by Pascual Padilla suffered the brunt of the repression. The following incident from 1932
effectively captures the Quevedos’ methods of dealing with workers, especially those with an
affinity for direct action. The Sin Trabajo organization formed by 1,500 unemployed workers in
the area, the majority of them longtime residents of Juárez, published a manifesto in the local
media in which they announced a ‘silent hunger’ demonstration. “After walking five blocks to go
to the municipal presidency, we were stopped by the police, who did not let the march continue
even though we had permission. The authorities violated Article 8 of the General Constitution of
the Republic by denying us the sacred right of petition, councilmen Baca Gallardo argued that
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we gave an ugly image to visitors. Later came the Chief of the Military garrison with a squad of
troops and proceeded to break up our demonstration.”51
The union showed that local officials violated the constitution in their actions against it
and proclaimed Article 8 as its justification for complaint. They also argued that neither machine
guns nor police batons would solve hunger. They called Quevedo’s operatives a caste of jackals
that wanted to prolong for an indefinite time the suffocating system “under which we live.”52 The
union called upon other organizations in the city for support, which shows their expectations
regarding the prevalent solidarity among workers during this period. Perhaps more notably, the
union’s mention of a “suffocating system” also reveals the degree to which class interest
influenced it and demonstrates workers’ awareness of a political and economic system based on
class. The repression did not end there, since weeks later Jesús Quevedo imprisoned the principal
leaders of the movement for fifteen days and imposed a fine of ninety pesos without any cause.53
Another incident at the mayor’s office on June 9, 1935, between municipal president and
known Quevedista, Dr. Quiroz, and the Unemployed Committee, illustrates the type of actions
that local officials engaged in to weaken radical workers’ influence.54 The committee was
comprised of local political, labor, and peasant groups, and was led by Pascual Padilla. At the
meeting, the group argued that they represented the “concerns of the working classes in this
area.”55 Trinidad Bustillos, secretary general of the Unemployed Committee, told the audience
that President Cárdenas had offered to send a commission to investigate the terrible conditions of
51
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workers in this region. Bustillos also distributed copies of the letters he exchanged with Cárdenas
to the audience. He continued with his speech when several policemen stormed the gathering,
pushing the audience away as they went after Bustillos to arrest him.
When workers demanded that the police free their leader, a mass action took place in
which “workers liberated him” from prison. During the struggle, police “drew their guns against
the audience.” Pedro Martínez, a member of the Centro Agrícola Industrial, was shot by the
police. Later that evening, the police also arrested another worker, Rafael Páramo, who was
brutally beaten. Workers manifested their indignation to the newspapers. They detailed the brutal
police response and detailed how the police threatened their lives if they continued with their
protests.56
However, the Quiroz administration blamed workers for inciting the violence. Workers
bitterly attested, “Naturally, they now say that it was our fellow workers who were the ones who
jumped on them.” The union added that in a “Socialist government,” workers should have legal
protections. Instead they were “answered with bullets.” They demanded the immediate liberation
of their “fellow workers” in order to bring justice.57
The widespread utilization of violence against these radical organizations resulted in
numerous shows of support. The Liga contra el Fachismo y la Guerra Imperialista (The League
against Fascism and Imperialist Wars) denounced the repression against the Unemployed
Committee by the police: “This organization (Unemployed Committee) has fought tenaciously
for the immediate and effective improvement of workers. It is precisely due to this reason that
they organized public meetings, seeking through this to EDUCATE the worker proletariat and
the peasants in their classist fight against capitalists, the everlasting exploiters of the humble
56
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classes.”58 The Liga claimed that the tactics and goals of the Unemployed Committee resulted in
a violent response from authorities once these actions seriously threatened their hold on political
power, which is precisely this study’s position. Finally, as mentioned in previous chapters, a
warrant for Padilla’s arrest arrived from the state of Jalisco. Quevedo’s appointed chief of police,
Jesús Chacón, suggested that the mayor could not ignore the warrant, and that its execution
would improve local and federal cooperation. The article explains that the warrant did not
contain any specifics regarding a crime; it only called for Padilla’s arrest without any details.
Padilla requested an injunction (amparo) to stop his arrest.59 Eventually, Padilla had to leave the
border or, as Chief Chacón announced in the local media, “face arrest for vagrancy and put him
to work to clean the streets.”60 Padilla returned to Juárez, or simply never left to form the new
Genuino Centro Agrícola Industrial after the original Centro Agricola, co-opted by local officials
in 1938, removed him from the organization. The CSO also expelled Padilla in 1940. Local
officials did not hesitate to arrest Padilla at least twenty times during the decade as well. The
fracture within the radical wing of organized labor evidenced by Padilla’s removal, illustrates the
degree of division among organized labor in the late 1930s. It was clear that the reformist wing
of the labor movements on the border wanted the radical unions weakened, including the CSO,
the Centro Agricola, and the Electricians’ Union.
Armando Pórras Murder
The aforementioned conflict between the Electricians’ Union and the Quevedos turned
lethal on July 9, 1938, when Juan Montes, a non-union employee of the power company in
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Ciudad Juárez, murdered the Electricians Union’s leader, Armando Pórras, outside his home.
Montes also shot Pórras’ wife, mother, and father, who later recovered from their injuries.
Pórras’ father recounted the dramatic killing: “Juan Montes got gradually closer, hiding behind
the power posts, but it was so sudden, got right next to Armando, said his name out loud, and
then shot him three times point blank.” 61 Immediately Pórras’ wife intervened to protect her
husband, and Montes said, “There is some for you too.”62 Juan Montes worked as a chauffeur for
the former mayor of Juárez, Jesús Quevedo (1932-1934), who also operated the electric company
at the time of the assassination. Pórras’ murder was the culmination of years of hostile
negotiations between the electrical union and the power company’s operators, one of whom was
Jesús Quevedo.
Pórras’ murder resonated throughout the nation. For example, the Electrician’s Union of
Ciudad Guzmán, in the state of Jalisco, wrote a letter to President Cárdenas detailing Pórras’
murder, “A member of the H. Sindicato de Obreros y Empleados de la Compañía Mexicana
Productora de Fuerza y Electricidad S. A., was brutally assassinated in Ciudad Juárez, at his
house, when three individuals suddenly shot our fellow worker Pórras, his parents, wife, and
children. Pórras died and the rest of his family members were injured.”63 The union also argued
that Jesús Quevedo and Domingo H. Tamez, the main stockholders of the company, were the
alleged masterminds of the crime since the murderers are their gunmen, and Pórras, organizer
and leader of the union, had become an obstacle with his firm resistance, which prevented the
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company from continuing “the exploitation of workers.” In their eyes, Pórras defended workers
against business owners.64
A newspaper article published in El Continental, illustrates the connections between the
gunmen and the Quevedo clan. It also goes into some detail regarding the motive for the murder
in an effort to exonerate Quevedo by creating the perception that the murder did not result from
political reasons, but from mere misunderstandings: “Salvador Sosa, arrested for the murder of
Pórras, told authorities that he is a member of the Electricians’ Union and that he was aware of
the problems between workers and the Company. Operators had expressed that they were no
longer able to cover payroll and that a readjustment was necessary. . . afterwards at the New
York bar, Sosa claims he saw Juan Montes, Javier Serrano and J. Hidalgo, who were talking
about the readjustment. Roberto Quevedo and José Ángeles were also there, and they bought
him a beer… He eventually said that he believed that the crime was the result of the enemies
Pórras had among other workers and employers of the power company.”65
The article also reveals that Roberto Quevedo was present in company of the eventual
killers, which further connects the Quevedo political machine with the murder. Pórras’ killing
exhibits the efficacy of the state’s strategy to weaken radical labor movements by co-opting,
exiling, or murdering certain labor leaders. For the Electricians’ union, the murder of their leader
had as a consequence a change in the leadership after elections shrouded in a climate of
intimidation and violence took place, which eventually negated the implementation of the
collective contract the union fought for ten years. The Electricians were not the only radical
organization co-opted by economic and political elites.
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The CSO’s Co-optation
After years of continuous violence and political persecution, on February 8, 1940, in a
“heated assembly,” one of the original founders of the CSO and Communist leader, Pascual
Padilla, was prohibited from making any statements in the CSO’s name, which basically meant
an outright expulsion from the organization.66 More notably, as had,	
  happened with the
Electricians Union, this meeting, shrouded by intimidation and violence in which Padilla was
removed, also brought about a change in the leadership structure of the CSO. In addition to
Padilla’s de facto expulsion, Secretary General Agustín C. Gonzales was removed alongside all
other union officials. Radical and Communist labor organizations, such as the Cámara Unitaria,
the Coal Workers’ Union, and the Libertad Bakers’ Union walked away from the meeting.67 In
fact, the new leader, Manuel Herrera, was the vice mayor prior to his appointment to head the
CSO. Herrera represented the conservative wing of the labor movement in Juárez,68 and he had
political connections with Governor Gustavo Talamantes; hence the initial reason for his
appointment as a high-ranking official in the local administration to begin with.
Political and economic elites resorted to violence against the most radical and militant
unions in the Ciudad Juárez region. The CSO endured a decade of violent attacks against it
before local political and economic elites had the ability to direct the union’s leadership. It took
ten years to dismantle this radical organization through outright violence, including murder,
persecution, false arrests, and electoral fraud. CSO’s widespread use of direct action, mass public
protests, and strikes exposed local officials’ lack of control over labor while at the same time
making the CSO a target. The CSO sought a continuous and significant presence in the
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community by engaging in continuous strikes, using the local courts successfully, and
establishing collective contracts, and were prominent during special celebrations, including
Independence Day, Worker’s Day, and the Revolution’s anniversary. The coverage this radical
union generated reached the top echelons of power, since the U.S. media and politicians
constantly reacted to the events in Juárez.69 Finally, CTM and former CSO labor leaders, like
Miguel Oaxaca, collaborated with the Mine, Mill, and Smelter union to organize workers in El
Paso.70 Organized labor’s actions on the border became a transnational affair as well, further
increasing their power and potential for radicalization.
The ability to protest and take to the streets needs highlighting. Kevin Middlebrook has
shown that political and economic elites have sought “to constrain the frequency and duration of
mass mobilizations and direct it through approved organizational CHANNELS AND LIMIT
MOBILIZATION activities to elite-defined political or economic objectives.”71 Elites on the
border utilized the aforementioned approved outlets in an effort to curtail labor militancy, but
violence was their primary weapon to undermine unions, like the Electricians’ Union, or
federations, like the CSO, as it forced a change in leadership.
The violence put a halt to these processes of class formation through cultural assertion
and direct action. This was especially true of the CSO and its Communist allies who had to hide
from authorities to avoid arrest. As a result, the CSO lost much of its influence in the
community. The continuous violence gradually inhibited the use of radical labor tactics to
generate pressure against businesses and authorities, including massive mobilizations.
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Furthermore, it interrupted the ongoing process of class formation by taking away one of its
primary weapons. Strikes, or even threats of strikes, were also met with violence, including
murder, as happened with Armando Pórras in 1938. Establishing a climate of terror curtailed the
activities that empowered workers the most.
As mentioned above, this hostile environment impacted the internal election processes of
certain unions as well. For example, continuous harassment in the form of false arrests and
threats of violence caused a decline in workers’ participation in the electoral processes of their
own organizations. In other instances, intimidation forced them to abstain from voting altogether,
or to vote for a different candidate, as happened with the Electricians’ Union and with the CSO.72
As a result of lower voter turnout and fraud, these tactics ensured that the resulting leadership
would eventually collaborate with Quevedismo, or other local officials. Furthermore, the events
of the 1930s demonstrate that violence, deportations, sensationalistic trials, arrests, and murder
halted transnational efforts to combine the movement on both sides of the border. The impunity
the Quevedistas’ enjoyed came to a political end with the removal of Mayor José Quevedo.
However, this apparent victory for organized labor in Juárez brought unforeseen consequences as
well.
José Quevedo’s Ousting and the Militarization of the Border
José Quevedo did not enjoy the support of Governor Talamantes in the municipal
elections of 1936, which exposed him to his countless adversaries. Once Governor Rodrigo
Quevedo’s term ended in 1936, the Quevedo political machine’s impressive ability to remain
above the law changed quickly. Their enemies around the state, including organized labor, held
many grievances against them and quickly pressured Governor Talamantes to act against the
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Quevedo group. However, for organized labor, Quevedo’s removal also came in the form of a de
facto military occupation of the border by federal forces which in turn curtailed most expressions
of militancy, including massive protests, walkouts, and strikes.
The first sign of problems for the Quevedos in Juárez came when Governor Talamantes
arrived in Ciudad Juárez at the beginning of March, 1937, and immediately criticized the
performance of the local administration: “They have done nothing to benefit the people, the
streets are dirty and dusty, the local slaughter house is a monopoly, the red light district has not
been removed from downtown, and the aldermen have not called on José Quevedo to do
something about it.”73 José Quevedo could not respond to these accusations, since he and his
allied aldermen mysteriously traveled to Mexico City before the Governor’s arrival.74
However, Quevedo realized that he needed to get back to the border and face his accusers
if he wanted to stay in power. On March 5, 1937, Quevedo returned to the city and quickly
denied the rumors about his resignation caused by his abrupt disappearance and that of his allied
aldermen: “There is no motive for deposing the entire municipal administration of Ciudad Juárez
since I sincerely believe that I as leader of the cooperative, as well as the councils and the rest of
the administration have fulfilled our duty as much as we could, have loyally cooperated with the
state government and have remained committed to improve the people.”75 Quevedos argument,
without his brother’s occupying the highest office in the state, did not carry any weight. On
March 19, 1937, a state judge responded to accusations of embezzlement against José Quevedo
by issuing a warrant for his arrest. Governor Talamantes also removed his chief of police and
named Quevedo’s eventual replacement, Captain Antero Torres, as the new chief. Furthermore,
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an audit on the municipality found many irregularities, including extraordinary amounts of
missing cash as well as scores of unpaid bills and loans.76
On March 26, 1937, the state legislature removed Quevedo from his elected position as
mayor of Ciudad Juárez. Quevedo used the courts to delay his removal, but only for a few days
because on March 31, 1937, the judge declared the action against him legal.77 Quevedo also tried
to persuade the federal military commander in the area to intervene, but to no avail. Capitan Juan
Felipe Rico did not interfere in the removal of Quevedo until the beginning of April when his
troops, under orders from Mexico City, began patrolling in Juárez after Quevedo clung to his
position: “José Quevedo refused to turn over his office, and it was not until Governor Talamantes
was reported to have had a personal conference with President Cárdenas that orders to the
garrison commander arrived from Mexico City to install Captain Torres, which was
accomplished on April 8.”78
The actions by the federal government, which for years had tried to weaken the political
Quevedista machine without much success, also served the purpose of undermining unions,
which depended on massive shows of public numbers and strikes. Thus, the presence of the army
on the streets significantly subverted their expressions of power in the community, since mere
presence of the military inherently prevented public manifestations.
As a result, the removal of José Quevedo in March of 1937, after years of continuous
illegal acts, came a bit late for organized labor. The constant acts of harassment and violence
weakened the labor movement significantly with the murder of their leaders, and their
movements co-opted by corrupt elections. The newspaper and archival evidence throughout the
1940s in Juárez suggests that unions and federations’ militancy and capacity for direct action
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gradually disappeared. This disappearance was aligned with the presence of the army on the
streets and the co-optation of the few radical unions present on the border. On the surface,
Quevedo’s removal appeared a victory for organized labor, but it really placed them into a
position where they were no longer able to use the streets for effective protest once the army
occupied them.
José Quevedo’s ousting also demonstrated that without the political support of his brother
in the governor’s office, the premature end of his tenure was inevitable. This explains the nature
of the politics of Chihuahua in which political connections and loyalties ruled the state. In
Chihuahua, powerful local elites trumped the federal government’s power, as evidenced by
Cárdenas’ fruitless efforts to stop Quevedo. This scenario was especially true if a particular
province had a strongman as governor, as was the case in Chihuahua.
Finally, although José Quevedo spent a few months in a United States prison charged
with fraud, he never served time in Mexico. His brother, Jesús, remained in the city to operate
the local power company and the rest of the family’s interests. His brother, Rodrigo, did not
experience any significant repercussions either, since he became chief commander of the
Guanajuato military zone, located in the central part of the nation, after his term as governor
ended. This shows that due to their political, economic, and military power, the Quevedos
enjoyed almost total impunity for their actions in Ciudad Juárez due to the historical power that
governors in Mexico had over their own provinces, sometimes at the expense of the federal
government.
The Quevedo clan’s eventual fall later in the 1930s from grace did not empower
organized labor, since by that time the level of violence had already established an environment
of fear, which slowly attenuated organized labor’s radicalness and reliance on direct action to
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such an extent that independent unions eventually disappeared from the city. Moreover, the way
the Quevedos dealt with organized labor, notwithstanding the fact that it cost his brother the
municipality of Juárez, showed future local political and economic elites that violence, in many
forms, could effectively neutralize the advancement of workers and communities. Despite Jose
Quevedo’s removal, the environment of fear remained.
Jose Borunda’s Murder and its Relation to Labor
Juárez Mayor José Borunda’s murder in April, 1938, after he spent less than three months
in office, illustrates the increasingly common use of violence to get rid of local officials in Juárez
who sided with labor. Borunda supported workers in his electoral campaign. As Charles
Hershberger noted, “José Borunda was the darling of the local labor unions, another important
factor for an ambitious Mexican politician living in the Lazaro Cárdenas era.”79 Borunda
replaced General Rico, who briefly assumed Jesús Quevedo’s position after the latter’s removal
from office in 1937 by incoming Governor Luis Talamantes in an intra-elite conflict. Quevedo
was removed only a couple of months before completing his term. Local newspapers covered the
murder effectively since they followed the police investigation throughout the entire process.
Municipal President José Borunda was killed on the 1st of April; a bomb inside a box ended his
life and that of worker Domingo Barraza.80
The following article in the Continental newspaper in El Paso, Texas, summarizes
Borunda’s short stint as mayor of Juárez: “Jose Borunda was 38 years old and had been mayor
for exactly 90 days before being murdered last Friday when he opened a mysterious package
received hours before, which functioned with mathematical precision, also killing Chief of
79
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Janitors Domingo Barraza.” Barraza did not belong to any union; he was simply at the wrong
place at the wrong time. The use of a bomb to kill a local official demonstrates the sophisticated
level of violence adversaries utilized to get rid of their enemies in Juárez.
Borunda’s murder coverage in the local newspapers evolved as the month progressed.
Initially, the local police accused Alfredo Aziz, a former official of the Quevedista regime in
Juárez and a close friend and political associate of the Quevedo clan, of the crime after
Borunda’s secretary claimed Aziz gave the package containing the dynamite to him early in the
day so that he could give it to Borunda. This accusation seemed plausible since the Quevedo
political machine did not support Borunda in his election for mayor of Juárez, and because the
clan frequently resorted to violence to resolve conflicts throughout the decade. Ex-governor
Rodrigo Quevedo denied any involvement.82 The former mayor of Juarez, José Quevedo,
remained in prison accused of fraud at La Tuna, New Mexico, during the time of the murder and
also denied any connection.
The following report by the U.S. Consulate described the animosity between the different
political forces participating in the election for mayor of Juárez in 1938. It came months before
the murder and the eventual removal of José Quevedo. “The final phases of the fight between the
Talamantes and Quevedo factions seem to have been concentrated in the campaign of the
Borunda-Escobar ticket against the Rodrigues-Mares ticket. The first is being backed by present
Governor Talamantes and the second by ex-Governor Quevedo.”83 The report confirms that the
Quevedos’ did not support Borunda in his run for mayor.
As it turned out, within two weeks, the municipal office secretary under Borunda, Efren
Escobar, confessed to the crime and exonerated Aziz from any connection with the murder. The
81
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change of testimony on the part of Escobar convolutes the entire situation. Once he confessed,
local authorities provided a plausible motive for the murder. Apparently, Borunda and Escobar
had some business ventures together connected to mining that went awry, and thus, Escobar
killed him. This explanation seemed unlikely: this so called ‘business venture’ happened years
before, and more importantly, Borunda had picked Escobar as his running mate.84
Regardless of the real motive or culprit behind Borunda’s murder, the blatant use of
violence against certain individuals or groups in the city, usually those associated with pro-labor
positions, came from the top echelons of local and state-wide political power. This allowed
political and economic elites to stop pro-labor initiatives and gains in this area by establishing an
environment of fear. Local political and economic elites’ use of murder to resolve conflicts
shows the severity that these labor-related conflicts reached. We can only imagine the
transgressions that did not make the headlines because the victims were not high-profile labor
leaders or city mayors. These actions established a legacy of violence in Juárez that still affects
the city today.
Conclusion
Organized labor’s political alliances on the border and in the mining region differed
dramatically when compared to each other. In the mining region, unions and federations never
questioned the place of ASARCO at the top of the existing economic hierarchies, nor the role of
political elites as stalwarts of labor’s well-being. They did, however, rely on direct action
extensively and exhibited at various times other forms of radicalism, including widespread
unionization, collective bargaining, and class solidarity across trade and skill. As a result of the
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limits placed on their radicalism, federations did not suffer any type of violence against their
organizing efforts, which allowed them to operate freely and achieve important concessions
rarely seen among workers. Their solidarity had limits. They supported the Quevedos regime
even when it was harming and even killing trade unionists in another community. In Juárez,
things played out differently. Local authorities’ economic and political interests directly
contravened those of workers. From the start of the 1930s, local officials made sure unions and
federations did not have any influence in local politics, as “securing political control had proven
crucial for the Quevedos being able to dominate the Juarez drug trade.”85 They achieved this
through the use of violence and electoral fraud, which in turn affected workers’ ability to act in
radical ways.
This difference resulted also from state and national politics. In the mining region, unions
and federations utilized post-revolutionary nationalism to attack foreign-owned ASARCO, which
made the giant smelter an easy target in the radical nationalist post-revolutionary years.
Additionally, Quevedo wholeheartedly supported the Cárdenas administration in their process of
empowering workers in the mining region, especially during the administrations of his political
allies, Gabriel Chávez and Chacón Baca. He also sided with workers in most strikes, collective
bargaining disputes, and price regulation efforts. In other words, perhaps, it seems likely that
Governor Quevedo acted the way he did in the mining region so that he could build enough
political capital with federal authorities to get away with his anti-labor policies against workers
in Juárez.
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CONCLUSION
The Revolution increased workers’ power in the communities under study. In an effort to
attenuate this power, which would have eventually threatened their ability to govern, political
elites put in place hegemonic processes that provided workers with access to certain spheres of
power in exchange for labor peace. In Ciudad Juárez and the Hidalgo Mining District, local elites
had to make significant concessions to workers. Workers readily took advantage of the legal
mechanisms established by the revolution to articulate long sought out popular demands, such as
unionization, the ability to strike, collective bargaining, and the use of conciliatory courts. In the
mining district, workers threatened political elites’ hold on power going back to the 1920s,
preventing capital owners from ignoring collective contracts, which gave workers a degree of
control in the workplace. As a result of workers’ increasing influence, local political elites
supported workers to shield their own vulnerability, although this situation gradually changed
once political elites cemented their mandate. At the same time, workers’ ties with the dominant
class undermined the potential for further radicalization. Workers’ continuous victories in the
courts, which gave them a de facto control of the workplace, prevented them from pushing
further. Although counterintuitive, the success enjoyed in the workplace, the community, and the
courts curtailed their ambition to change power structures and take hold of the revolution. Thus,
miners in the mining district missed an historical opportunity to transform their legacy.
On the border, workers radicalized their movement. Interestingly enough, this
radicalization began in earnest once political elites responded with violence to workers’ demands

190	
  

to merely uphold the law. Although workers in Juárez also increased their power during the
1930s through collective contracts and continuous court victories, political elites use of violence
slowly undermined workers’ power. They achieved this by co-opting the most radical unions and
federations through coercive methods starting in the late 1930s and continuing into the 1940s.
The study of the Hidalgo mining district and Ciudad Juárez demonstrates that workers
increasing influence began in the1920s and matured in the1930s. This study argues that this
power resulted from the high levels of unity and the willingness to use direct action that workers
demonstrated. Nevertheless, shrewd politicians utilized this momentum to curtail further
advancement in a risky move that eventually succeeded. On the border, political elites made the
decision to confront workers head on, even if it meant violating the rule of law, once their
economic and political interests were threatened by workers’ increasing power.
President Lázaro Cárdenas made timid efforts to stop Quevedo in Juárez, perhaps due to
his own fragile hold on power, and the importance of the mining industry in the Mexican
economy. Once Quevedo proved a staunch labor protector in the district, and a fierce antiCatholic, as well as a supporter of Cárdenas’ educational policies, he was able to have a carte
blanche in Juárez. The border situation also exposed the limits of solidarity that miners displayed
towards their border counterparts.
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